Doughnut MacH. Corporation v. Joe-Lowe Corporation

67 F.2d 135, 19 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 84, 1933 U.S. App. LEXIS 4376
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
DecidedOctober 3, 1933
Docket3487
StatusPublished
Cited by25 cases

This text of 67 F.2d 135 (Doughnut MacH. Corporation v. Joe-Lowe Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Doughnut MacH. Corporation v. Joe-Lowe Corporation, 67 F.2d 135, 19 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 84, 1933 U.S. App. LEXIS 4376 (4th Cir. 1933).

Opinion

PARKER, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal in a suit brought to enjoin infringement of patent No. 1,702,191, issued February 12, 1929, on application filed by one J. C. Bergner October 13, 1919. Defendants, in addition to denying infringement, pleaded that the patent was void on grounds of anticipation and lack of invention. The judge below held that, in view of the prior art, it must be held limited to the particular mechanism described in the specification and drawings, and that, as so limited, it was not infringed by the defendants. From decree in accordance with this holding, complainant has appealed, contending that, upon a proper application of the doctrine of equivalents, infringement must be held to exist.

The machine covered by the patent is described as one “for forming pastries and the like.” It is an automatic doughnut former to be used with an automatic cooking machine. It consists of an automatic feed for the dough geared to synchronize with an automatic cutter, so that, when dough is fed into a hopper, it is carried by an auger feed to the cutting device which shapes, cuts, and drops the doughnuts. Drawing VII of the patent shows the construction of the machine as follows:

The operation of the machine is thus well and simply described in the brief of counsel for complainant: “The dough fills the hopper at the top of the machine resting over and around the auger-feed 3. When the cutter-disc 5 is open, the auger revolves one turn to feed a measure of dough and then another measure of dough until the orifice above the cutter-disc is filled, and the batter is extruded through the opening between sleeve and disc. When the batter is extruded, the cutter-disc moves up within the sleeve, or the sleeve moves down over the cutter-disc, so as to cut, sever and doff the annular formation. The auger 3 feeds a measure of dough when the cutting elements are open for extrusion and does not revolve during the quick movement of severing, but thereafter revolves again to feed another measure as the cutter-disc and sleeve are again opened. Both the cutter-disc and the *136 cutter sleeve have sharp circumferential cutting edges and they move relatively so that the disc is within the sleeve after the cutting and doffing.”

All of the claims of the patent are combination claims, and complainant relies upon claims 3 to 7, inclusive. Of these, claim 6 may be taken as typical. It is as follows: “6. In a machine of the character described for producing annular formations of plastic material, the combination of die mechanism comprising an inner cutter element and an outer annular cutting die element, said elements being movable axially relative to one another, one over and off of the other, so as, on the one hand, to open and afford an annular die outlet for extrusion of the material in annular formations, and, on the other hand, to close said die outlet and sever and doff the annular formations as such; means for feeding material to the die mechanism, including a feed device with means for periodically actuating it, and for varying the amount of material fed by it at each actuation; and means for periodically actuating said die mechanism in definite correlation with the operation of said feeding means.”

The machines of the defendant use practically the same cutting and doffing device as is described in the patent. Instead of the auger feed, however, they use a piston or plunger, which performs the same function as the auger feed, except that it performs same more efficiently. Like the auger feed of the patent, it is geared to synchronize in its operation with the operation of the cutter. Complainant contends that the piston or plunger feed was a recognized equivalent of the auger feed in the pastry making art, and that defendants did not avoid infringement by its adoption.

It appears that no commercial machines have been made with the aug’er feed of complainant’s patent. Its own machines employ a compressed air feed; and a number of machines, developed during the ten years that the patent was pending in the Patent Office, employ feeds of various kinds with a cutter of the same general type, but none uses the auger feed. If defendant’s machines are held to infringe on the application of the doctrine of equivalents, it will result that, through obtaining a patent on a mechanism which it does not use, and which has never been used commercially, complainant will be enabled to enjoin the use of useful machines developed during the long period that its patent was pending in the patent office. This, of course, is no reason for refusing any relief to which complainant is entitled; but it is a valid reason for applying strict rules of interpretation to the claims of the patent. Especially is this true where it appears, as it does here, that the claims urged before the Patent Office were amended time after time, that contentions were repeatedly renewed after being rejected, and that the patent was finally issued to cover, not the broad claims asserted, but only a combination of devices old in the art. Liberal rules of interpretation should be applied in favor of one whose inventive genius has made any real contribution to knowledge, Gulf Smokeless Coal Co. v. Sutton, Steele & Steele (C. C. A. 4th) 35 F. (2d) 433, 438, but not in favor of those who seek a monopoly on mere combinations of old devices, Wright v. Yuengling, 155 U. S. 47, 52, 15 S. Ct. 1, 39 L. Ed. 64; Piggly Wiggly Corporation v. Jitney Jungle Corporation (C. C. A.) 39 F.(2d) 592, 593; Frink, Inc., v. Erickson (D. C.) 16 F. (2d) 496.

We agree with the complainant that the piston or plunger feed in a machine of the character of that involved here is the mechanical equivalent of the auger feed. Both do the same thing in substantially the same way; and both at the time of the application for the patent were well known in the pastry making art as means for the mechanical feeding of pastry. For use of the screw or auger feed, see patents of Holmes 249,938, Duhrkop 518,942, Bauer 596,137, Kintner 902,088, and Robertson 1,319,534. For use of the piston or plunger feed, see patents of Holmes 174,244, Hueg 534,106, Hueg 554,273, Cote 750,609, and Baker 1,035,299. It is well settled that, while the holder of a patent covering merely a combination of old elements is entitled to invoke the doctrine of equivalents, the term “equivalent” as applied to such an invention has a signification somewhat more limited than when applied to an invention consisting of a new device or an entirely new machine. A patent embracing a combination of old ingredients covers, with respect to each, “every other ingredient which, in the same arrangement of the parts, will perform the same function, if it was well known as a proper substitute for the one described in the specification at the date of the patent.” Imhaeuser v. Beurk, 101 U. S. 647, 653, 656, 25 L. Ed. 945; Black & Decker Mfg. Co. v. Baltimore Truck Tire Service Corp. (C. C. A. 4th) 40 F.(2d) 910, 915; Norton v. Jensen (C. C. A. 9th) 49 F. 859. But there can be no question, in the light of the disclosures of the patents to which we have referred, that the piston or plunger *137 feed was the equivalent of the auger feed for the mechanical feeding of pastry, even within the limits of this definition.

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Bluebook (online)
67 F.2d 135, 19 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 84, 1933 U.S. App. LEXIS 4376, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/doughnut-mach-corporation-v-joe-lowe-corporation-ca4-1933.