Doris Williams v. State

Opinion

IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

 

No. 10-03-00184-CR

Doris Williams,

                                                                      Appellant

 v.

The State of Texas,

                                                                      Appellee

From the County Court at Law No. 2

McLennan County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2002-1728

MEMORANDUM  Opinion

          Doris Williams was charged with failure to identify.  She was convicted of the offense by a jury, which assessed punishment at thirty-five days’ confinement and a $700 fine.  In four issues, Williams argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the conviction and that the trial court erred in failing to grant her motion to dismiss.  Finding the evidence factually insufficient to show that Williams was detained at the time she gave the officer a false name, we will reverse the judgment and remand the cause.

          Williams argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support her conviction because the State failed to prove that she gave a false or fictitious name to a peace officer while she was under lawful arrest or detention.  We review legal sufficiency by examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determining whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.  Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788-89, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).  We review factual sufficiency by considering all of the evidence in a neutral light to determine whether a jury was rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).  The evidence may be factually insufficient either because the evidence that supports the verdict is too weak to support a beyond a reasonable doubt guilt finding or because the evidence contrary to guilt is strong enough that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard “could not have been met.”  Id.

          The essential elements of the offense charged are: (1) a person, (2) intentionally gives a false or fictitious name, residence address, or date of birth, (3) to a peace officer, (4) who has lawfully arrested or lawfully detained her.  Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 38.02 (Vernon Supp. 2004-05).  The law further provides an enhancement to punishment if it is shown at trial that the defendant was a fugitive from justice at the time of the offense.  Id.

          Williams does not dispute that she gave the officer a false name.  Williams was not under arrest at the time she gave the officer the false name.  Thus the issue is whether Williams was lawfully detained at the time she gave the officer the false name.

          Not every encounter between an officer and a citizen constitutes a detention because police officers, like anyone else, may ask questions of their fellow citizens.  Smith v. State, 944 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. ref’d).  For purposes of constitutional analysis, an investigatory detention is considered a “seizure” because it involves varying degrees of restraint on the detained individual’s liberty.  Dean v. State, 938 S.W.2d 764, 768 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.).  In either an investigative detention or an arrest, the seizure of the citizen has not occurred until a reasonable person would believe he or she was not free to leave, and that person has yielded to the officer’s show of authority or has been physically forced to yield.  Johnson v. State, 912 S.W.2d 227, 235 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).

          Williams was outside her house, but on her property, when she was approached by Officer Myers.  Myers asked Williams for her name and date of birth.  Williams identified herself as Dolores Baldwin.  Myers then walked back to his car and checked the information with the dispatcher.  Suspecting that Williams had not given him her real name, Myers called a municipal judge who was familiar with Williams.  The judge arrived and identified Williams.  Myers then arrested Williams.

          Myers testified that he approached Williams because he had been informed that there was a warrant for her arrest.  Myers testified that he informed Williams that he was investigating a warrant, but his testimony is inconclusive on the issue of whether he informed Williams of the warrant before she gave him the false name.  On direct examination, Myers testified that “I pulled into the driveway and got out of my patrol car and identified myself and asked her what her name was.”  Under cross-examination, he testified that “I told her that I – that there was a warrant, and I needed to find out who she was.  So I asked her her name and date of birth.”  However, when asked if he explained to Williams why he was talking to her after she gave him the name, Myers responded “yes.”  Williams testified that Myers did not tell her why he was asking for her name before she gave the fictitious name.

          Myers’s testimony was also inconsistent regarding the point at which, in his mind, Williams was detained.  On direct examination, he testified that she was detained “[w]hen she gave me the wrong name and I believed it was still her” and that she was detained “[a]fter she gave me that name. . . .”  On redirect, however, the officer testified that she was detained when he approached her to investigate who she was.

          The issue, however, is not the officer’s subjective belief as to whether the defendant was detained, but whether a reasonable person would, under the circumstances, believe that they were not free to leave and whether the defendant actually yielded to the officer’s show of authority.  See California v. Hodari, 499 U.S. 621, 628, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 1551, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991); Smith, 944 S.W.2d at 457.  The State argues that Williams acquiesced to the detention by remaining where she was until the judge arrived to identify her.  However, the relevant issue is not whether she was detained after she gave the false name, but whether she was detained at the time she gave it.

The evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict shows that the officer arrived at Williams’s residence and parked his vehicle in her driveway.  He then approached Williams, who was standing on her own property.  He identified himself, informed her that he believed she was a person for whom there was an outstanding warrant, and asked her for her name and date of birth.  She then gave him a false name.  Considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we cannot say that a rational jury could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that a reasonable person would believe she was not free to leave and that Williams had yielded to the officer’s show of authority.

          Considering the evidence in a neutral light, however, we find that the evidence is too weak to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams had yielded to the officer’s show of authority or had been physically forced to yield at the time she gave the officer a false name.  We cannot determine from the officer’s testimony whether he informed Williams that he was conducting an investigation prior to her giving the false name.  There is no evidence that he informed Williams that she was being detained or that she was not free to leave.  There is no evidence that she made an attempt to leave and was prevented from doing so.  There is no evidence that Williams was physically restrained or had acquiesced to any instructions from the officer.

          The evidence is factually insufficient to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams was detained at the time she gave the officer a false name.  Because of our determination of this issue, we need not consider Williams’s other issues.

CONCLUSION

          We reverse the judgment and remand the cause to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BILL VANCE

Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Vance, and

Justice Reyna

          (Chief Justice Gray dissenting)

Reversed and remanded

Opinion delivered and filed September 21, 2005

Do not publish

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