Dorothy F. Brainard v. United States

D.C. Circuit

Dorothy F. Brainard v. United States

220 F.2d 384, 95 U.S. App. D.C. 121, 1955 U.S. App. LEXIS 3355

CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit

DecidedMarch 10, 1955

Docket12388_1

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 220 F.2d 384 (Dorothy F. Brainard v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Dorothy F. Brainard v. United States, 220 F.2d 384, 95 U.S. App. D.C. 121, 1955 U.S. App. LEXIS 3355 (D.C. Cir. 1955).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Appellant was convicted of the crimes of housebreaking and larceny. On appeal, she contends that the trial court erred in denying a pretrial motion to suppress and in dismissing a renewal of the motion at the trial after the introduction of new evidence.

Appellant was, we think, legally arrested; and, several hours thereafter, her living quarters were searched with her consent, obtained freely and without coercion or duress. This consent is shown, not only by the testimony of the police officer, but by that of a disinterested witness, who was present at the time the consent was given. We believe, therefore, that the case is governed by United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 64 S.Ct. 896, 88 L.Ed. 1140, rehearing denied 322 U.S. 770, 64 S.Ct. 1257, 88 L.Ed. 1595, and that our ruling in this case is in compliance with the standards established in Judd v. United States, 89 U.S.App.D.C. 64, 190 F.2d 649, and in Higgins v. United States, 93 U.S.App.D.C. 340, 209 F.2d 819.

Complaint is also made that the trial court erred in its charge but we find no error on this score.

Affirmed.

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PER CURIAM.

Appellant was convicted of the crimes of housebreaking and larceny. On appeal, she contends that the trial court erred in denying a pretrial motion to suppress and in dismissing a renewal of the motion at the trial after the introduction of new evidence.

Appellant was, we think, legally arrested; and, several hours thereafter, her living quarters were searched with her consent, obtained freely and without coercion or duress. This consent is shown, not only by the testimony of the police officer, but by that of a disinterested witness, who was present at the time the consent was given. We believe, therefore, that the case is governed by United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 64 S.Ct. 896, 88 L.Ed. 1140, rehearing denied 322 U.S. 770, 64 S.Ct. 1257, 88 L.Ed. 1595, and that our ruling in this case is in compliance with the standards established in Judd v. United States, 89 U.S.App.D.C. 64, 190 F.2d 649, and in Higgins v. United States, 93 U.S.App.D.C. 340, 209 F.2d 819.

Complaint is also made that the trial court erred in its charge but we find no error on this score.

Affirmed.

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220 F.2d 384, 95 U.S. App. D.C. 121, 1955 U.S. App. LEXIS 3355, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dorothy-f-brainard-v-united-states-cadc-1955.

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