Mr. Justice Davila
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Several persons filed a complaint against the Dorado Beach Hotel Corporation pursuant to the procedure established in Act No. 2 of October 17, 1961, 32 L.P.R.A. § 3118 (Supp. 1964), in a claim for wages, vacation and extra hours worked. They allege that “defendant contracted and utilized the services of the complainant workers as ‘caddies’ for ‘tourists’ or permanent or transient guests at its hotel, who used its golf course to play said sport.”
The defendant challenged the validity of the Act which established the procedure on which complainants based their claim. Defendant maintains that it is unconstitutional because said measure of legislative origin establishes a procedure for claims of wages, thus contravening the constitutional precept which provides that the Supreme Court is the body authorized to adopt initially the regulation of the judicial procedures. The constitutional provision invoked is § 6 of Art. Y which reads as follows:
“The Supreme Court shall adopt for the courts rules of evidence and of civil and criminal procedure which shall not abridge, enlarge or modify the substantive rights of the parties. The rules thus adopted shall be submitted to the Legislative Assembly at the beginning of its next regular session and shall [596]*596not g-o into effect until sixty days after the close of said session, unless disapproved by the Legislative Assembly, which shall have the power both at said session and subsequently to amend, repeal or supplement any of said rules by a specific law to that effect.”
The trial court dismissed the constitutional contention and then defendant, pursuant to Rule 30 of the Rules of Civil Procedure of 1958, delivered some interrogatories to complainants.1 It requested a 20-day term to answer the com[597]*597plaint as of the date of the answer to the interrogatories. The extension requested was granted. Complainants then filed a petition to set aside the extension granted and to order that the complaint be answered “without the need of the discovery of information requested because it is contrary to § 3 of Act No. 2 of October 17, 1961.”
The court decided that complainants were not under obligation to answer the interrogatories. Upon passing on tne question it stated:
“This statute [ 3 of Act No. 2 of October 17, 1961] prevents the discovery of information in these cases of claims for wages prosecuted according to a particular procedural law prescribed for this type of actions; the discovery of information prohibited is that which relates to data which must appear in the papers, payrolls, lists of wages and other records which employers are bound to keep under the provisions of the Minimum Wage Act and the regulations promulgated thereunder.”
Upon relieving complainants from answering the interrogatories it granted defendant 20 days to answer the complaint.
The complaint was answered within the prescribed term but defendant requested us to review the order which relieved the complainants from answering the interrogatories as well as the refusal to declare Act No. 2 of October 17, 1961 unconstitutional.
Defendant argues that § 6 of the Judiciary Article of our Constitution only empowers the Legislative Assembly to amend, repeal or supplement the rules initially adopted by the Supreme Court. Granting that is the only faculty the Legislative Assembly has we must examine the background of the challenged Act.
Almost fifty years ago the Legislative Assembly approved an act adopting a summary proceeding to regulate the claims for wages. It established a rapid and simple procedure to expedite the proceedings in these claims. When this Court [598]*598first adopted the Rules of Procedure in 1943, the procedure established by the Legislative Assembly by means of Act No. 10 of 1917 remained in effect. Likewise in 1958 when new Rules of Procedure were adopted it was specifically provided in Rule 61 that “all special legal proceedings and any other proceedings of a special nature not covered by Rules 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, and 602 shall be prosecuted in the manner provided by law.” Therefore, the procedure established by the Act of 1917 subsisted as rule of procedure adopted by this Court.
Thus, insofar as this Act is concerned, since it was adopted by this Court as special regulation for claims for wages, the Legislative Assembly could amend, repeal or supplement it.
Albeit the Act of 1961 repealed the Act of 1917, the truth is that if both statutes are examined it will be noted that the new Act is fundamentally the same as the one repealed. In fact, it is a reenactment of the former with some amendments. It keeps the basic principles of the former and the chief amendment consists of adding the provisions related to the manner in which the Rules of Procedure concerning the discovery of information3 shall be applied. In [599]*599fact, the Legislative Assembly did not approve new rules of procedure for claims for wages. It amended the law in effect which had been adopted by this Court as rule of procedure for this type of claims, and there is no doubt that the Legislative Assembly could amend it. The Constitution specifically authorizes it. See Ramos Buonomo, La Natura-[600]*600leza del Poder del Tribunal Supremo de Puerto Rico para Adoptar Reglas de Procedimiento Civil y Criminal y Reglas de Evidencia, 33 Rev. U.P.R. 390, 406 (1954).
Let us consider now the question of the interrogatories served by defendant corporation. The trial judge decided that complainants were under no obligation to disclose the information requested inasmuch as the Act provides that “in [601]*601relation with the pretrial means of disclosure authorized by the Rules of Civil Procedure ... the defendant may not use them to obtain information which must appear in the records, payrolls, wage lists and other records which the employers are bound to keep under the provisions of the Minimum Wage Act and the regulations promulgated thereunder. . . .”
But we cannot apply the law completely apart from the allegations. In the answer filed it is stated that the defendant “specifically alleges that complainants are not and never were employees of defendant.” This is, in fact, the main defense raised by defendant. We must presume that said allegation has been made in good faith. When a bona fide controversy exists on whether or not plaintiffs have been employees of defendant and the latter, believing they have not been, does not carry records, payrolls, wage lists and other records, which it is bound to keep under the provisions of the Minimum Wage Act, the provision of the Act of 1961 [602]*602which prohibits employers from using interrogatories to request such information which they should carry and keep cannot be applied.
It could be argued that in order to be able to use the interrogatories, any defendant would only have to allege that complainants have not been its employees. Nevertheless, nothing prevents plaintiffs from requesting the admission of that fact and in the event defendant denies it and it is proved afterwards to be true, defendant will be subject to the corresponding sanction.
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Mr. Justice Davila
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Several persons filed a complaint against the Dorado Beach Hotel Corporation pursuant to the procedure established in Act No. 2 of October 17, 1961, 32 L.P.R.A. § 3118 (Supp. 1964), in a claim for wages, vacation and extra hours worked. They allege that “defendant contracted and utilized the services of the complainant workers as ‘caddies’ for ‘tourists’ or permanent or transient guests at its hotel, who used its golf course to play said sport.”
The defendant challenged the validity of the Act which established the procedure on which complainants based their claim. Defendant maintains that it is unconstitutional because said measure of legislative origin establishes a procedure for claims of wages, thus contravening the constitutional precept which provides that the Supreme Court is the body authorized to adopt initially the regulation of the judicial procedures. The constitutional provision invoked is § 6 of Art. Y which reads as follows:
“The Supreme Court shall adopt for the courts rules of evidence and of civil and criminal procedure which shall not abridge, enlarge or modify the substantive rights of the parties. The rules thus adopted shall be submitted to the Legislative Assembly at the beginning of its next regular session and shall [596]*596not g-o into effect until sixty days after the close of said session, unless disapproved by the Legislative Assembly, which shall have the power both at said session and subsequently to amend, repeal or supplement any of said rules by a specific law to that effect.”
The trial court dismissed the constitutional contention and then defendant, pursuant to Rule 30 of the Rules of Civil Procedure of 1958, delivered some interrogatories to complainants.1 It requested a 20-day term to answer the com[597]*597plaint as of the date of the answer to the interrogatories. The extension requested was granted. Complainants then filed a petition to set aside the extension granted and to order that the complaint be answered “without the need of the discovery of information requested because it is contrary to § 3 of Act No. 2 of October 17, 1961.”
The court decided that complainants were not under obligation to answer the interrogatories. Upon passing on tne question it stated:
“This statute [ 3 of Act No. 2 of October 17, 1961] prevents the discovery of information in these cases of claims for wages prosecuted according to a particular procedural law prescribed for this type of actions; the discovery of information prohibited is that which relates to data which must appear in the papers, payrolls, lists of wages and other records which employers are bound to keep under the provisions of the Minimum Wage Act and the regulations promulgated thereunder.”
Upon relieving complainants from answering the interrogatories it granted defendant 20 days to answer the complaint.
The complaint was answered within the prescribed term but defendant requested us to review the order which relieved the complainants from answering the interrogatories as well as the refusal to declare Act No. 2 of October 17, 1961 unconstitutional.
Defendant argues that § 6 of the Judiciary Article of our Constitution only empowers the Legislative Assembly to amend, repeal or supplement the rules initially adopted by the Supreme Court. Granting that is the only faculty the Legislative Assembly has we must examine the background of the challenged Act.
Almost fifty years ago the Legislative Assembly approved an act adopting a summary proceeding to regulate the claims for wages. It established a rapid and simple procedure to expedite the proceedings in these claims. When this Court [598]*598first adopted the Rules of Procedure in 1943, the procedure established by the Legislative Assembly by means of Act No. 10 of 1917 remained in effect. Likewise in 1958 when new Rules of Procedure were adopted it was specifically provided in Rule 61 that “all special legal proceedings and any other proceedings of a special nature not covered by Rules 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, and 602 shall be prosecuted in the manner provided by law.” Therefore, the procedure established by the Act of 1917 subsisted as rule of procedure adopted by this Court.
Thus, insofar as this Act is concerned, since it was adopted by this Court as special regulation for claims for wages, the Legislative Assembly could amend, repeal or supplement it.
Albeit the Act of 1961 repealed the Act of 1917, the truth is that if both statutes are examined it will be noted that the new Act is fundamentally the same as the one repealed. In fact, it is a reenactment of the former with some amendments. It keeps the basic principles of the former and the chief amendment consists of adding the provisions related to the manner in which the Rules of Procedure concerning the discovery of information3 shall be applied. In [599]*599fact, the Legislative Assembly did not approve new rules of procedure for claims for wages. It amended the law in effect which had been adopted by this Court as rule of procedure for this type of claims, and there is no doubt that the Legislative Assembly could amend it. The Constitution specifically authorizes it. See Ramos Buonomo, La Natura-[600]*600leza del Poder del Tribunal Supremo de Puerto Rico para Adoptar Reglas de Procedimiento Civil y Criminal y Reglas de Evidencia, 33 Rev. U.P.R. 390, 406 (1954).
Let us consider now the question of the interrogatories served by defendant corporation. The trial judge decided that complainants were under no obligation to disclose the information requested inasmuch as the Act provides that “in [601]*601relation with the pretrial means of disclosure authorized by the Rules of Civil Procedure ... the defendant may not use them to obtain information which must appear in the records, payrolls, wage lists and other records which the employers are bound to keep under the provisions of the Minimum Wage Act and the regulations promulgated thereunder. . . .”
But we cannot apply the law completely apart from the allegations. In the answer filed it is stated that the defendant “specifically alleges that complainants are not and never were employees of defendant.” This is, in fact, the main defense raised by defendant. We must presume that said allegation has been made in good faith. When a bona fide controversy exists on whether or not plaintiffs have been employees of defendant and the latter, believing they have not been, does not carry records, payrolls, wage lists and other records, which it is bound to keep under the provisions of the Minimum Wage Act, the provision of the Act of 1961 [602]*602which prohibits employers from using interrogatories to request such information which they should carry and keep cannot be applied.
It could be argued that in order to be able to use the interrogatories, any defendant would only have to allege that complainants have not been its employees. Nevertheless, nothing prevents plaintiffs from requesting the admission of that fact and in the event defendant denies it and it is proved afterwards to be true, defendant will be subject to the corresponding sanction. On the other hand, the prohibition to use the means to discover information is directed to the employer because complainants being its employees, it is bound to carry and keep the records under the provisions of the Minimum Wage Act and the regulations; but if it is true that defendant did not keep these records because as we already said, it believes in good faith that they are not its employees, then the application of the former, the prohibition to utilize the means to discover information, would turn out to be discriminatory and of doubtful validity. Besides, it is a means to help clarify and simplify the judicial controversy. If prior to the trial defendant did not have knowledge of the details requested, it could only obtain them by means of cross-examination and, evidently, at that time it would not be in the best position to challenge complainant’s evidence and the hearing would be unduly prolonged. Thus, in view of the attendant circumstances in the case at bar, in which it is alleged that complainants are not employees, the information requested should be given to defendant.
The order appealed from will be set aside and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing.
Mr. Justice Belaval concurs in the result. Mr. Justice Santana Becerra concurs in part and dissents in part.
[603]*603Mr. Justice Hernández Matos and Mr. Justice Blanco Lugo did not participate.
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