Dorsey v. Blue Bird Corp.

74 F. Supp. 3d 779, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141839, 2014 WL 5017894
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Mississippi
DecidedOctober 6, 2014
DocketCivil Action No. 2:12CV17-B-A
StatusPublished

This text of 74 F. Supp. 3d 779 (Dorsey v. Blue Bird Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Mississippi primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dorsey v. Blue Bird Corp., 74 F. Supp. 3d 779, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141839, 2014 WL 5017894 (N.D. Miss. 2014).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

NEAL B. BIGGERS, JR., District Judge.

This cause comes before the court on the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Upon due consideration of the motion, response, exhibits, and supporting and opposing authority, the court is ready to rule.

Factual and Procedural Background

This action arises from an April 1, 2011 vehicular accident at the intersection of Highway 450 and Highway 61 in Bolivar County, Mississippi, in which a 1994 Blue Bird school bus owned by the Shaw School District collided with a gravel truck owned by Southeast Gravel Co., Inc. (“Southeast Gravel”), and operated by Michael Tad-lock, who was delivering gravel to Mid South Water and Machine Works, LLC (“Mid South”). The plaintiffs were aboard the school bus at the time of the collision and suffered injuries. The school bus was designed and manufactured by defendant Blue Bird Body Company.1 The school bus was sold to the school district by Waters Truck & Tractor Co., Inc. (“Waters”).

This court denied the plaintiffs’ motion to remand and dismissed Waters, a non-diverse defendant, finding that it was exempt from liability under the innocent seller provision of the Mississippi Products Liability Statute, Miss.Code Ann. § 11 — 1— 63(h). The court also found that the plaintiff had no plausible claim against defendant Mid South, which was simply a customer of Southeast Gravel, and dismissed Mid South along with Waters. The plaintiffs settled their claims against Southeast Gravel and Michael Tadlock, and they have been dismissed. The plaintiff also initially sued IC Bus, LLC, Navistar International Corporation, and Navistar International Transportation Corp. These parties were dismissed by an agreed order early in the litigation. The only remaining defendants are, therefore, Blue Bird Body Company and Blue Bird Corporation (collectively “Blue Bird”).

Standard of Review

A party is entitled to summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). On a motion for summary judgment, the movant has the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If the movant makes such a showing, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to “go beyond the pleadings and by ... affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. [781]*7812548 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), (e)). Before finding that no genuine issue for trial exists, the court must first be satisfied that no rational trier of fact could find for the non-movant. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1848, 89 L.Ed.2d 588 (1986).

“[T]he issue of fact must be ‘genuine.’ When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Id. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348. “Unsubstantiated assertions, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation are not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Brown v. City of Houston, Tex., 337 F.3d 539, 541 (5th Cir.2003). Further, self-serving “affidavit or deposition testimony setting forth ultimate or conclusory facts and conclusions of law are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Clark v. America’s Favorite Chicken Co., 110 F.3d 295, 297 (5th Cir.1997).

The court must render summary judgment in favor of the moving party if “there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 135, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). The Supreme Court has cautioned, however, that the ruling court must not encroach upon the functions of the jury. The Court stated in Reeves as follows:

[T]he court must review all of the evidence in the record, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, but making no credibility determinations or weighing any evidence. The latter functions, along with the drawing of legitimate inferences, from the facts, are for the jury, not the court. Thus, although the court should review the record as a whole, it must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe.

Id. (citations omitted). “Summary judgment, although a useful device, must be employed cautiously because it is a final adjudication on the merits.” Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235, 1241 (5th Cir.1989).

Analysis

The plaintiffs assert that contested issues of fact remain in this case including, inter alia, whether Blue Bird manufactured an unreasonably dangerous product because it did not include seatbelts on the subject bus and whether that defective product proximately caused the plaintiffs’ damages. Blue Bird acknowledges that it had a duty to manufacture a reasonably safe bus, but it asserts it had no duty to include seatbelts on the subject bus. It asserts that the plaintiffs cannot meet the requirements of the Mississippi Products Liability Act, Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-63, because they cannot prove that the school bus was unreasonably dangerous without seatbelts or that the lack of seatbelts caused the plaintiffs’ injuries. The defendant also argues that it cannot be liable for adhering to the decisions made by state and local governing authorities, which require no seatbelts on school buses.

The National Association for Pupil Transportation (NAPT), the National School Transportation Association (NSTA), and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) are in agreement that seatbelts in school buses are not necessarily a safety improvement. See NAPT and NSTA’s “Joint Response to NTSB’s Recommendations for Further Improving the Safety of School Bus Occupants,” Dec. 9, 2013 (Def. Ex. “N”). The NHTSA, the federal agency responsible for enacting the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, has “repeatedly come to the conclusion that safety belt mandates for large school buses are inadvisable and could actually be counter-productive to improving safety.” [782]*782Id.

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Related

Brown v. City of Houston, TX
337 F.3d 539 (Fifth Circuit, 2003)
Darrell Jackson v. Warden Burl Cain
864 F.2d 1235 (Fifth Circuit, 1989)
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.
530 U.S. 133 (Supreme Court, 2000)
Cooper v. General Motors Corp.
702 So. 2d 428 (Mississippi Supreme Court, 1997)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
74 F. Supp. 3d 779, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141839, 2014 WL 5017894, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dorsey-v-blue-bird-corp-msnd-2014.