Dorothy v. Commonwealth Commercial Co.

278 Ill. 629
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
DecidedApril 19, 1917
DocketNo. 10962
StatusPublished
Cited by21 cases

This text of 278 Ill. 629 (Dorothy v. Commonwealth Commercial Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Illinois Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dorothy v. Commonwealth Commercial Co., 278 Ill. 629 (Ill. 1917).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Cooke

delivered the opinion of the court:

The facts in this case are similar to those involved in Mercantile Trust Co. v. Kastor, 273 Ill. 332. On and prior to July 22, 1908, the R. K. Maynard Piano Company (hereinafter referred to as the Maynard Company) was engaged in the manufacture and sale of pianos in the city of Chicago. On July 22, 1908, the Maynard Company en- ' tered into a contract with the Commonwealth Commercial Company, (hereinafter referred to as the Commonwealth Company) as follows:

“Articles of agreement made and entered into at Chicago, Illinois, this twenty-second day of July, A. D. 1908, by and between R. K. Maynard Piano Company, hereinafter designated as first party, and the Commonwealth Commercial Company, an Illinois corporation, hereinafter designated as second party.

“Witnesseth, that whereas first party is now engaged in the business of manufacturing pianos at Chicago, Illinois, and has, owns and is possessed of accounts receivable evidencing shipments and deliveries of goods usually dealt in by said first party, which said accounts receivable are owing and will be due to said first party, and which accounts receivable, and any others to be hereafter created, said first party desires to sell to said second party, and said second party is desirous of purchasing same upon the terms, provisions and conditions hereinafter stated:

“Now, therefore, in consideration of the premises and the sum of one dollar and other good and valuable considerations each to the other in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto have agreed and do hereby agree as follows:

“First—First party agrees to sell, and second party agrees to buy, accounts receivable which may be acceptable to second party, and second party agrees to pay therefor the face value of accounts, less one per cent on accounts paid within fifteen days, two per cent on accounts paid within thirty days, three per cent on accounts paid within sixty days, four per cent on accounts paid within ninety days, five per cent on accounts paid within one hundred twenty days, six per cent on accounts paid within one hundred fifty days, seven per cent on accounts paid within one hundred eighty days; subject, however, to the terms and conditions of this agreement or any other writing executed between said parties at any time hereafter, said payment to be made by second party as follows: Seventy-eight per cent on thirty day accounts, seventy-seven per cent on sixty day accounts, seventy-six per cent on ninety day accounts, seventy-five per cent on one hundred twenty day accounts, seventy-four per cent on one hundred fifty day accounts, seventy-three per cent on one hundred eighty day accounts, upon receipt of such accounts duly assigned to second party and the acceptance of such accounts by second party, the remainder, less the discount, as aforesaid, and any and all deductions and discounts taken by the debtor, to be paid to first party upon payment in full of any account, provided, however, that no payment of the remainder shall be made while any of the accounts sold as aforesaid shall be in default.

“Second—It is further agreed that first party shall assign to second party all right, title and interest in and to the accounts so purchased by second party, and that upon delivery of same second party shall control and be alone entitled to receive all moneys due and owing on any account so purchased, but that said second party assumes no responsibility, beyond the exercise of due diligence and ordinary business judgment, in the acceptance of checks or other forms of exchange in payment of the accounts acquired by it from first party, and that said accounts so owned by second party shall not be considered as having been paid until said second party actually receives the face value thereof.

“Third—First party does hereby make, constitute and appoint J. E. Bayrd or J. G. M. Glessner, or any person whom either or both may designate, the true and lawful attorney of first party, and does hereby authorize said attorney or his substitute to indorse the name of said first party upon any checks or other forms of exchange that may come into the possession of second party as payment upon or on account of said accounts so purchased by it from first party, or to indorse the name of first party on. any freight or express bill or bill of lading relating to said accounts, hereby ratifying and confirming any and all acts of said attorney in this behalf.

"Fourth—First party, in further consideration of the premises, does hereby guarantee payment of all accounts, as aforesaid, to second party according to the terms indicated and appearing on said accounts, and first, party hereby waives notice of default or non-payment of all accounts, and agrees that second party may grant one or more extensions to any or all parties liable on said accounts.

“Fifth—It is agreed that in the event of non-payment, at maturity, of any accounts purchased, as aforesaid, by reason of the insolvency of the debtors or otherwise, second party is given the right and option, without notice to first party, to apply any moneys in its hands or that may thereafter come into its possession, belonging to first party, in settlement and discharge of such accounts so in default at maturity, for reasons in this paragraph stated. It is understood and agreed that the term ‘insolvency/ as used in this contract, shall be defined to mean the inability, refusal or failure of debtor to pay the debt at maturity, or the suspension of business, or any other act of the debtor constituting a business failure.

“Sixth—First party agrees not to sell or tender for sale to second party any account unless full and complete deliveries shall have been made pursuant to any agreement, representation or understanding had between first party and the debtors named in said account, or concerning which there is any difference or dispute in relation to the quality, quantity or consideration of said debt, but that each and every of said accounts shall be for a certain, definite, undisputable, liquidated claim or demand and which is not yet due. It is further agreed that immediately upon the execution and delivery to second party of an assignment of the right, title and interest of first party in and to the accounts so purchased, as aforesaid, second party shall be and become vested with all the rights theretofore belonging to first party in and to said accounts, including the right of first party to exercise the right of stoppage in transitu upon any shipment of merchandise evidenced by said accounts that may then be in transit. It is further agreed that in the event of failure or refusal of debtor to retain said merchandise* title to such merchandise shall revert to and remain in second party until such account is fully paid. It is further agreed that second party shall have and is hereby given the right and privilege- to inspect the books, accounts and records of first party relating to the accounts, as aforesaid, at any time; that immediately upon the consummation of the purchase by second party of the accounts, as aforesaid, first party shall make a suitable and proper entry upon the books of first party, disclosing the absolute sale of said accounts to second party.

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Bluebook (online)
278 Ill. 629, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dorothy-v-commonwealth-commercial-co-ill-1917.