OPINION BY
Judge LEAVITT.
The Doris Terry Revocable Living Trust (Trust) appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (trial court) upholding a variance that had been granted by the Pittsburgh Zoning Board of Adjustment (Board) to Michael Seate and Kim Love (collectively Interve-nors). The variance in question was granted for a motorcycle garage that had been constructed by Intervenors, without any approval and in violation of applicable zoning requirements, on a lot immediately adjacent to the Trust’s property.1 The Trust asserts that Intervenors’ case, completed in seven minutes, was completely inadequate to show hardship, as needed for the grant of a variance.
The adjoining lots of the Trust and of Intervenors are located in an historic, residential district (Rl-AH) in the North Side of the City of Pittsburgh; each lot is twenty-feet wide and fronts on Monterey Street. Doris Terry lives in the house belonging to the Trust, which is situated at the rear of the lot, thirty feet back from Monterey Street;" the rear wall of her house abuts Day Way, an alley. Terry’s house shares a common wall on one side, and on the other side is Intervenors’ lot. Intervenors’ house2 is placed at the front of their lot, closer to Monterey Street, and [59]*59their garage is located at the rear of their lot, next to Terry’s house. The rear wall of the garage abuts Day Way, and its side wall abuts the Trust’s property line. Indeed, this wall of this garage is 3-J6 feet from the kitchen windows of Terry’s house; the 3$ feet of land between the two buildings belongs to the Trust.
On June 16, 2003, the Zoning Administrator issued a Statement of Noncompliance to the Intervenors because their garage violated the setback requirements of the zoning ordinance.3 Intervenors appealed, seeking Board approval to erect a 15' x 10' one-story garage in the rear yard of the existing 2-h story dwelling.4 The appeal sought variances from the provisions of the Pittsburgh Zoning Code that require property line set backs of ten feet from side lines and two feet from the rear boundary for any building.5 The Board held a hearing on July 10, 2003, to determine whether dimensional variances would be granted.
At the hearing, Seate appeared for In-tervenors, and Terry appeared for the Trust. The hearing lasted seven minutes.6 Terry presented eight photographs that showed placement of the structures on the two lots, the close proximity of the houses in the neighborhood, and the proximity of the garage to her kitchen windows. Terry testified that the garage blocked her kitchen windows, and the music and motorcycle noise emanating from the garage destroyed the quiet enjoyment of her home.7
Seate acknowledged that he built the garage without applying for a variance. The garage is a 15' x 10' single story structure, eleven feet high, and has a peaked roof. He also stated “couldn’t get a contractor in to settle the ground” and that “[t]hey would have to take out two 60 foot trees.”8 Notes of Testimony at 9 [60]*60(N.T. -), R.R. 41A. Seate offered to put a flat roof on the garage to reduce the obstruction of Terry’s kitchen window.
On July 17, 2004, the Board granted the requested variance in a one-page letter. The Board found the variance to be reasonable, given the narrow width of the property and that the “[(Opposition has not established evidence to the contrary.” R.R. 69A. The variance reduced the ten foot side set back to 2-k feet and it reduced the two foot rear set back to zero feet.9 The Trust appealed to the trial court.10 Without taking further testimony, on March 19, 2004, the trial court affirmed the decision of the Board and dismissed the Trust’s appeal. In its July 12, 2004, Opinion the trial court summarized the decision of the Board as follows:
The Board concluded that the unique physical characteristics and conditions created an unnecessary hardship for the Intervenors. The property is not able to be developed in rigid conformity with the Zoning Ordinance provisions, so the variance is necessary to enable the reasonable use of the property. The Board of Adjustment also concluded that the variance will not alter the essential character of the neighborhood, and that the allowances for the garage represent the minimum variance and the least modification from the relief requested.
Opinion at 4. Because the trial court agreed with the Board’s conclusions, it affirmed. The Trust then appealed to this Court.
On appeal,11 the Trust presents two issues. First, the Trust contends that In-[61]*61tervenors failed to present evidence that would support the legal conclusions necessary to the grant of a variance. Second, the Trust contends that because the record is woefully lacking in evidence, the Board assumed facts not of record thereby giving Intervenors a pass with respect to their burden of proof. In sum, the Trust contends that the trial court erred in affirming the Board.
The Trust correctly states the general rule that to obtain a variance, a landowner bears the heavy burden of proving that he suffers from an unnecessary hardship, which hardship is not self-imposed, and that granting the variance will not adversely affect the public health, safety, and welfare. Bruni v. Zoning Hearing Board of Plymouth Township, 52 Pa.Cmwlth. 526, 416 A.2d 111 (1980). In Larsen v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of the City of Pittsburgh, 543 Pa. 415, 672 A.2d 286 (1996), our Supreme Court established four criteria that must be satisfied in order for a landowner to show a compelling reason for a variance.12 Intervenors counter that these factors are to be considered in granting a use variance. They claim to have sought a dimensional variance, which is a type of variance more easily obtained. In Hertzberg v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of the City of Pittsburgh, 554 Pa. 249, 721 A.2d 43 (1998), our Supreme Court explained that “the quantum of proof required to establish unnecessary hardship is indeed lesser when a dimensional variance, as opposed to a use variance, is sought.” Id. at 258, 721 A.2d at 48.13
Pittsburgh’s Zoning Code addresses the subject of variances without regard to whether the variance is a use or a dimensional variance.14 It states as follows;
No variance in the strict application of any provisions of this Zoning Code shall be granted by the Zoning Board of Adjustment unless it finds that all of the following conditions exist:
[62]*621. That there are unique physical circumstances or conditions, including irregularity, narrowness, or shallowness of lot size or shape, or exceptional topographical or other physical conditions peculiar to the particular property, and that the unnecessary hardship is due to the conditions, and not the
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OPINION BY
Judge LEAVITT.
The Doris Terry Revocable Living Trust (Trust) appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (trial court) upholding a variance that had been granted by the Pittsburgh Zoning Board of Adjustment (Board) to Michael Seate and Kim Love (collectively Interve-nors). The variance in question was granted for a motorcycle garage that had been constructed by Intervenors, without any approval and in violation of applicable zoning requirements, on a lot immediately adjacent to the Trust’s property.1 The Trust asserts that Intervenors’ case, completed in seven minutes, was completely inadequate to show hardship, as needed for the grant of a variance.
The adjoining lots of the Trust and of Intervenors are located in an historic, residential district (Rl-AH) in the North Side of the City of Pittsburgh; each lot is twenty-feet wide and fronts on Monterey Street. Doris Terry lives in the house belonging to the Trust, which is situated at the rear of the lot, thirty feet back from Monterey Street;" the rear wall of her house abuts Day Way, an alley. Terry’s house shares a common wall on one side, and on the other side is Intervenors’ lot. Intervenors’ house2 is placed at the front of their lot, closer to Monterey Street, and [59]*59their garage is located at the rear of their lot, next to Terry’s house. The rear wall of the garage abuts Day Way, and its side wall abuts the Trust’s property line. Indeed, this wall of this garage is 3-J6 feet from the kitchen windows of Terry’s house; the 3$ feet of land between the two buildings belongs to the Trust.
On June 16, 2003, the Zoning Administrator issued a Statement of Noncompliance to the Intervenors because their garage violated the setback requirements of the zoning ordinance.3 Intervenors appealed, seeking Board approval to erect a 15' x 10' one-story garage in the rear yard of the existing 2-h story dwelling.4 The appeal sought variances from the provisions of the Pittsburgh Zoning Code that require property line set backs of ten feet from side lines and two feet from the rear boundary for any building.5 The Board held a hearing on July 10, 2003, to determine whether dimensional variances would be granted.
At the hearing, Seate appeared for In-tervenors, and Terry appeared for the Trust. The hearing lasted seven minutes.6 Terry presented eight photographs that showed placement of the structures on the two lots, the close proximity of the houses in the neighborhood, and the proximity of the garage to her kitchen windows. Terry testified that the garage blocked her kitchen windows, and the music and motorcycle noise emanating from the garage destroyed the quiet enjoyment of her home.7
Seate acknowledged that he built the garage without applying for a variance. The garage is a 15' x 10' single story structure, eleven feet high, and has a peaked roof. He also stated “couldn’t get a contractor in to settle the ground” and that “[t]hey would have to take out two 60 foot trees.”8 Notes of Testimony at 9 [60]*60(N.T. -), R.R. 41A. Seate offered to put a flat roof on the garage to reduce the obstruction of Terry’s kitchen window.
On July 17, 2004, the Board granted the requested variance in a one-page letter. The Board found the variance to be reasonable, given the narrow width of the property and that the “[(Opposition has not established evidence to the contrary.” R.R. 69A. The variance reduced the ten foot side set back to 2-k feet and it reduced the two foot rear set back to zero feet.9 The Trust appealed to the trial court.10 Without taking further testimony, on March 19, 2004, the trial court affirmed the decision of the Board and dismissed the Trust’s appeal. In its July 12, 2004, Opinion the trial court summarized the decision of the Board as follows:
The Board concluded that the unique physical characteristics and conditions created an unnecessary hardship for the Intervenors. The property is not able to be developed in rigid conformity with the Zoning Ordinance provisions, so the variance is necessary to enable the reasonable use of the property. The Board of Adjustment also concluded that the variance will not alter the essential character of the neighborhood, and that the allowances for the garage represent the minimum variance and the least modification from the relief requested.
Opinion at 4. Because the trial court agreed with the Board’s conclusions, it affirmed. The Trust then appealed to this Court.
On appeal,11 the Trust presents two issues. First, the Trust contends that In-[61]*61tervenors failed to present evidence that would support the legal conclusions necessary to the grant of a variance. Second, the Trust contends that because the record is woefully lacking in evidence, the Board assumed facts not of record thereby giving Intervenors a pass with respect to their burden of proof. In sum, the Trust contends that the trial court erred in affirming the Board.
The Trust correctly states the general rule that to obtain a variance, a landowner bears the heavy burden of proving that he suffers from an unnecessary hardship, which hardship is not self-imposed, and that granting the variance will not adversely affect the public health, safety, and welfare. Bruni v. Zoning Hearing Board of Plymouth Township, 52 Pa.Cmwlth. 526, 416 A.2d 111 (1980). In Larsen v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of the City of Pittsburgh, 543 Pa. 415, 672 A.2d 286 (1996), our Supreme Court established four criteria that must be satisfied in order for a landowner to show a compelling reason for a variance.12 Intervenors counter that these factors are to be considered in granting a use variance. They claim to have sought a dimensional variance, which is a type of variance more easily obtained. In Hertzberg v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of the City of Pittsburgh, 554 Pa. 249, 721 A.2d 43 (1998), our Supreme Court explained that “the quantum of proof required to establish unnecessary hardship is indeed lesser when a dimensional variance, as opposed to a use variance, is sought.” Id. at 258, 721 A.2d at 48.13
Pittsburgh’s Zoning Code addresses the subject of variances without regard to whether the variance is a use or a dimensional variance.14 It states as follows;
No variance in the strict application of any provisions of this Zoning Code shall be granted by the Zoning Board of Adjustment unless it finds that all of the following conditions exist:
[62]*621. That there are unique physical circumstances or conditions, including irregularity, narrowness, or shallowness of lot size or shape, or exceptional topographical or other physical conditions peculiar to the particular property, and that the unnecessary hardship is due to the conditions, and not the circumstances or conditions generally created by the provisions of the zoning ordinance in the neighborhood or district in which the property is located;
2. That because of such physical circumstances or conditions, there is no possibility that the property can be developed in strict con- ■ formity with the provisions of the zoning ordinance and that the authorization of a variance is therefore necessary to enable the reasonable use of the property;
3. That such unnecessary hardship has not been created by the appellant;
4. That the variance, if authorized, will not alter the essential character of the neighborhood or district in which the property is located, nor substantially or permanently impair the appropriate use or development of adjacent property, nor be detrimental to the public ' welfare; and ’
5.That the variance, if authorized, will represent the minimum variance that will afford relief and will represent the least modification possible of the regulation in issue.
In granting any variance, the board may attach such reasonable conditions and safeguards as it may deem necessary to implement to purposes of this act and the zoning ordinance.
The applicant shall have the burden of demonstrating that the proposal satisfies the applicable review criteria.
Zoning Code § 922.09.E (emphasis added).15 The Board has no discretion to grant a variance unless it finds that all of the above-enumerated conditions are met. Even if we accept Intervenors’ premise that a lesser quantum of evidence is required under Hertzberg, there must be some evidence presented on each of the conditions listed in Section 922.09.E before the Board can grant a variance. Given the record here, the Board did not, and could not, find that all conditions needed for a variance were found to exist in the case of Intervenors’ garage.16
[63]*63The overriding standard for a variance is unnecessary hardship. At the hearing Intervenors did not define their hardship, economic or otherwise, and they offered no evidence as to why the particular placement of the garage was required to avoid the unspecified hardship. Inter-venors argue, however, that other factors support a finding of hardship. They note that Seate is a nationally recognized expert on motorcycles whose work includes a regular column in the PITTSBURGH Tribune, six books and appearances on national news programs, such as the CBS Evening News. Seate makes his living from writing about motorcycle riding, etiquette and safety, and his motorcycle is his only form of transportation. He does not know how to operate a vehicle. Intervenors also argue that the neighborhood is dotted with garages large enough to house an automobile that “dwarf” Intervenors’ more modest structure.
It may well be that Seate needs the garage and that he will suffer a professional hardship in its absence.17 It may also be the case that the character of the neighborhood will be unaffected by the addition of the Intervenors’ garage. We may not, however, consider these facts in evaluating the validity of the variance because they are not in the record. The Board members appear to have drawn on their personal knowledge of Seate and of the neighborhood, but this knowledge is not a valid substitute for evidence of record. Interve-nors were required to place this evidence on the record, assuming its relevance to hardship, and they failed to do so.
Further, there is nothing in the record to support a finding that the variance granted was the “minimum” variance that will afford relief and will represent the least modification possible of the regulation in issue. Zoning Code § 922.09(E)(5). There was no finding that the garage would not “impair the appropriate use ... of adjacent property.” Id. at § 922.09(E)(4). It is impossible to determine whether the garage could have been located elsewhere on the lot so as to minimize the impact upon the Trust’s adjoining property, or whether the Board should have imposed conditions or safeguards upon the garage so as to make the structure more consonant with the purposes of the Zoning Code. Id.
Also troublesome is the fact that the Board appeared to shift the burden of proof from the applicant to the Trust by noting the opposing party’s failure to prove the requested variance unreasonable. Terry did, in fact, offer photographs and testimonial evidence on the unfortunate effect of the garage, located three feet from her kitchen window, upon her use and enjoyment of her property. This issue was not even addressed by the Board. It was required, however, to find that a variance would not “impair the appropriate use ... of adjacent property.” Zoning Code § 922.09E(4).
Finally, the Board granted a variance to permit the continued use of a structure that was erected in violation of the Zoning Code. The Zoning Code, however, requires a finding that the hardship [64]*64has “not been created by the appellant.” ZONING Code § 922.09E(3). In Appletree Land Development v. Zoning Hearing Board of York Township, 884 A.2d 1214 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003), we held that a landowner whose porch, violated a setback requirement by one foot, in one corner, was not entitled to a variance because the hardship was of the landowner’s; own making. We explained that “[t]here is a strong policy against assisting landowners who violate a zoning ordinance, whether negligently or intentionally, long apparent in this Court’s jurisprudence.” Id. at 1218. The burden of zoning compliance is upon the landowner; his failure to determine the zoning requirements applicable to the construction of a building on his property cannot be the basis for establishing an unnecessary hardship. Stated otherwise, the fact that Intervenors may be required to dismantle or reconstruct their existing garage is not a hardship because this is a situation of their own making.
In sum, the Board’s grant of an after-the-fact variance for Intervenors’ garage was improperly sustained by the trial court because Intervenors’ evidence fell wide of the mark established in the Zoning Code for the grant of a variance. Interve-nors did not present evidence on each of the relevant criteria and, thus, did not prove a hardship. The Board assumed facts not of record, which is always improper, to relieve Intervenors of their evi-dentiary burden, but even so, the Board did not assume enough facts to support a conclusion that the requested variance satisfied each requirement specified in Section 922.09.E of the Zoning Code.
Accordingly, the order of the trial court is reversed.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 28th day of April, 2005, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County dated March 19, 2004, in the above-captioned matter is hereby reversed.