Dore v. Omaha & Council Bluffs Street Railway Co.

149 N.W. 792, 97 Neb. 250, 1914 Neb. LEXIS 353
CourtNebraska Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 4, 1914
DocketNo. 17,830
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 149 N.W. 792 (Dore v. Omaha & Council Bluffs Street Railway Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nebraska Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dore v. Omaha & Council Bluffs Street Railway Co., 149 N.W. 792, 97 Neb. 250, 1914 Neb. LEXIS 353 (Neb. 1914).

Opinion

Reese, C. J.

This is an action for personal injuries. Plaintiff being an infant sues by his next friend, John J. Dore. The uncontested facts are that on or about December 31, .1908, at the hour of about 4 o’clock in the afternoon, the plaintiff, a boy seven years of age, with his sister, a girl nine years of age, boarded a street car of defendant at Twenty-fourth and N streets, in South Omaha, to ride north to F street, in the vicinity of their home. They paid their fare and took seats near the rear door of the car. By some means the boy fell or was thrown from the car to the street, and received the injuries of which he complains. The street car was stopped. The conductor, with the help of others, picked up the boy and carried him into a nearby saloon. The girl started at once to notify their mother, and returned with her but met a physician and others taking the boy home, where he was placed on a bed, and the family physician sent for, who appeared in a very short time and ministered to plaintiff. The foregoing facts are substantially alleged in the petition, with the further averments that, after the children had proceeded to and passed <3- street and were approaching F street, the point of their destination, the sister arose from her seat, signaled and notified the conductor, who was in the forward part of the car, of their desire to disembark at F street, which they were approaching, but that the conductor paid no attention to said signal and notification and failed and refused to stop the car at the usual and proper place after crossing F street; that, as they came near the stopping place of the car, plaintiff left his seat, walking to the door, which he opened, and stood in the doorway preparatory to alighting from the car; that the conductor “recklessly, negligently and carelessly disregarded the safety of [252]*252said infant, Francis Thomas Bore, well knowing that said infant was standing in the rear of said car and was desir- ' ous of alighting therefrom at F street, refused and neglected to signal the car to stop, and when said car arrived at F street the employee of defendant herein, unmindful of the safety of said child, Francis Thomas Bore, negligently applied greater power to said car, thereby causing the car to give a sudden lurch forward, and by reason thereof the said Francis Thomas Doré lost his hold of the car as he was standing in the doorway of the car and was thrown violently out of said car, striking the guard-rail thereof, and onto the pavement of the street,” receiving great and lasting injuries. Negligence is alleged in the failure to stop the car and in failing to exercise any care for the protection of said child. The negligence of the motorman is alleged by reason of his act in greatly increasing the power causing the car to give a great lurch, whereby plaintiff was injured by being thrown upon the pavement of the street striking his head and side, causing concussion of the brain, as well as internal injuries; that the injuries received are permanent; that before receiving them plaintiff was a strong, healthy and intelligent child, but that by reason thereof his health has greatly declined, and he has suffered both physically and mentally to his great and permanent damage, to the extent of $15,000, for which judgment was demanded.

The answer of defendant contains a number of specific denials, among which are that the sister notified the conductor that she and plaintiff desired to alight from the car at F street, that the conductor neglected plaintiff in any way, that he refused or neglected to signal the car to stop at F street, that the car gave a sudden jerk forward, and that by reason of any jerking of the car plaintiff was thrown out of the car and injured. The answer set up the facts of the entry and passage of the children on the car substantially as above stated; alleged that they appeared familiar with riding on street cars; that there was nothing in their conduct or appearance to indicate that they would attempt to leave the car while in motion; that with[253]*253out any notice or warning given to the conductor, who was then engaged with other passengers, plaintiff suddenly left his seat in the car, went out onto the platform, and, while the car was in motion at its usual rate of speed, wilfully and knowingly stepped from the car to the pavement; that the accident was the result of the wilful act of plaintiff in leaving his seat and stepping from the moving-car. There is also a general denial of the averments of the petition. The reply is a general denial of the allegations of the answer. There was a jury trial, which resulted in a verdict in favor of plaintiff for $1,500. A motion for new trial was filed, overruled, and judgment rendered on the verdict. Defendant appeals.

As is usual in such cases, there was a sharp conflict in the evidence hearing upon the facts of the cause of the accident. The plaintiff’s evidence depended largely upon the testimony of the little girl and that of a lady who sat near them in the car, and upon the testimony of others, which in some degree, though slight, tended to corroborate certain portions of their evidence. As is well understood, these questions of conflict are solely for the consideration of the jury, and, where there is sufficient to sustain the verdict, it cannot be reviewed by the courts: There was sufficient, if believed by the jury, to sustain a finding that the ages of the children were as stated; that they boarded the car at Twenty-fourth and N streets, paid their fare, and were seated in the car near the rear door without any inquiry by- the conductor as to their destination or where they desired to leave the car; that as the car approached F street, after passing G street, they both arose in their places, and the girl signaled to the conductor to stop the car at F street; that the conductor was looking at her át the time, but failed to signal to the motorman to stop the car; that, as the car approached F street, plaintiff went to the door, opened it, and was standing in the doorway, holding to the sides of the doorway, apparently waiting for the car to stop in order that he might leave it; that while he was thus standing, by a sudden increase of power, or otherwise, the car gave a lurch or jerk, by [254]*254which plaintiff was thrown to the rear platform, striking his head against an iron guard-rail, and thrown from the car upon the pavement, striking upon his head and side, by which, it seems, he was rendered unconscious and helpless; that the car was stopped after running a short distance, when the conductor went back to where he was lying, and, with the assistance of others, picked him up,, carried him into a nearby saloon, where the conductor left him in charge of others and proceeded on his way with the car; that the child was assisted to his home, where he complained of his head and the soreness of his body, was at times delirious, was for a long time confined to his bed and room; that since his apparent and partial recovery he has lost in Aveight and mental power, and has never entirely recovered from the effects of the accident.

It was assigned in the motion for a neAV trial that the amount of the verdict was excessive. We cannot so conclude. Assuming, as we must, that the facts found by the jury are correct, we are unable to see that the verdict could have, rightfully, been for less.

The brief of appellant is exhaustive, and many cases are cited with extracts from the holdings of the various courts. The particular point to which those cases are cited is to the effect that a jerk or lurch of the car is not of itself eAddence of negligence.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Camerlinck v. Thomas
312 N.W.2d 260 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1981)
Vantage Enterprises, Inc. v. Caldwell
244 N.W.2d 678 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1976)
Rakes v. State
62 N.W.2d 273 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1954)
Wilson v. State
34 N.W.2d 880 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1948)
Linch v. Thorpe
300 N.W. 383 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1941)
Norton v. State
230 N.W. 438 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1930)
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Harrelson
14 F.2d 893 (Eighth Circuit, 1926)
Taylor v. Keneston
161 N.W. 175 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1916)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
149 N.W. 792, 97 Neb. 250, 1914 Neb. LEXIS 353, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dore-v-omaha-council-bluffs-street-railway-co-neb-1914.