Dorian v. Johnson

297 N.W.2d 175, 1980 S.D. LEXIS 401
CourtSouth Dakota Supreme Court
DecidedOctober 8, 1980
Docket12751
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 297 N.W.2d 175 (Dorian v. Johnson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering South Dakota Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dorian v. Johnson, 297 N.W.2d 175, 1980 S.D. LEXIS 401 (S.D. 1980).

Opinion

WOLLMAN, Chief Justice.

FACTS

Plaintiff, Willard Lynn Dorian, Sr., appeals from the order denying his request for a writ of mandamus, a permanent injunction, and declaratory relief. We affirm.

Plaintiff is the guardian ad litem of Willard Lynn Dorian, Jr. William D. Johnson is the director of the Bureau of Vital Statistics (Bureau), South Dakota Department of Health.

Willard Lynn Dorian, Jr., was born March 3, 1976, to Amy Lou Respects Nothing, who was not married at the time of the conception or birth of the child. Amy Lou Respects Nothing named plaintiff as the child’s -father, but the birth certificate showed the child’s last name as Respects Nothing, pursuant to SDCL 34-25-13.3. 1

On May 4, 1977, plaintiff signed an affidavit acknowledging the paternity of Willard Lynn Dorian, Jr. Shortly thereafter, the paternity affidavit was submitted to the Bureau with the mother’s consent and a request that the birth certificate reflect the acknowledgment of paternity and show the child’s last name as Dorian.

The Bureau subsequently issued an amended birth certificate. A line had been drawn through Willard Lynn Dorian, Jr.’s original surname of “Respects Nothing” and the name “Dorian” typed in above the delineated words, as required by ARSD 44:09:05:07 and 09. 2 The word “amended” appears at the top of the certificate.

Plaintiff then filed a class action suit in circuit court, contending that the Bureau had unlawfully discriminated in amending the birth certificate rather than issuing a *177 new certificate. Plaintiff claims that the amended certificate calls attention to the fact that Willard Lynn Dorian, Jr., is illegitimate.

I

The first contention on appeal is that South Dakota law imposes a duty upon the state to issue a new birth certificate instead of an amended certificate when paternity of the child is acknowledged by affidavit. We do not agree.

The South Dakota Legislature has enacted statutes governing vital records and the registration, amendment, and certification of births, deaths, fetal deaths, burials, marriages and divorces. SDCL ch. 34-25. These statutes provide for only two instances in which a new birth certificate is to be issued. 3 The first instance is upon legitimation of the child and is governed by SDCL 34-25-15:

In cases of legitimation, the state department of health, upon receipt of proof of the marriage of the parents of an illegitimate child together with an affidavit of paternity signed by both parents of the child, shall prepare a new certificate of birth in the new name of the legitimated child.

The second instance in which a new birth certificate is issued is upon adoption. SDCL 34-25-16 provides:

Within ten days after the filing of every original, amended or annulled decree of adoption, the clerk of courts shall forward to the department such information necessary to establish a new certificate of birth on a form prepared by the department.

The legislature did, however, give the secretary of health the authority to adopt regulations under which a certificate could be amended. This authority is granted to the secretary of health in SDCL 34-25-51, which provides in part:

A certificate or record registered under this chapter may be amended in accord-anee with regulations adopted by the secretary of health. ...

We conclude that while adoption or legitimation by marriage results in the issuance of a new certificate, other certificates can only be amended, as prescribed by regulations adopted by the secretary of health.

The rules of statutory construction require that the purpose of a statute or statutes is to be determined from a reading of the act as a whole. State v. Douglas, 70 S.D. 203, 16 N.W.2d 489 (1944). Likewise, “this court will not enlarge a statute beyond its face where the statutory terms are clear and unambiguous in meaning and do not lead to an absurd or unreasonable conclusion.” Ogle v. Circuit Ct., Tenth Jud. Circuit, 89 S.D. 18, 21, 227 N.W.2d 621, 623 (1975). Furthermore, words and phrases should be given their plain meaning and effect. Board of Regents v. Carter, 89 S.D. 40, 228 N.W.2d 621 (1975).

Here, the legislature has made a distinction between a new certificate and an amended certificate. The use of the plain meaning of these words does not lead to an unreasonable conclusion. Accordingly, we hold that the Bureau did not err in issuing an amended birth certificate.

II

The second issue is whether the prohibition of the issuance of a new birth certificate to an illegitimate child upon acknowledgment of paternity is violative of the due process and equal protection clauses of the United States and South Dakota Constitutions. We hold that it is not.

This Court has in the past utilized a two-part test in determining whether the equal protection clause has been violated. City of Aberdeen v. Meidinger, 89 S.D. 412, 233 N.W.2d 331 (1975). See also Morrill v. Wollman, 271 N.W.2d 356 (S.D.1978). The first part of this test is “whether, the statute does set up arbitrary classifications among various persons subject to it.” City *178 of Aberdeen v. Meidinger, supra, 89 S.D. at 415, 233 N.W.2d at 333. The second part of the test is the application of the appropriate standard of review to this arbitrary classification.

In the case at bar, we do not find it necessary to apply the second part of the test. We conclude that the statutes involved here do not set up arbitrary classifications among various persons subject to the statute.

“[I]n order to subject a law to any form of review under the equal protection guarantee one must be able to demonstrate that the law classifies persons in some manner.” Nowak, Rotunda & Young, Constitutional Law, p. 527 (1978). In this case plaintiff contends that the state’s policy of amending birth certificates distinguishes illegitimate children from legitimate children and certain legitimated children.

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Bluebook (online)
297 N.W.2d 175, 1980 S.D. LEXIS 401, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dorian-v-johnson-sd-1980.