Douglas, Angela v. Adient US, LLC

2018 TN WC 55
CourtTennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims
DecidedApril 25, 2018
Docket2017-05-0990
StatusPublished

This text of 2018 TN WC 55 (Douglas, Angela v. Adient US, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Tennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Douglas, Angela v. Adient US, LLC, 2018 TN WC 55 (Tenn. Super. Ct. 2018).

Opinion

FILED Apr 25, 2018 01:51 PM(CT) TENNESSEE COURT OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION CLAIMS

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION IN THE COURT OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS AT MURFREESBORO

ANGELA DOUGLAS, ) Docket No. 2017-05-0990 Employee, ) v. ) ) ADIENT US, LLC, ) State File No. 66160-2017 Employer, ) And ) ) OLD REPUBLIC INS. CO., ) Judge Dale Tipps Carrier. )

EXPEDITED HEARING ORDER DENYING BENEFITS (DECISION ON THE RECORD)

This matter came before the undersigned workers’ compensation judge on April 23, 2018, on Angela Douglas’ Request for Expedited Hearing. The present focus of this case is whether Ms. Douglas is entitled to medical benefits. The central legal issues are whether Ms. Douglas gave adequate notice of her alleged injury and whether she is likely to prove at a hearing on the merits that she suffered an injury arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of her employment. For the reasons below, the Court holds Ms. Douglas is likely to prevail on the issue of notice but not on whether she suffered an injury arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of her employment.

History of Claim

Ms. Douglas alleged in her affidavit that she suffered a left-knee injury while working for Adient at the end of July 2017. She described working two separate jobs, Cushion Start and Cushion Install, on the day of her injury because the company had a visitor from Nissan, for whom Adient built car seats. When she turned to return to Cushion Start, she felt a pop in her left knee. Over the following week, Ms. Douglas’

1 knee began “giving her trouble,” and she started icing it during her work breaks.

During a medical checkup on August 21, Ms. Douglas said she told her personal physician, Dr. Dana Chandler, that she injured her knee at work. The next day, Ms. Douglas reported the injury to Human Resources and filled out an injury report. Adient subsequently denied the claim, and Ms. Douglas sought treatment on her own with Dr. Cason Shirley.

Dr. Chandler’s August 21 record showed that Ms. Douglas appeared for her annual exam and reported: “an approximately 3 week history of left knee pain – described as sharp severe – there has been no overt trauma, her pain is much worse with going up or down stairs, and she states her knee will just give out sometimes.” When Ms. Douglas returned on October 16, she reported a specific twisting injury at work in early August.

Dr. Shirley’s October 19 record gave a July 24 onset date when Ms. Douglas “was putting a cushion in a seat and twisted her knee and it popped.” He diagnosed a medial meniscus tear and gave her a lidocaine injection.

Ms. Douglas filed a Petition for Benefit Determination (PBD) seeking medical treatment. The parties did not resolve the issues through mediation, and the mediating specialist filed a Dispute Certification Notice. Ms. Douglas filed a Request for Expedited Hearing seeking a decision on the record without an evidentiary hearing. The Court issued a Docketing Notice identifying the documents it received for review and providing the parties an opportunity to file objections to the admissibility of any of those documents. Neither party filed an objection, and the Court took up the hearing request on April 23.

Adient contended that Ms. Douglas cannot establish that her condition arose primarily out of and in the course of her employment. It also argued that Ms. Douglas’ claim is barred because she failed to provide proper notice of an injury.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Ms. Douglas need not prove every element of her claim by a preponderance of the evidence to obtain relief at an expedited hearing. Instead, she must present sufficient evidence that she is likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(d)(1) (2017); McCord v. Advantage Human Resourcing, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 6, at *7-8, 9 (Mar. 27, 2015).

Notice

Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-201(a)(1) provides that an injured

2 employee must give written notice of an injury within fifteen days unless it can be shown that the employer had actual knowledge of the accident or that “reasonable excuse for failure to give the notice is made to the satisfaction of the tribunal.” Ms. Douglas submitted no proof that she provided written notice of an injury within fifteen days. Likewise, she offered no proof that Adient had actual knowledge of her alleged injury.

However, the Court finds it unnecessary to resolve the question of notice because Adient presented no evidence of any prejudice to its ability to defend this claim. Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-201(a)(3) provides that failure to give notice will not bar a claim unless the employer can show it was prejudiced by the lack of notice. Without any evidence on this issue, the Court cannot find Ms. Douglas’ alleged failure to report the injury resulted in any prejudice to Adient, such as a serious impediment to investigating the claim. This is especially true, since Adient received written notice of the alleged injury when Ms. Douglas filed her accident report on August 22. Therefore, the Court finds that Ms. Douglas appears likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits on the notice issue.

Causation

Ms. Douglas must show that her alleged injuries arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of her employment. To do so, she must show her injury arose primarily out of a work-related incident, or specific set of incidents, identifiable by time and place of occurrence. Further, she must show, “to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that it contributed more than fifty percent (50%) in causing the . . . disablement or need for medical treatment, considering all causes.” “Shown to a reasonable degree of medical certainty” means that, in the opinion of the treating physician, it is more likely than not considering all causes as opposed to speculation or possibility. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14).

Adient filed affidavits of several of its employees. None of these is particularly persuasive, as they consist primarily of statements that Ms. Douglas didn’t report a work injury until August 22, speculation on alternative causes of the injury, legal arguments as to whether any work duty caused the injury, and disputes over whether Ms. Douglas identified the correct date of injury.1 Nonetheless, applying the above principles, the Court cannot find at this time that Ms. Douglas is likely to meet her burden of proof.

Regarding the requirement of a work-related incident “identifiable by time and place of occurrence,” the exhibits submitted do not support Ms. Douglas’ contention that she suffered a discrete, identifiable injury on July 24, 2017. The first medical record to mention Ms. Douglas’ knee pain specified “no overt trauma.” Later, Dr. Shirley noted

1 The Court recognizes that Adient questions the correct date of the alleged injury but is not persuaded that an approximate or estimated date is necessarily insufficient to establish causation. 3 that Ms. Douglas’ injury occurred while she “was putting a cushion in a seat and twisted her knee and it popped.” Both of these notations are inconsistent with Ms. Douglas’ statement that she felt a pop in her knee “as I turn[ed] to go back to Cushion Start.”

Additional information or live testimony sometimes resolves these types of inconsistencies. However, Ms. Douglas chose to have this matter resolved on the record and, weighing the conflicting information before it at this time, the Court is unable to conclude that she is likely to identify a specific incident by time and place of occurrence.

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Related

§ 50-6-102
Tennessee § 50-6-102(14)
§ 50-6-239
Tennessee § 50-6-239(d)(1)

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2018 TN WC 55, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/douglas-angela-v-adient-us-llc-tennworkcompcl-2018.