COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Malveaux, Chaney and White UNPUBLISHED
Argued at Lexington, Virginia
DOUGLAS DALE GINDLESBERGER MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY v. Record No. 0817-24-3 KIMBERLEY SLAYTON WHITE AUGUST 12, 2025 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PITTSYLVANIA COUNTY Stacey W. Moreau, Judge
Jason S. Eisner for appellant.
Sheri H. Kelly, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Douglas Gindlesberger was convicted in a bench trial of assaulting and battering a law-
enforcement officer, assaulting and battering a family member, and obstructing justice. His three
assignments of error challenge the sufficiency of the evidence for each conviction. Applying the
deferential standard of review and thus finding sufficient evidence to support these convictions, we
affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
In September 2023, 17-year-old K.G.1 lived with her grandmother Lori Wasden, who was
her legal guardian, in Wasden’s Pittsylvania County home. With K.G. and Wasden lived K.G.’s
brother and K.G.’s boyfriend (“the boyfriend”).
* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A). 1 We identify this party by her initials to afford her privacy. On the night of September 20, Gindlesberger visited his daughter K.G. at Wasden’s
home. Gindlesberger had recently moved to Virginia from California. Gindlesberger, K.G., the
boyfriend, the brother, and the boyfriend’s sister (“the sister”) were “chilling” in K.G.’s
bedroom. When a “conversation got brought up,” things “got out of hand, almost immediately,”
according to K.G. She testified that the disagreement “got loud,” prompting her to tell
Gindlesberger “we’re done” and to begin pushing him out of her bedroom. She told the court
that Gindlesberger then pushed her back “in return.”
As a result of the disagreement, Deputy Jerry Overstreet of the Pittsylvania County
Sheriff’s Office responded to a domestic disturbance call from Wasden’s home. He wore his
police uniform and displayed his badge. When he arrived, Overstreet saw K.G. in the driveway
speaking with Deputy Joseph Eanes. K.G. was crying; she told Overstreet that Gindlesberger
had assaulted her, the boyfriend, the sister, and Wasden. When asked where Gindlesberger was
located, K.G. said that after she had locked him out of the house, he had reentered the house by
going through the garage. She said that she then left the house when the officers arrived, at
which point Gindlesberger had locked her out.
Deputies Overstreet and Eanes approached the front door of the house and spoke to
Gindlesberger through the door. Overstreet testified that Gindlesberger told him that “he didn’t
want to talk to the police” and “wasn’t going to open the door for” the officers. However,
Wasden, the homeowner, gave them permission to enter the house.
Overstreet and Eanes testified that when Overstreet tried to step into the house,
Gindlesberger began to shut the door on him. Consequently, Overstreet forced open the door so
that he could assess the condition of the boyfriend and the sister and told Gindlesberger to get
out of his way. Overstreet testified that “[a]t that point” Gindlesberger “bum-rushed and
shoved” him with both hands, knocking Overstreet’s body camera off of him. Overstreet
-2- observed blood coming from open wounds on Gindlesberger’s hands that left “a handprint of
blood” on his uniform after Gindlesberger shoved him.
Eanes stood behind Overstreet during the conversation at the front door. He testified that
Overstreet, having “re-opened” the front door as Gindlesberger started closing it, “came back
towards” him suddenly. He saw Gindlesberger’s “hand come up” toward Overstreet, though he
did not see “exactly where on [Overstreet’s] body [Gindlesberger] touched at.”
Overstreet and Eanes began to arrest Gindlesberger. Eanes grabbed one arm while
Overstreet grabbed the other, but Gindlesberger “somewhat tried to pull away from” them. The
officers were trying to “get cuffs on to detain him,” a process that Eanes approximates lasted for
at least 30 seconds.
Earlier, while Overstreet and Eanes were speaking to Gindlesberger from the porch, a
third officer, Deputy Larry Crews, arrived on scene wearing his body camera. The six-and-a-
half-minute video and audio of Officer Crews’ body camera were admitted into evidence. The
footage opened with Overstreet, Eanes, and K.G. standing on the porch facing the open front
door while Gindlesberger stood just inside facing the officers. Wasden was standing near him
inside the house. Gindlesberger refused to allow the officers into the house, saying “you’re not
welcome in here.” He told Overstreet, “My daughter is getting [expletive] raped.”2
Gindlesberger then pointed upstairs to K.G.’s bedroom and told the officers that the boyfriend
was an “adult” and K.G. was not. He gestured to Wasden and said, “My mom is suffering from
dementia.” He explained that he just moved “out here” from California and that his daughter,
K.G., “is being allowed to live in here with her boyfriend, who is over nineteen years old. . . .
2 The trial court sustained Gindlesberger’s objection that “statements from third parties on the video” not be admitted, but the court allowed “[s]tatements from the defendant in response to others” to be admitted. Consequently, we do not include statements by the officers, K.G., or Wasden in this summation of the body camera footage. -3- That’s against the law. Period. That’s rape.” He told the officers that Wasden was not “of the
right mind” to deal with the situation; the boyfriend “comes in here and . . . act[s] like he owns
this property and my daughter.”
The footage continues, and in reply to a question by an officer, Gindlesberger replied that
the boyfriend was “upstairs right now. He’s hiding up in there.” Gindlesberger then called
upstairs for the boyfriend to “come down here.”
The officers continued to stand on the porch holding open the front screen door.
Gindlesberger told Overstreet that he was not allowed inside and denied that the officer was
given permission to enter. Though asked to move away from the door and further into the home,
Gindlesberger grabbed the main front door and started to close it, telling the officers, “Do not
enter this home. I’m telling you right now you’re not allowed in this home.” As he began to
fully close the door, one of the officers warned him not to do so.
Overstreet put one foot into the house. Gindlesberger yelled to “get out of the house
now.” Gindlesberger asked for Overstreet’s badge number as Overstreet demanded that he move
out of his way and step back. Gindlesberger refused, saying, “No, what’s your badge number,”
and Overstreet responded that this was the last time he will tell him to move. At this point,
Eanes was behind Overstreet and blocked the view of Crews’ camera. But Overstreet was heard
telling Gindlesberger to put his hands behind his back and was seen to move suddenly backwards
into Eanes while Gindlesberger went up to Overstreet with his hands raised. Overstreet then
pushed Gindlesberger by the chest further into the house. Overstreet and Eanes grabbed his
shoulders and started to try to handcuff him. But Gindlesberger refused to put his hands behind
his back as ordered, pressing his fists together in front of his chest. Officer Crews joined the
struggle as Gindlesberger continued his refusal to put his hands behind his back and continued to
argue with the officers.
-4- A fourth officer arrived as Overstreet and Eanes were still struggling to get
Gindlesberger’s hands behind him and to finish the handcuffing. Gindlesberger said, “You
gonna try to twist my finger you [expletives]? Get out of the house now.” A fifth officer arrived
and joined Overstreet and Eanes in their ongoing struggle to handcuff Gindlesberger.
Gindlesberger told them, “Cops, you need to leave now. Get the [expletive] out of here before
you get hurt.” More than two minutes after the initial order to put his hands behind his back,
Officer Crews’ body camera footage shows Gindlesberger still resisting the efforts of three
officers to handcuff him. As an officer started to lead him toward the door and outside, he
continued cursing and resisting and fell to the ground before finally being led out of the door.
The footage ends.
Gindlesberger testified in his defense. He stated that K.G. told him that she was calling
the police as a result of the disagreement in the bedroom. He testified that when Eanes arrived
and asked to speak to K.G. and the boyfriend, Gindlesberger said, “okay that’s fine,” and “one
by one” went upstairs to get everyone to come down, but K.G. interfered.
He further testified that Wasden owned the house and admitted that she authorized the
officers to enter, though he “didn’t think it was necessary.” He claimed that he was concerned
about Wasden’s authorization due to what he alleged to be her dementia.
Gindlesberger testified that he did not “strike” or “hit” Overstreet. He stated that he
“didn’t put hands on [Overstreet] to shove him back.” Gindlesberger testified that he was “being
bombarded with people” and was “just trying to state that legally they didn’t have the right to be
doing that,” and, further, that he had been cooperating with “all the other officers.” He denied
putting his hands on Overstreet prior to the commencement of the arrest. He admitted his hand
was bleeding at the time and that “that’s where the blood on [Overstreet’s] uniform came from.”
-5- But he stated that, as “an auto mechanic, I have lots of cuts. A scab was knocked off of my
wrist, in that frenzy.” He said, “It wasn’t from breaking into a house or breaking anything else.”
On cross-examination, Gindlesberger admitted that his hands touched Overstreet’s chest
and that this contact with Overstreet was “the first thing that happened” when the officer entered
the home. He stated that the reason he did not want the officers inside the house was because he
was “fully cooperating” and the “dispute was being held outside.”
At the close of the Commonwealth’s evidence, Gindlesberger moved to strike all three
charges. The court denied his motion to strike.
The trial court stated that it was a “shame” that Gindlesberger had refused admission to
the officers because all he “had to do [wa]s let the officers in” to check on the boyfriend and the
sister. The court found that Gindlesberger had “no right to push [K.G.] back” because she was
not an aggressor and was trying to remove him from the increasingly hostile conversation in the
bedroom. The court found that Overstreet did not enter the home until Wasden gave him
permission to come in. Despite due authorization to enter, as Overstreet went in, Gindlesberger
“pushed” him, as shown by the testimony about the bloody handprint on Overstreet’s uniform
and the detachment of his body cam, which Officer Crews can be seen picking up from the floor
in the admitted footage. Gindlesberger “had no right to push” Overstreet as he proceeded with
his investigation and “struggl[ed]” with the officers as they were arresting him, “definitely not
cooperating.” Accordingly, the court denied Gindlesberger’s renewed motion to strike and found
him guilty of the offenses of assault and battery of a police officer, assault and battery of a
family member, and obstruction of justice. He was given an active sentence of seven months.
ANALYSIS
Gindlesberger challenges the sufficiency of the evidence used to convict him of the three
offenses. “When presented with a sufficiency challenge on appeal, we review the evidence in
-6- the ‘light most favorable’ to the Commonwealth.” Bowman v. Commonwealth, 290 Va. 492, 494
(2015) (quoting Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 514 (2003)). “Viewing the record
through this evidentiary prism requires us to ‘discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with
that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the
Commonwealth and all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom.’” Id. (quoting Kelley v.
Commonwealth, 289 Va. 463, 467-68 (2015)). “In a criminal case appealed on sufficiency of the
evidence grounds,” we do not ask ‘“whether [we] believe[] that the evidence at the trial
established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt’”; rather, we ask whether ‘“any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’”
Commonwealth v. Moseley, 293 Va. 455, 462-63 (2017) (quoting Williams v. Commonwealth,
278 Va. 190, 193 (2009)). The trial court’s “judgment is presumed correct and will not be
disturbed unless it is ‘plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.’” Id. at 463 (quoting Code
§ 8.01-680). This presumption applies with the same force in a bench trial as in a jury trial. Id.
(quoting Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 249 (2016)).
On appeal, the trial court’s findings of fact “will not be disturbed unless plainly wrong or
without evidence to support” them. Commonwealth v. Holland, ___ Va. ___, ___ (Jan. 16, 2025)
(quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 503, 512 (1999)). Additionally, “in reviewing a
defendant’s claim that a trial court unreasonably rejected h[is] hypothesis of innocence,” we
recognize that whether ‘“an alternative hypothesis of innocence is reasonable is a question of
fact’” that binds us on appeal ‘“unless plainly wrong.’” Maust v. Commonwealth, 77 Va. App.
687, 700 (2023) (quoting Wood v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 286, 306 (2010)).
A. Assault and Battery of a Police Officer
Gindlesberger contends that the evidence is not sufficient to convict him of assault and
battery of Deputy Overstreet. He asserts that his contact with Overstreet can be “reasonably
-7- interpreted as incidental contact resulting from an unanticipated use of force” by the officer in
arresting him. He states that his hands made only incidental contact with Overstreet’s chest, and
only after Overstreet had “forced” his way into the house. Gindlesberger denies shoving
Overstreet. Having allegedly “made clear” to the officers that he was trying to bring the
boyfriend and the sister out to them, Gindlesberger argues that he was merely “exercising his
perceived right to keep them out of his residence.”
Code § 18.2-57(C) defines assault and battery of a police officer as “an assault and
battery against another knowing or having reason to know that such other person is . . . a law-
enforcement officer” who is “engaged in the performance of his public duties anywhere in the
Commonwealth.” See also Code § 18.2-57(H) (defining a law-enforcement officer as “any full-
time or part-time employee of a police department or sheriff’s office . . . who is responsible for
the prevention or detection of crime and the enforcement of the penal . . . laws of the
Commonwealth”). When the defendant does not contest that he knew the victim to be a law-
enforcement officer, “the sole issue before us is whether the evidence supports the circuit court’s
determination that [the defendant] committed an assault and battery on” the officer. Montague v.
Commonwealth, 278 Va. 532, 540 (2009).
“Assault and battery are common law crimes.” Id. at 541. Though distinct criminal acts,
they are linked under the statute, and the Commonwealth can prove the complete assault-and-
battery crime “by proving a battery.” Blankenship v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 608, 620
(2020) (citing Parish v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 324, 329 (2010)). “Because the statute
does not define battery, we examine the common law definition.” Lopez v. Commonwealth, 73
Va. App. 70, 83 (2021) (citing Parish, 56 Va. App. at 329).
The common law defines battery as the willful or unlawful touching of another. Yellock
v. Commonwealth, 79 Va. App. 627, 641 (2024) (quoting Parish, 56 Va. App. at 330). The
-8- actor’s unlawful intent determines whether a touching rises to battery and is a question of fact for
the factfinder. Id. (first quoting Parish, 56 Va. App. at 330; and then quoting Cornell v.
Commonwealth, 76 Va. App. 17, 29 (2022)). Unlawful intent exists if the touching is an
“objectively offensive or forcible contact with the victim’s person resulting in some
manifestation of a physical consequence or corporeal hurt,” Lopez, 73 Va. App. at 84 (quoting
Adams v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 463, 468 (2000)), or done in a “rude, insolent, or angry
manner,” Yellock, 79 Va. App. at 641 (quoting Kelley v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 617, 628
(2019)). Unlawful intent “may often be gathered from the conduct of the aggressor, viewed in
the light of the attending circumstances.” Parish, 56 Va. App. at 331 (quoting Wood v.
Commonwealth, 149 Va. 401, 405 (1927)). For example, a person who shoves the victim in the
chest and causes the victim to fall has committed an objectively offensive touching. Lopez, 73
Va. App. at 84.
Here, Gindlesberger testified that he knew that Overstreet, who was wearing his uniform,
was a police officer. He also testified that K.G. had told him that she was calling the police,
putting him on alert that officers might soon be on scene. Thus, Gindlesberger knew or had
reason to know that Overstreet was an officer.
Additionally, we accept the trial court’s findings that Wasden gave permission for the
officers to enter the house but that Gindlesberger nonetheless “pushed” Overstreet as the latter
tried to enter the home. These findings of fact are entitled to our deference because they have
support in the record. Overstreet testified that Gindlesberger shoved him. Eanes testified that,
standing behind Overstreet, he saw Gindlesberger’s arms come up towards Overstreet at the
same time that Overstreet came backward towards Eanes, providing circumstantial evidence of
Gindlesberger’s shove. Crews’ body camera footage also shows what Eanes described. In light
of this evidence, the trial court did not clearly err in rejecting Gindlesberger’s story that he
-9- accidentally touched Overstreet following the officer’s forcible entry into the house. The court’s
finding that Gindlesberger intentionally shoved Overstreet is supported by evidence and not
plainly erroneous.
Finally, the shove was objectively offensive because it caused Overstreet to stumble
backwards into Eanes, imparted two bloody handprints onto Overstreet’s uniform, and knocked
Overstreet’s body camera off of him. These were three physical consequences of the shove.
Moreover, the circumstances surrounding the shove show that Gindlesberger stood obstinately at
the door and for an extended period of time, refusing to let Overstreet inside to check on the
boyfriend and the sister, despite the homeowner’s authorization. The circumstances before and
after the shove demonstrate that Gindlesberger was angry and uncooperative with the officers’
lawful efforts to ascertain whether the boyfriend and the sister were safe. The evidence supports
the finding that Gindlesberger shoved Overstreet with the requisite intent while knowing that he
was an officer engaged in his public duties. Thus, the evidence is sufficient for a conviction on
this offense.
B. Assault and Battery of a Family Member
Gindlesberger argues that he should not have been convicted of assault and battery of
K.G. due to the undisputed facts “establish[ing] self-defense as a matter of law.” He notes that
K.G. testified that she pushed Gindlesberger first. He contends that his pushing her back did not
entail “any more force” than what was necessary to repel K.G.’s initial aggression.
Code § 18.2-57.2(A) defines the crime of assault and battery against a family or
household member. Again, as the statute does not define battery, we turn to the common law.
See Marshall v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 648, 655 (2019) (citing Carter v. Commonwealth,
269 Va. 44, 46 (2005)). “An intentional touching qualifies as a battery unless the actor has some
legal justification or excuse.” Woodson v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 685, 694 (2022).
- 10 - Gindlesberger pleads that in pushing K.G., he acted in self-defense. Self-defense is
ordinarily a question of fact. Colas v. Tyree, 302 Va. 17, 29 (2023) (noting that defense of others
is commensurate with self-defense and that defense of others is “ordinarily a question of fact”).
“In Virginia, self-defense includes both subjective and objective components. The defendant
‘must have believed and must have had reasonable ground to believe, at the time [he acted],
that he was in . . . danger.’” See id. (alterations in original) (quoting Perkins v. Commonwealth,
186 Va. 867, 877 (1947)).
Self-defense must be in response to a criminal act of violence by another. See Bell v.
Commonwealth, 66 Va. App. 479, 487 (2016). Self-defense may be either justified, meaning the
defendant was without fault “in provoking or bringing on the difficulty,” or excused, meaning
that the defendant was at fault in bringing about the difficulty but he retreated “as far as
possible,” announced his “desire for peace,” and only committed the act for which he pleads self-
defense “from a reasonably apparent necessity to preserve his own life or save himself from
great bodily harm.” Id. (citations omitted).
Sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that Gindlesberger battered his
daughter without justification or excuse. The trial court credited the testimony of K.G., who
asserted that she, her brother, the boyfriend, the sister, and Gindlesberger were in her room
“chilling out” until the conversation “got out of hand” and she “pushed” Gindlesberger out. The
court found that Gindlesberger then “push[ed] her back,” which he had “no right” to do since
K.G. was not “an aggressor” and was trying to “remove” Gindlesberger from a conversation that
was getting out of hand. The testimony establishes that Gindlesberger was visiting K.G. at her
residence—the home of Wasden, her legal guardian—and that the conversation took place in her
bedroom there. Gindlesberger was not a resident of the home and was simply visiting K.G.
Moreover, Officer Crews’ body camera footage demonstrates that Gindlesberger was angry at
- 11 - the presence of the boyfriend in the house. K.G. testified that she tried to “defer” the escalating
conflict in the bedroom and that she pushed him “once things got loud” and after she told him
that “we’re done.” Based on these facts, the trial court’s finding that Gindlesberger shoved his
daughter, K.G., prior to the arrival of the officers is not plainly erroneous.
Additionally, the trial court’s conclusion that Gindlesberger did not have the right to push
K.G. back is correct. Gindlesberger was in her bedroom and ignored K.G.’s efforts to remove
him from the situation when things began to get out of hand. Her action was not a criminal act
of violence because she had the right to insist that he leave her bedroom, especially since he was
contributing to conflict while inside of it.
Even if K.G.’s initial push was a criminal act, Gindlesberger’s responsive shove is not
justified or excused under self-defense. He was at least slightly at fault because he was a cause
of the rising tension in the bedroom conversation. Thus, he was at least partially to blame for
“provoking or bringing on the difficulty,” see Bell, 66 Va. at 487, so his act is not justified. Nor
is his act excused, since under excusable self-defense he had a duty to retreat as far as possible,
to announce his peaceable desires, and to both believe and have reasonable grounds to believe
that he was in danger from K.G. See id.; Colas, 302 Va. at 29. But the testimony does not
establish that he retreated once K.G. tried to remove him from her room, which he could have
done. Nor did he announce any peaceable intentions. His later conduct after the officers arrived,
especially his anger at the boyfriend, suggests the opposite. And he did not have reasonable
grounds to assume that K.G. was putting him in danger. He simply should have left the room.
Accordingly, the trial court’s implicit finding against self-defense is supported by evidence. We
affirm the conviction.
- 12 - C. Obstruction of Justice
Gindlesberger contends that his conviction for obstruction of justice is error because he
was trying to help the officers and did not impair their investigation. He asserts that he was
“trying to assist the officers’ demands by bringing out any witnesses they would care to
question.” Gindlesberger also argues that he had “at minimum a perceived right to keep [the
officers] out of his residence.” He states that he had a right to deny the police entry since a
homeowner may deny entry to an officer who lacks a warrant or, alternatively, that he “had no
reason to believe that the officers had been authorized to make entry into his residence.” He
asserts that Maldonado v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 554 (2019), controls.
Obstruction of justice occurs when someone, “by threats or force, knowingly attempts to
intimidate or impede . . . any law-enforcement officer, . . . lawfully engaged in his duties as
such.” Code § 18.2-460(B). The two elements of the offense are knowingly attempting to
impede an officer and using threats or force. Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 176, 196
(2018). The intent requirement is the “intent to impede a police officer in the performance of his
duties” and may be proven by the defendant’s “statements or conduct.” Id. (quoting Woodson v.
Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 787, 795 (1992)). The force requirement is the use of “[p]ower,
violence, or pressure directed against a person or thing.” Id. (alteration in original) (citation
omitted).
Here, there is abundant evidence to support Gindlesberger’s conviction for obstructing
the officers. His reliance on Maldonado is misplaced because there, the court declined to extend
the offense of obstruction to a homeowner’s “refus[al] to admit law enforcement officers who
lack either an arrest warrant or search warrant to one’s home to further an investigation.” 70
Va. App. at 566. Gindlesberger is not the homeowner; the police obtained the true homeowner’s
consent to enter the home. He further relies on Maldonado to argue that “actions that merely
- 13 - frustrate a police officer’s investigation, but do not ‘oppose, impede, or resist’ an officer’s lawful
efforts to conduct an investigation, do not constitute obstruction of justice as contemplated
by Code § 18.2-460(A).” Id. at 569-70 (citing Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 428,
431 (1998)). But Maldonado concerned a different subsection of the obstruction of justice
statute. Id. (analyzing Code § 18.2-460(A)). Consequently, its analysis of what it means to
“oppose, impede, or resist” does not apply to the present case.
Here, Gindlesberger’s statement that he was trying to assist the officers in their
investigation is contradicted by the same testimony and by the camera footage. The trial court
was not plainly wrong in rejecting Gindlesberger’s proffered theory of innocence in which he
argues that he was assisting the officers in their investigation. He was not. And, as explained
above, we must accept as true the trial court’s finding that Gindlesberger shoved Overstreet as
the officer tried to enter. Gindlesberger’s battery clearly shows his intent to impede Officer
Overstreet and his use of force in doing so. We thus find sufficient evidence to support his
conviction on the obstruction of justice charge and affirm.
CONCLUSION
For the above-stated reasons, we affirm Gindlesberger’s convictions for assault and
battery of a police officer, assault and battery of a family member, and obstruction of justice.
Affirmed.
- 14 -