Dorothy M. Bennett v. Margaret M. Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services

813 F.2d 400, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 30220, 1986 WL 18589
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
DecidedSeptember 11, 1986
Docket86-1526
StatusUnpublished

This text of 813 F.2d 400 (Dorothy M. Bennett v. Margaret M. Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Dorothy M. Bennett v. Margaret M. Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services, 813 F.2d 400, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 30220, 1986 WL 18589 (4th Cir. 1986).

Opinion

813 F.2d 400
Unpublished Disposition

NOTICE: Fourth Circuit I.O.P. 36.6 states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Fourth Circuit.
Dorothy M. BENNETT, Appellant,
v.
Margaret M. HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Appellee.

No. 86-1526.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued June 3, 1986.
Decided Sept. 11, 1986.

Before PHILLIPS and SPROUSE, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Janet L. Todd, for appellant.

James C. Breeden (Beverly Dennis, III, Chief Counsel; Charlotte Hardnett, Supervisory Assistant Regional Counsel; Heather L. Anderson, Assistant Regional Counsel; David A. Faber, United States Attorney; Sarah G. Sullivan, Assistant United States Attorney, on brief), for appellee.

BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge:

The district court held that the Secretary's determination that Dorothy Bennett was not entitled to widow's insurance benefits because she was not disabled was supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.

* Bennett's husband died on August 27, 1982. Bennett was 58 years old at the time. In order to receive widow's insurance benefits prior to her 60th birthday, she must establish that she is disabled. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 402(e)(1)(B) (1982). She alleged in her amended claim that she became disabled on March 1, 1982.

Bennett has been diagnosed as suffering from obesity, hypertension, arteriosclerotic heart disease, angina pectoris, osteoarthritis of the spine and hip, and chronic venous insufficiency with edema in her legs. She reports additional ailments, but the clinical evidence establishes that these ailments are not of sufficient severity or duration to affect her disability status.

Dr. Jack Woodrum has treated Bennett since 1971. He stated that she was not a suitable candidate for gainful employment. Dr. Rogelio Lim, Dr. Wyson Curry, and Dr. Dominic Gaziano reviewed Bennett's medical records on behalf of the Social Security Administration. They concluded that she was not disabled.

The administrative law judge reviewed Bennett's impairments and placed particular emphasis on her complaints of angina, hypertension, and chronic venous insufficiency. The ALJ rejected Dr. Gaziano's opinion on the ground that he did not give sufficient consideration to the combined effect of Bennett's impairments. The ALJ did not discuss the reports of Dr. Lim and Dr. Curry. The ALJ concluded that Bennett was disabled because of her combined impairments since March 1, 1982. The ALJ issued his decision on May 26, 1983.

On August 15, 1983, the Appeals Council reopened the ALJ's decision. It found that Bennett "has the following impairments: obesity; venous insufficiency of the lower extremities; hypertension; osteoarthritis; and possible arteriosclerotic heart disease." The Appeals Council rejected the ALJ's finding that Bennett suffers from angina pectoris. It stated:

The administrative law judge's finding of angina pectoris was made in the face of contrary statements by two State agency physicians and the medical advisor. This diagnosis was listed on only one occasion, that being her 1979 hospitalization for complaints of chest pain. Dr. Woodrum has never listed angina pectoris as one of his diagnoses, either before or after 1979, despite her several "chest pain" admissions. Further, the investigation of her complaints during the 1979 admission resulted in entirely normal findings. In view of these considerations, the administrative law judge's statements concerning angina do not appear to be supported by the evidence of record.

The Appeals Council accepted the opinions of the three agency physicians that Bennett was not disabled.

II

In order to receive widow's insurance benefits, Bennett must establish that "her physical or mental impairment or impairments are of a level of severity which under regulations prescribed by the Secretary is deemed to be sufficient to preclude an individual from engaging in any gainful activity." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 423(d)(2)(B) (1982). A physical or mental impairment is "an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 423(d)(3) (1982). Furthermore, an impairment must "be expected to result in death or ... to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.1577 (1986).

The regulations provide that a widow is disabled if her "impairment(s) has specific clinical findings that are the same as those for any impairment in the Listing of Impairments in Appendix 1 or are medically equivalent to those for any impairment shown there." 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.1578(a)(1) (1986). Disability cannot be established solely on the basis of medical diagnoses or Bennett's statements about her symptoms. Instead, the diagnoses and symptoms must be supported by clinical findings. Sec. 404.1525(d), .1528(a).

In determining whether Bennett's impairments are medically equivalent to a listed impairment, the Secretary must consider "the combined effect of all of [her] impairments." Sec. 404.1523. Social Security Ruling 83-19 provides:

Equivalency can be found under three circumstances:

1. A listed impairment for which one or more of the specified medical findings is missing from the evidence but for which other medical findings of equal or greater clinical significance and relating to the same impairment are present in the medical evidence.

2. An unlisted impairment, in which the set of criteria for the most closely analogous listed impairment is used for comparison with the findings of the unlisted impairment.

3. A combination of impairments (none of which meet or equal a listed impairment), each manifested by a set of symptoms, signs, and laboratory findings which, combined, are determined to be medically equivalent in medical severity to that listed set to which the combined sets can be most closely related.

Medical equivalence may not be established when the reported medical findings reflect lesser severity than listed criteria require (and there are no related findings of equal or greater medical significance).

As in determining whether the listing is met, it is incorrect to consider whether the listing is equaled on the basis of an assessment of overall functional impairment. The level of severity in any particular listing section is depicted by the given set of findings and not by the degree of severity of any single medical finding--no matter to what extent that finding may exceed the listed value.

The mere accumulation of a number of impairments also will not establish medical equivalence.

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813 F.2d 400, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 30220, 1986 WL 18589, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dorothy-m-bennett-v-margaret-m-heckler-secretary-o-ca4-1986.