Douglas, Angela v. ADIENT USA, LLC

2018 TN WC 187
CourtTennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims
DecidedNovember 21, 2018
Docket2018-05-0914
StatusPublished

This text of 2018 TN WC 187 (Douglas, Angela v. ADIENT USA, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Tennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Douglas, Angela v. ADIENT USA, LLC, 2018 TN WC 187 (Tenn. Super. Ct. 2018).

Opinion

FILED Nov 21, 2018 10:38 AM(CT) TENNESSEE COURT OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION CLAIMS

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION IN THE COURT OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS AT MURFREESBORO

ANGELA DOUGLAS, ) Docket No. 2018-05-0914 Employee, ) v. ) ) ADIENT USA, LLC, ) State File No. 66160-2017 Employer, ) And ) ) OLD REPUBLIC INS. CO., ) Judge Dale Tipps Carrier. )

EXPEDITED HEARING ORDER DENYING REQUESTED BENEFITS

This matter came before the Court on November 14, 2018, for an Expedited Hearing focusing on Ms. Douglas’s entitlement to medical benefits. The central legal issues are whether Ms. Douglas’s claim is barred by failure to give proper notice and, if not, whether she is likely to establish at a hearing on the merits that her injury arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of her employment. For the reasons below, the Court holds Ms. Douglas is not entitled to the requested benefits at this time.

History of Claim

Ms. Douglas testified that she suffered a left-knee injury while working for Adient. She was initially unsure about the exact date of injury but later determined that it occurred on July 24, 2017, the same day Adient had a visitor from Nissan, for whom Adient built car seats. Ms. Douglas described working at two stations that were just a few steps apart. As she turned to go from one station to the other, she felt a pop in her left knee. This caused her to step off the line for a few moments, but she returned to work and finished her shift. When, Ms. Douglas returned to work the next week, her knee was painful and swollen. She began icing it in Adient’s first aid station during her work breaks.

1 Ms. Douglas had an annual medical checkup on August 21 with her personal physician, Dr. Dana Chandler. Dr. Chandler noted an approximately three-week history of sharp and severe left knee pain. Ms. Douglas reported difficulty with stairs and said her knee would “give out” at times. Although Ms. Douglas testified that she told Dr. Chandler about injuring her knee at work, Dr. Chandler noted “no overt trauma.” Dr. Chandler ordered x-rays and prescribed Prednisone.

The next day, Ms. Douglas reported the injury to Human Resources and filled out an injury report. Adient subsequently denied the claim, and Ms. Douglas sought treatment on her own with Dr. Cason Shirley.

Dr. Shirley’s October 19 record gave a July 24 onset date, when Ms. Douglas “was putting a cushion in a seat and twisted her knee and it popped.” He diagnosed a medial meniscus tear and gave her a lidocaine injection.

David Miller, Adient’s Health and Safety Lead, and Steve Williams, Production Superintendent, testified that they knew Ms. Douglas was icing her knee during her work breaks. However, Adient was unaware that Ms. Douglas’s knee problem was work- related until she filled out her injury report on August 22. They also explained that the delay in learning of the alleged injury impaired their ability to investigate the claim. Specifically, they were unable to review any video or speak to any witnesses with memory of the incident.

Ms. Douglas asked the Court to order Adient to provide medical treatment for her knee.

Adient contended that Ms. Douglas’s claim is barred by her failure to provide proper notice of an injury. It also argued that, even if notice was legally adequate, Ms. Douglas’s injury is not compensable because it was idiopathic. Finally, Adient maintained that Ms. Douglas failed to meet her burden of proving that her knee injury arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of her employment. For these reasons, it asked the Court to deny her request.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Standard applied

Ms. Douglas need not prove every element of her claim by a preponderance of the evidence in order to obtain relief at an expedited hearing. Instead, she must present sufficient evidence she is likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(d)(1) (2018); McCord v. Advantage Human Resourcing, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 6, at *7-8, 9 (Mar. 27, 2015).

2 Notice

Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-201(a)(1) provides that an injured employee must give written notice of an injury within fifteen days unless it can be shown that the employer had actual knowledge of the accident or that “reasonable excuse for failure to give the notice is made to the satisfaction of the tribunal.”

When the employer raises lack of notice as a defense, the burden is on the employee to show either the employer had actual notice, that she provided notice, or that her failure to give notice was reasonable under the circumstances. Hosford v. Red Rover Preschool, 2014 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 1, at *15 (Oct. 2, 2014). Our Appeals Board explained the notice requirement “exists so that an employer will have an opportunity to make a timely investigation of the facts while still readily accessible, and to enable the employer to provide timely and proper treatment for an injured employee.” Id. Guided by this authority, the Court must determine whether Ms. Douglas rebutted Adient’s notice defense.

The Court first finds Adient had no “actual notice” of the injury. There is no evidence that any representative of Adient authorized to receive notice knew of the incident when it occurred.

Second, the Court turns to whether Ms. Douglas provided notice to Adient within fifteen days. On this point, Ms. Douglas acknowledged she provided no written notice of her alleged July 24 injury until August 22. Accordingly, the Court finds she failed to provide timely notice.

Next, the Court finds no reasonable excuse for Ms. Douglas’s failure to provide timely notice of her injury. In Buckner v. Eaton Corp., 2016 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 84 (Nov. 9, 2016), the employee sustained an injury on July 21, 2015, at a “specific time and place performing a specific task.” However, he did not report his injury until September 2, 2015, forty-three days later. Id. at *3. Under such circumstances, the Appeals Board concluded “that Employee’s excuse for failing to provide timely notice of his work injury was not ‘reasonable,’ the standard mandated by the legislature in section 50-6-201(a)(1).” Id. at *11. Specifically, “this was not a case where symptoms developed gradually over time or were not immediately apparent.” Rather, the employee “was immediately aware he hurt his back and shortly thereafter was . . . unable to work.” Id.

The facts of this case are similar. Like the employee in Buckner, Ms. Douglas alleged an injury at a specific time and place while performing a specific task. She testified that she felt her knee pop on July 24, 2017, which caused her to take a short break from her duties. Although she kept working that day, she soon developed swelling

3 and pain. Thus, any delayed reporting of her injury is not excused on grounds that her “symptoms developed gradually over time or were not immediately apparent.” See Buckner, at *11.

However, the inquiry does not end there. Tennessee Code Annotated section 50- 6-201(a)(3) provides that the failure to give timely notice of a work-related injury will not bar compensation “unless the employer can show, to the satisfaction of the workers' compensation judge before which the matter is pending, that the employer was prejudiced by the failure to give the proper notice, and then only to the extent of the prejudice.” Accordingly, the Court must determine whether Adient suffered prejudice, and if so, to what extent any such prejudice affects the benefits to which Ms. Douglas may be entitled.

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Related

Masters v. Industrial Garments Manufacturing Co.
595 S.W.2d 811 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1980)
York v. Federal Chemical Co.
216 S.W.2d 725 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1949)

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Bluebook (online)
2018 TN WC 187, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/douglas-angela-v-adient-usa-llc-tennworkcompcl-2018.