Doroski v. Ashton

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Doroski v. Ashton

99 A.D.3d 902, 952 N.Y.2d 259

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedOctober 17, 2012

StatusPublished

This text of 99 A.D.3d 902 (Doroski v. Ashton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Doroski v. Ashton, 99 A.D.3d 902, 952 N.Y.2d 259 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2012).

Pincite

Opinion

[903]*903Modification of an existing custody arrangement is permissible only upon a showing that there has been a change in circumstances such that modification is necessary to ensure the best interests of the child (see Matter of Strand-O’Shea v O’Shea, 32 AD3d 398 [2006]). Parental alienation of a child from the other parent is “an act so inconsistent with the best interests of the children as to, per se, raise a strong probability that the [offending party] is unfit to act as custodial parent” (Entwistle v Entwistle, 61 AD2d 380, 384-385 [1978]; see Bobinski v Bobinski, 9 AD3d 441 [2004]; Stern v Stern, 304 AD2d 649 [2003]; Young v Young, 212 AD2d 114, 122 [1995]). As custody determinations turn in large part on assessments of the credibility, character, temperament, and sincerity of the parties, the Family Court’s determination should not be disturbed unless it lacks a sound and substantial basis in the record (see Eschbach v Eschbach, 56 NY2d 167, 173-174 [1982]). Here, the Family Court’s determinations that there had been a change in circumstances, and that a transfer of sole custody to the father would be in the child’s best interests, have a sound and substantial basis in the record and, thus, should not be disturbed (see Matter of Tobar v Velez-Molina, 95 AD3d 1224 [2012]; Matter of Galanos v Galanos, 28 AD3d 554, 555 [2006]).

The mother’s remaining contention is without merit. Eng, EJ., Rivera, Hall and Sgroi, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

[903]*903Modification of an existing custody arrangement is permissible only upon a showing that there has been a change in circumstances such that modification is necessary to ensure the best interests of the child (see Matter of Strand-O’Shea v O’Shea, 32 AD3d 398 [2006]). Parental alienation of a child from the other parent is “an act so inconsistent with the best interests of the children as to, per se, raise a strong probability that the [offending party] is unfit to act as custodial parent” (Entwistle v Entwistle, 61 AD2d 380, 384-385 [1978]; see Bobinski v Bobinski, 9 AD3d 441 [2004]; Stern v Stern, 304 AD2d 649 [2003]; Young v Young, 212 AD2d 114, 122 [1995]). As custody determinations turn in large part on assessments of the credibility, character, temperament, and sincerity of the parties, the Family Court’s determination should not be disturbed unless it lacks a sound and substantial basis in the record (see Eschbach v Eschbach, 56 NY2d 167, 173-174 [1982]). Here, the Family Court’s determinations that there had been a change in circumstances, and that a transfer of sole custody to the father would be in the child’s best interests, have a sound and substantial basis in the record and, thus, should not be disturbed (see Matter of Tobar v Velez-Molina, 95 AD3d 1224 [2012]; Matter of Galanos v Galanos, 28 AD3d 554, 555 [2006]).

The mother’s remaining contention is without merit. Eng, EJ., Rivera, Hall and Sgroi, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

99 A.D.3d 902, 952 N.Y.2d 259, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/doroski-v-ashton-nyappdiv-2012.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack