Dorothy D. Black v. James A. Black

2017 ME 124, 164 A.3d 966, 2017 WL 2644394, 2017 Me. LEXIS 130

• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
• Decided: June 20, 2017
• Status: Published

Opinion

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 2017 ME 124 Docket: Wal-16-151 Submitted On Briefs: January 19, 2017 Decided: June 20, 2017

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.

DOROTHY D. BLACK

v.

JAMES A. BLACK

HJELM, J.

[¶1] James A. Black appeals from a judgment of the District Court

(Belfast, Raimondi, J.) denying a motion for contempt filed against him by his

ex-wife, Dorothy D. Black, but nevertheless ordering him to pay Dorothy a

sum that the court determined he owed to her pursuant to the parties’ divorce

judgment. James argues that the court lacked authority to grant Dorothy any

form of relief upon denying her motion for contempt, which was not

accompanied by a motion to enforce. The record reveals that the court

determined that Dorothy had proved that James was in contempt, but the

court denied Dorothy’s motion for a reason that was erroneous. Given these

unusual circumstances, we conclude that the court ultimately acted within its

authority by issuing an order requiring James to pay Dorothy the arrearage 2

owed to her and that James was not unfairly prejudiced by that result. We

therefore affirm the judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] James and Dorothy were divorced by a judgment (Sparaco, J.)

entered in June 2012. Neither party was represented by counsel in that

proceeding. The judgment incorporates a written settlement agreement that

James drafted without the help of an attorney.

[¶3] The judgment evenly divided the parties’ assets, including bank

accounts, personal property, and several parcels of real estate. The judgment

also provides for the equal division of the parties’ ongoing income. Relevant

to this appeal, the judgment allocates to each party his or her respective

income from social security—$455 to Dorothy, and $812 to James—and

allocates $378.50 in “[a]partment income” to Dorothy. The parties do not

dispute that the apartment is located on one of the parcels of real estate

allocated to James, that it generates a total of $800 per month in rental

income, and that James is required to pay $378.50 of that amount to Dorothy

each month.1

1 The divorce judgment does not characterize the agreed-upon payments as spousal support,

and in fact, the judgment explicitly states, “Neither party shall pay alimony to the other.” 3

[¶4] In August 2015, Dorothy filed a motion for contempt, see M.R.

Civ. P. 66, 120, alleging that James had failed to pay her $378.50 per month as

required by the divorce judgment. In the motion, Dorothy requested that the

court impose remedial sanctions and award her costs, including reasonable

attorney fees.2

[¶5] A hearing was held in March 2016, where both parties were

represented by counsel. The parties testified that they had not contemplated

what would happen if circumstances changed affecting the distribution of

rental income—a reduction of rental income, for example. Dorothy testified

that they had discussed only that James would pay her $378.50 per month

during his lifetime.

[¶6] James acknowledged that he had agreed to pay Dorothy $378.50

per month but failed to make those payments for eleven months, beginning in

March 2015, and that as a result he “did owe [Dorothy] some money.” He

stated that although he stopped making the payments because a tenant moved

out of the apartment, he did not resume making payments even when he

found a new tenant several months later because he had to pay for unforeseen

repairs, which he anticipated would cost more than $10,000. He testified that

2 Dorothy also alleged that James failed to comply with the divorce judgment in two other ways.

The parties resolved those issues, and they are not at issue in this appeal. 4

he had been receiving the entire $800 in monthly rental income since

approximately April 2015, and that he owned assets including real estate and

accounts that by themselves had a value that exceeded the arrearage claimed

by Dorothy.

[¶7] The court (Raimondi, J.) found that the settlement agreement

incorporated in the divorce judgment is “plain on its face” and “clear[ly]”

requires James to pay $378.50 of the rental income to Dorothy, but that James

had simply stopped making the payments. Despite these findings and the

court’s determination that James had the present ability to pay the arrearage,

however, the court explicitly declined to find James in contempt. The court

explained that because the parties were unrepresented at the time of the

divorce and because, as a result, their agreement was “silent on a number of

points,” it would give James “the benefit of the doubt.” Important to this

appeal, the court stated at the hearing that had James been represented at the

time of the divorce, “there would be no question . . . [it] would find him in

contempt.” The court ordered James to pay Dorothy $4,163.50, representing

eleven months of missed payments, within thirty days of the date of the order,

with execution to issue; and $152.09 in costs, to be paid within fourteen days 5

of the date of the order. James timely appealed. See 14 M.R.S. § 1901 (2016);

M.R. App. P. 2(b)(3).

II. DISCUSSION

[¶8] James asserts that the court was without authority to grant

Dorothy any relief whatever after denying her motion for contempt. Given the

particular circumstances of this case, we disagree.

[¶9] “For a court to find a party in contempt, the complaining party

must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the alleged contemnor

failed or refused to comply with a court order and presently has the ability to

comply with that order.” Murphy v. Bartlett, 2014 ME 13, ¶ 9, 86 A.3d 610;

see also M.R. Civ. P. 66(d)(2)(D). As a remedy for contemptuous conduct, a

court may impose a variety of sanctions designed to coerce compliance or to

compensate the aggrieved party. See M.R. Civ. P. 66(a)(2)(C), (d)(3); Murphy,

2014 ME 13, ¶ 16, 86 A.3d 610. Contempt sanctions may include entry of a

“judgment in favor of the person aggrieved for a sum of money sufficient to

indemnify the aggrieved party” and to satisfy that party’s costs, “including

reasonable attorney fees.” M.R. Civ. P. 66(d)(3)(C) (identifying a

“[c]ompensatory [f]ine” as one type of remedial sanction). The court’s

remedial order requiring James to make Dorothy whole for his failure to 6

comply with the payment obligation created by the divorce judgment falls

well within what Rule 66 would authorize.

[¶10] Although the court denied Dorothy’s contempt motion, it stated

that “there would be no question” that it would have found James in contempt

had he been represented at the time of the divorce. Because unrepresented

parties are not entitled to special consideration, see Ezell v. Lawless, 2008 ME

139, ¶ 22, 955 A.2d 202, this was an improper rationale for the court to deny

Dorothy’s motion.3 The court’s statement demonstrates, however, that it

determined that Dorothy had proved contempt by clear and convincing

evidence, because the only reason the court denied her motion was James’s

unrepresented status when the divorce judgment was issued. See supra ¶ 7.

The court thus implicitly but necessarily concluded that Dorothy had proved

the elements of her contempt motion, even though it nominally did not find

James in contempt.

[¶11] Accordingly, James was not prejudiced by the court’s order

providing Dorothy with a remedy that was within the court’s Rule 66

3 Despite the court’s error, Dorothy is not entitled to a remand for entry of an order expressly

finding James in contempt because she did not appeal from the court’s denial of her contempt motion. See U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. Mackenzie, 2016 ME 149, ¶ 8, 149 A.3d 267 (stating that a cross-appeal is necessary if an appellee wishes to modify a judgment in a way that is different from the change sought by the appellant); Alexander, Maine Appellate Practice § 2.7(a) at 39 (4th ed. 2013). 7

authority but that, as shown by the court’s reasoning, it erroneously failed to

invoke. Given these unique circumstances, the court did not err by issuing an

order enforcing James’s liability to Dorothy.

The entry is:

Judgment affirmed.

Anthony A. Trask, Esq., Rudman Winchell, Bangor, for appellant James A. Black

Joseph W. Baiungo, Esq., Belfast, for appellee Dorothy D. Black

Belfast District Court docket number FM-2012-78 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY