Dorado v. Stephan

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DANIEL DORADO, Case No.: 25-cv-0083-WQH (SBC) CDCR #BN-7728, 12

Plaintiff, 13 vs. ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 14 EXTENSION OF TIME TO AMEND SUMMER STEPHAN, San Diego District 15 Attorney; JESSICA COTO, Deputy San 16 Diego District Attorney; KATHERINE CRUMB, San Diego Police Detective; 17 NANCY KARMELECH, Accuser; and 18 CHARLES ROGERS, Superior Court Judge, 19 Defendants. 20 21 HAYES, Judge: 22 On January 7, 2025, Plaintiff Daniel Dorado, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed 23 a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, accompanied by a Motion to Proceed 24 In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”). (ECF Nos. 1-2.) Plaintiff alleged that Defendants San Diego 25 County District Attorney Summer Stephan, San Diego County Deputy District Attorney 26 Jessica Coto, San Diego County Superior Court Judge Charles Rogers, San Diego Police 27 Detective Katherine Crumb, and Nancy Karmelech, an “accuser,” were all involved in his 28 1 San Diego County Superior Court criminal prosecution which resulted in his December 2 2019 conviction for raping four women. (ECF No. 1 at 2-3; ECF No. 1-26 at 25.) On 3 February 25, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP and screened the 4 Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b), which require sua sponte 5 dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, 6 fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. (ECF No. 7.) 7 The Court found the claims for damages against Defendant Judge Rogers are barred by the 8 doctrine of judicial immunity, the claims for damages against Defendants District Attorney 9 Stephan and Deputy District Attorney Coto are barred by the doctrine of quasi-judicial 10 immunity, and Defendant Karmelech, a private citizen who testified against Plaintiff, was 11 not acting under color of state law. (Id. at 5-7.) The Court found Plaintiff had failed to 12 state a damages claim against the remaining Defendant Detective Crumb, and did not state 13 a § 1983 claim for equitable relief against any Defendant, because to the extent success on 14 his claims would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of his confinement or its duration, 15 he had not shown his conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged 16 by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such 17 determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas 18 corpus, and to the extent Plaintiff sought to raise claims unrelated to his conviction he had 19 presented conclusory allegations. (Id. at 7-9.) Although it appeared unlikely Plaintiff 20 would be able to amend his Complaint to state a claim, because he is proceeding pro se, 21 the Court granted an opportunity to amend on or before April 11, 2025. (Id. at 9-10.) 22 On March 14, 2025, Plaintiff filed the present Motion for an extension of time to file 23 an amended complaint. (ECF No. 9.) Plaintiff states that he is currently challenging certain 24 aspects of his conviction in state court but thinks it unlikely he will succeed in having his 25 conviction invalidated by the time his amended complaint is due in this action, and requests 26 either an extension of time to amend to include additional claims relating to his conviction, 27 which he admits would be “senseless” since he needs time to invalidate his conviction 28 through state and federal habeas actions before proceeding with his claims here, or advice 1 on how to “get around” the April 11, 2025, deadline. (Id. at 1-2.) 2 To the extent Plaintiff requests a stay, as noted in the Court’s prior dismissal Order, 3 Plaintiff’s conviction has been upheld on appeal and he is currently proceeding with 4 resentencing based on intervening changes in state sentencing laws. (ECF No. 7 at 5 n.2.) 5 Once a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 plaintiff has been convicted, a stay is not necessary to avoid 6 interference with ongoing criminal proceedings, and dismissal is required if, as here, 7 success on the merits of the claims for damages would necessarily demonstrate the 8 invalidity of confinement or its duration. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 394 (2007) (“If 9 the plaintiff is ultimately convicted, and if the stayed civil suit would impugn that 10 conviction,” dismissal is required absent invalidation of the conviction); see also Davis v. 11 O’Connor, No. 18cv2824-LAB (LL), 2019 WL 290571, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2019) 12 (where plaintiff had opportunity to raise his federal claims in his state criminal proceedings 13 and abstention is not available, dismissal without prejudice rather than stay of damages 14 claims is appropriate) (citing Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 981-82 (9th Cir. 2004) 15 (noting that dismissal is the appropriate remedy with respect to unripe claims for injunctive 16 relief)). In any case, irrespective of whether a stay is available, in this case it is clear 17 Plaintiff has not stated a claim for damages which would survive mandatory dismissal on 18 screening even were he to succeed in invalidating his conviction. Rather, he seeks damages 19 from the trial court Judge, two prosecutors, an investigating detective and a witness. As 20 the Court noted in the previous dismissal Order, the Complaint fails to state a claim for 21 damages against any of these Defendants, and a stay of this action is not available or 22 appropriate. 23 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for an extension of time to amend is DENIED. 24 Plaintiff is once again notified that an amended complaint is due on April 11, 2025, and 25 26 27 28 1 be complete by itself without reference to his original pleading. 2 If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint within the time provided, or voluntarily 3 || dismisses his Complaint, the Court will enter a final Order dismissing this civil action based 4 || both on Plaintiff's failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 5 ||U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)Gi) & 1915A(b)(1), and failure to prosecute in compliance with a 6 || court order requiring amendment. See Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) 7 || Tf a plaintiff does not take advantage of the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district 8 ||}court may convert the dismissal of the complaint into dismissal of the entire action.”). 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 || Dated: April 1, 2025 itt Zz. Ma 11 Hon. William Q. Hayes 2 United States District Court 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 || 27 ||! Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on February 24, 2025, which the Court had not received before it 3g || issued its Order dismissing the original complaint. (See ECF No. 8.) However, that amended complaint contains no factual allegations and it remains unclear as to what purpose it was submitted.