Dorman Lee Taylor, Sr. v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: February 4, 2009
• Docket: 09-07-00493-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

____________________

NO. 09-07-00493-CR

NO. 09-07-00494-CR

NO. 09-07-00495-CR

DORMAN LEE TAYLOR, SR., Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court

Jasper County, Texas

Trial Cause Nos. JC 25810, JC 25811, JC 25812

MEMORANDUM OPINION

After appealing from justice court, Dorman Lee Taylor ("Dorman") ⁽¹⁾ was convicted by a jury in the county court for three offenses: (1) failing to maintain financial responsibility (Trial Cause No. JC 25810); (2) failing to carry and exhibit on demand a driver's license (Trial Cause No. JC 25811); and (3) operating an unregistered motor vehicle (Trial Cause No. JC 25812). The trial court assessed fines in the amount of $350, $200, and $200, respectively. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

After conducting a hearing, the trial court found the appellant was not indigent. Dorman does not challenge this ruling on appeal. The appellant is not entitled to proceed without costs. See Tex. R. App. P. 20.2. An exhibit depicting the traffic stop was filed with the appellate record, but no reporter's record of the trial has been filed. See Tex. R. App. P. 37.3(c).

On appeal, Dorman mentions that he enjoys "an inalienable right of passages" protected by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. ⁽²⁾ Generally based upon the citizenship clause and the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the right to travel expressed in American jurisprudence

protects the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave another State, the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second State, and, for those travelers who elect to become permanent residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that State.

Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500, 119 S.Ct. 1518, 143 L.Ed.2d 689 (1999).

Saenz v. Roe concerned a statute that limited welfare benefits available to new residents of California to the benefits available in the State of previous residence. Id. at 493-94. Reasoning that the Fourteenth Amendment equates citizenship with residence, the Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutionally violated the rights of equally eligible citizens. Id. at 506.

Edwards v. California concerned a Depression-Era prohibition upon bringing indigent persons into the state. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 171, 62 S.Ct. 164, 86 L.Ed. 119 (1941). The Supreme Court held the statute placed an unconstitutional burden upon interstate commerce and was not a valid exercise of police power. Id. at 177.

Dorman does not articulate how the three statutes he violated create a discriminatory classification, constitute an undue burden on interstate commerce, or allow an impermissible exercise of police power. In short, he does not attempt to bring his arguments within the framework of the rights he invokes. Certainly, the ability to move about as one wills is a central component of the liberty enjoyed by our citizens. It does not necessarily follow, however, that the State cannot police its citizens or regulate the use of public roadways.

The contention raised by Dorman is unorthodox but not novel. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals resolved a similar argument, as follows:

Driving an automobile on Texas highways is a privilege. It is not property or a property right. This privilege is subject to reasonable regulation under the State's police power in the interest of the welfare and safety of the general public. See Gillaspie v. Department of Public Safety, 152 Tex. 459, 466, 259 S.W.2d 177, 182 (1953); Taylor v. State, 151 Tex. Crim. 568, 570, 209 S.W.2d 191, 192 (App.1948) (op. on reh'g); Coyle v. State, 775 S.W.2d 843, 846 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1989, no pet.). Thus, regulating licensing, inspection, and registration laws and requiring proof of financial responsibility as a protection for Texas citizens is a proper subject of the State's police powers and not a denial of due process. See Gillaspie, 259 S.W.2d at 182; Riggle v. State, 778 S.W.2d 127, 129 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1989, no pet.).

Naff v. State, 946 S.W.2d 529, 533 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1997, no pet.).

The arguments raised in Dorman's brief do not persuade us to create a split of authority with our sister court. On appeal, Dorman asserts that the judgment must be reversed and the charges dismissed because he is a private vehicle owner who does not transport persons or things from place to place for hire. He cites the 1941 version of the Drivers License Law and the Private Motor Vehicle Owners Act. See Law of April 14, 1941, 47th Leg., R.S., ch.173, 1941 Tex. Gen. Laws 245; Law of May 14, 1941, 47th Leg., R.S., ch. 290, 1941 Tex. Gen. Laws 463. Dorman does not explain why these statutes apply to him, as opposed to the law in effect on the date of the offenses. The offenses at issue in these appeals occurred on July 28, 2004. Thus, the relevant sections of the Texas Transportation Code apply.

Dorman suggests that the Legislature intended to regulate only common carriers. The actual legislative intent is clear: "A person, other than a person expressly exempted under this chapter, may not operate a motor vehicle on a highway in this state unless the person holds a driver's license issued under this chapter." Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 521.021 (Vernon 2007). The term "motor vehicle" means "a self-propelled vehicle" and that definition is not confined to vehicles being driven for hire. See id. § 521.001(b) (Vernon 2007), § 541.201(11) (Vernon Supp. 2008). Dorman does not suggest that he satisfied one of the statutory exemptions found in section 521.027 of the Texas Transportation Code. See id. § 521.027 (Vernon 2007). A person required to hold a license under section 521.021 must have the license in his possession while operating a motor vehicle and display the license on the demand of a peace officer. See id. § 521.025(a) (Vernon Supp. 2008). Failure to display the license on demand is a misdemeanor offense punishable by a fine. Id. § 521.025(c).

Likewise, an owner of a motor vehicle must apply for the registration of the vehicle for each registration year in which the vehicle is used or to be used on a public highway. Id. § 502.002 (Vernon 2007). Operating a vehicle that has not been registered as required by law is a misdemeanor offense punishable by fine. See id. § 502.402 (Vernon 2007). Words contained in codified statutes acquire a particular meaning through legislative definition. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011 (Vernon 2005). "Motor vehicle" means "a vehicle that is self-propelled." Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 502.001(13) (Vernon Supp. 2008). "Commercial motor vehicle" is also defined in section 502.001. Id. § 502.001(2). Had the Legislature intended section 502.402 apply only to persons operating commercial motor vehicles, it would have used the term "commercial motor vehicle" in place of the more inclusive term "motor vehicle."

Furthermore, a person may not operate a motor vehicle in this state unless he establishes financial responsibility. Id. § 601.051 (Vernon 1999). A person commits a misdemeanor offense punishable by fine if he "operates a motor vehicle in violation of Section 601.051." Id. § 601.191. "Motor vehicle" is defined by statute and that definition is not limited to commercial vehicles. See id. § 601.002(5) (Vernon Supp. 2008). The sections of the Texas Transportation Code at issue in this appeal apply to private motor vehicle operators and are not restricted to operators of motor vehicles for hire.

We overrule the issues raised by Dorman's brief and affirm the judgments.

AFFIRMED.

__________________________________

CHARLES KREGER

Justice

Submitted on January 26, 2009

Opinion Delivered February 4, 2009

Do not publish

Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.

1. Out of respect for the personal preference of the appellant.

2. Dorman cites Kent v. Dulles, which held that federal law then in effect did not permit the Secretary of State to refuse to issue passports to two individuals who refused to sign an affidavit regarding membership in the Communist Party. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129-30, 78 S.Ct. 1113, 2 L.Ed.2d 1204 (1958). The Supreme Court held the federal statutes granting discretionary authority in issuing passports did not extend the kind of authority exercised by the Secretary of State in that case but did not reach the constitutional issue. Id.