Doris E. Wilson v. John E. Potter

Eighth Circuit

Doris E. Wilson v. John E. Potter

65 F. App'x 581

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

DecidedJune 6, 2003

Docket02-3658

StatusUnpublished

This text of 65 F. App'x 581 (Doris E. Wilson v. John E. Potter) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Doris E. Wilson v. John E. Potter, 65 F. App'x 581 (8th Cir. 2003).

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Opinion

*582 PER CURIAM.

Doris Wilson appeals the district court’s 1 adverse grant of summary judgment in her employment-discrimination suit. For reversal, she argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment because she made a trialworthy case and demanded a jury trial; that the district court erred in not compelling the defendant to cooperate in discovery; and that the district judge was biased. After careful review of the record, we affirm.

We agree that Wilson failed to exhaust administrative remedies for her race and national-origin claims. She did not raise them in her Equal Employment Opportunity complaint, and they are not reasonably related to the claims she did raise. See McAdams v. Reno, 64 F.3d 1137, 1141 (8th Cir.1995). We also agree that Wilson did not establish a prima facie case of gender or age discrimination; she offered no evidence that similarly situated employees outside the protected class were treated more favorably than she. See Jacob-Mua v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 517, 521-22 (8th Cir.2002); Tatom v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 228 F.3d 926, 931 (8th Cir.2000). Further, we agree that Wilson’s disability-discrimination claim fails because she did not show that she was disabled. See Fenney v. Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R. Co., 327 F.3d 707, 711 (8th Cir.2003).

Wilson’s discovery arguments are unavailing as well. Because she did not move to compel discovery and because she did not move for a continuance under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f), the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying her motion to produce documents. See Toghiyany v. AmeriGas Propane, Inc., 309 F.3d 1088, 1093 (8th Cir.2002); Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1238 (8th Cir.1997). Finally, Wilson did not move for recusal below, and she has produced nothing to show judicial bias warranting recusal by the district judge (sua sponte or otherwise). See Rush v. Smith, 56 F.3d 918, 922 (8th Cir.) (en banc) (standard of review), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 959, 116 S.Ct. 409, 133 L.Ed.2d 328 (1995).

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

1

. The Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.

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*582 PER CURIAM.

Doris Wilson appeals the district court’s 1 adverse grant of summary judgment in her employment-discrimination suit. For reversal, she argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment because she made a trialworthy case and demanded a jury trial; that the district court erred in not compelling the defendant to cooperate in discovery; and that the district judge was biased. After careful review of the record, we affirm.

We agree that Wilson failed to exhaust administrative remedies for her race and national-origin claims. She did not raise them in her Equal Employment Opportunity complaint, and they are not reasonably related to the claims she did raise. See McAdams v. Reno, 64 F.3d 1137, 1141 (8th Cir.1995). We also agree that Wilson did not establish a prima facie case of gender or age discrimination; she offered no evidence that similarly situated employees outside the protected class were treated more favorably than she. See Jacob-Mua v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 517, 521-22 (8th Cir.2002); Tatom v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 228 F.3d 926, 931 (8th Cir.2000). Further, we agree that Wilson’s disability-discrimination claim fails because she did not show that she was disabled. See Fenney v. Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R. Co., 327 F.3d 707, 711 (8th Cir.2003).

Wilson’s discovery arguments are unavailing as well. Because she did not move to compel discovery and because she did not move for a continuance under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f), the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying her motion to produce documents. See Toghiyany v. AmeriGas Propane, Inc., 309 F.3d 1088, 1093 (8th Cir.2002); Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1238 (8th Cir.1997). Finally, Wilson did not move for recusal below, and she has produced nothing to show judicial bias warranting recusal by the district judge (sua sponte or otherwise). See Rush v. Smith, 56 F.3d 918, 922 (8th Cir.) (en banc) (standard of review), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 959, 116 S.Ct. 409, 133 L.Ed.2d 328 (1995).

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

1

. The Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.

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