Doty Lumber & Shingle Co. v. Lewis County

111 P. 562, 60 Wash. 428, 1910 Wash. LEXIS 1063
CourtWashington Supreme Court
DecidedNovember 10, 1910
DocketNo. 9005
StatusPublished
Cited by23 cases

This text of 111 P. 562 (Doty Lumber & Shingle Co. v. Lewis County) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Washington Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Doty Lumber & Shingle Co. v. Lewis County, 111 P. 562, 60 Wash. 428, 1910 Wash. LEXIS 1063 (Wash. 1910).

Opinion

Gose, J.

These are consolidated causes, tendering certain sums as taxes, and seeking injunctive relief as to all taxes in excess of the sums tendered. The charge in each of the bills is that the board of equalization, in pursuance of a fraudulent scheme on the part of the county commissioners, raised the assessment against the timber lands of the several plaintiffs. After issue joined and a full hearing on the merits, the court found that the charge of fraud had no foundation in fact or law, and dismissed the bills. The plaintiffs have appealed.

It appeal’s from the record that in April, 1907, the board of commissioners, being of the opinion that the timber lands of the county were not bearing their just proportion of the burdens of government, appointed a head timber cruiser with authority to appoint “cruisers sufficient in number to complete the cruise of the timber lands in the county at as early a date as to him [the head cruiser] may seem practicable.” In obedience to his directions, he employed and kept in the field from eight to twenty-three cruisers from that time until the meeting of the board of equalization in August, following. When the board of equalization met in August, 1907, about one-third of the timber lands of the county had been cruised, and notice of intention to raise the assessments had been mailed to the owners of such land. The board proceeded to equalize the assessment upon all the cruised lands where it had been able to serve notice upon the owner. Upon the land not cruised and upon the cruised land, where it had not been able to serve notice, it took no action. The commissioners, before the meeting of the board of equalization, tentatively established as bases of value seventy-five cents per thousand feet on all first-class timber within four miles of a commercial railroad, fifty cents per thousand feet beyond the four miles and within the limits of ten miles of such road, and twenty-five cents per thousand feet beyond the limits of ten miles, with proper deductions for timber of a lower class. The appellants had a hearing before the board of equalization.

[430]*430In raising the assessment upon the timber lands of the several appellants after the hearing, the tentative bases were not strictly adhered to, but the board took into consideration the distance of the property from a logging stream or a commercial railroad, and the contour of the land as affecting the expense of getting the timber to market. In short, it fixed values on the basis of the quality of the timber and its accessibility to market. The timber, including the land upon which it stood, was equalized at from one-fourth to one-third of its value. Farming land and town property were assessed at about one-fourth of their value, and no change was made respecting their assessment by the board of equalization. Acting upon the advice of the attorney general of the state, money was not assessed. The detail sheets returned by the cruisers show the distance the land lies from the nearest railroad and logging stream respectively, the grade and kind of timber, and the character and contour of the land.

The appellants contend that the tentative bases of value-were arbitrary and capricious; that their land is assessed at its full value; that other land in the county is assessed at not to exceed one-fourth of its value; that money was not assessed at all; and that the resultant acts of the board of equalization are fraudulent and void as to the taxes in excess of the assessment returned by the assessor. These several positions are variously stated and argued in ’the briefs, but we do not think the record bears out the charge that the-board acted either arbitrarily or fraudulently. On the other hand, the evidence is convincing that the appellants had a full and fair hearing before the board of equalization, and that it and the commissioners acted in the utmost good faith. It is said, however, that the board acted on a fundamentally wrong principle in establishing the limits of four and ten miles as bases of value, and that the resultant acts are therefore void. Hersey v. Board of Supervisors of Baron County, [431]*43137 Wis. 75, is cited as supporting the contention. In that case a fixed value was put upon standing timber within the limits established, without reference to logging conditions, the quality of the timber, or the character of the soil. There is a marked divergence in the opinions of the respective witnesses as to the value of the timber land, but the law put the burden upon the appellants, and the trial court who saw and heard the witnesses concluded that they failed to meet the burden, and we are inclined to take the same view. The board of equalization is the tribunal created by law to determine and equalize the values of property, and it is only when it acts arbitrarily or fraudulently that courts of equity will 'control its action. Edison Elec. Ill. Co. v. Spokane County, 22 Wash. 168, 60 Pac. 132; Templeton v. Pierce County, 25 Wash. 377, 65 Pac. 553; Union Pac. R. Co. v. Pierce County, 55 Wash. 108, 104 Pac. 178.

Laws of 1907, pages 239, 240, 241 (Rem. & Bal. Code, § 9200), provides that the county commissioners, the county assessor, and the county treasurer, or a majority of them, shall form a board of equalization; that they shall meet annually on the first Monday in August of each year, examine and compare the returns of the assessment of the property of the county, and proceed to equalize the same so that each tract of real property shall be assessed at “its true and fair value,” and that after giving at least five days’ written notice to the owner or agent of the property, they shall raise the valuation of each tract of real property which in their opinion is returned below its true and fair value, to such price or sum as they believe to be “the true and fair value thereof.” A like provision is made for personal property.

The assessment of the property of others at a lower proportion of its value than that of a complaining taxpayer, which is not assessed at more than its fair cash value as required by law, does not make the tax invalid unless the assessment was fraudulently made. Keokuk & Hamilton [432]*432Bridge Co. v. People, 161 Ill. 514, 44 N. E. 206; Engelke v. Schlenker, 75 Tex. 559, 12 S. W. 999; Albuquerque Bank v. Perea, 147 U. S. 87; Mercantile Nat. Bank v. New York, 172 N. Y. 35, 64 N. E. 756; State v. Cudahy Packing Co., 103 Minn. 419, 115 N. W. 645, 1039; Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. Babcock, 204 U. S. 589; Coulter v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 196 U. S. 599.

In Keokuk & Hamilton Bridge Co. v. People, the court said that the complainant’s property was assessed at one-half its fair cash value, whilst the evidence showed that other property in the township was assessed at one-third its fair cash value. The court recognized the principle that the overvaluation may be so excessive and made under Such circumstances as to create the presumption of fraud, but concluded upon the facts that there was neither actual nor constructive fraud shown, and refused to grant relief. In the Albuquerque Bank case it was held that the fact that the plaintiff’s property was assessed at eighty-five per cent of its full value, whilst other property was assessed at seventy per cent of its value, was not ground for equitable interference. The court said:

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Bluebook (online)
111 P. 562, 60 Wash. 428, 1910 Wash. LEXIS 1063, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/doty-lumber-shingle-co-v-lewis-county-wash-1910.