Dooney & Bourke Inc v. Lee

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: December 17, 1998
• Docket: 98-1544
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

DOONEY & BOURKE, INCORPORATED, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

YONG HEE LEE;OK JA LEE; WAN LEE, Defendants-Appellants, No. 98-1544 and

D. B. TRADING CORPORATION; KIM ALLISON; CHONG MIZE; IN SUK ROCHA; KYONG SUN WATERS; JANE DOE; JOHN DOE, Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Greenville. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., District Judge. (CA-96-2918-20-6, CA-96-2239-20-6)

Submitted: November 17, 1998

Decided: December 17, 1998

Before WILKINS, LUTTIG, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Yong Hee Lee, Ok Ja Lee, Wan Lee, Appellants Pro Se. Oscar Wil- liam Bannister, Jr., HILL, WYATT & BANNISTER, LLP, Green- ville, South Carolina; Cort Flint, Jr., Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Appellants Yong Hee Lee, Ok Ja Lee, and Wan Lee appeal from the district court's judgment, after a jury trial, awarding Dooney & Bourke, Inc., damages due to trademark infringements. For the rea- sons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

The Lees raise two nonmeritorious claims on appeal. First, we find no support in the record that Dooney & Bourke transacts business in the state of South Carolina such that it would be required to obtain a certificate of authority. See S.C. Code Ann. § 33-15-102(a) (Law. Co-op. 1990) (South Carolina's "door-closing statute" prohibits com- panies who transact business without a certificate of authority from filing suit in a S.C. court). In addition, even if § 33-15-102(a) is appli- cable to Dooney & Bourke (which we do not find), the Lees have pro- vided no authority for the proposition that a South Carolina statute may bar a federal court action based upon federal question jurisdic- tion. Rather, § 33-15-102(a) has only been used to bar actions based on state law. See Chet Adams Co. v. James F. Pedersen Co., 413 S.E.2d 827 (S.C. 1992); Cost of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Shaw, 357 S.E.2d 20 (S.C. 1987); cf. Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20 (1974) (holding that a Mississippi door-closing statute may not impede a diversity action concerning interstate or foreign commerce brought in a federal court). Second, the Lees' argument that the dis- trict court lacked personal jurisdiction over them fails because they voluntarily appeared before the court and testified at the trial. See Maybin v. Northside Correctional Ctr., 891 F.2d 72, 74-75 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that the issue of personal jurisdiction is waived unless the party appears before the court solely to contest such jurisdiction).

2 Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We dis- pense with oral argument as the facts and legal contentions have been adequately presented before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED