Dooner v. President of Delaware

33 A. 415, 171 Pa. 581, 1895 Pa. LEXIS 1346
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedNovember 4, 1895
DocketAppeal, No. 446
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 33 A. 415 (Dooner v. President of Delaware) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dooner v. President of Delaware, 33 A. 415, 171 Pa. 581, 1895 Pa. LEXIS 1346 (Pa. 1895).

Opinion

Opinion by

Mr. Justice Green,

The plaintiff was a brakeman in the employment of the corporation defendant, and had been engaged in that kind of ser[587]*587vice about five years prior to tire occurrence of the accident in question. The last year of that time he was in the service of the defendant. He therefore had all the experience necessary to qualify him for the performance of his duties, and to apprise him of its risks and hazards. He was twenty-eight years of age and in good physical condition as he testified himself. He received his injury while engaged in the act of uncoupling a freight car from the tender of the engine. He had completed the act of uncoupling by withdrawing the pin, had gone to the side of the car for the purpose of signaling to the engineer that all was right by extending his hand beyond the side of the ear, and was returning to the steps on the end of the car when he lost his balance, fell from the car and one of his legs was crushed under the wheels. He claims damages of the defendant for his injury. There was no defect alleged in any of the appliances on the end of the freight car from which he fell, and there is nothing upon which to base an allegation of negligence against the company except the character, or kind of the appliances that were fitted upon the end of the freight car for the use of the brakemen in the performance of their duties. Such an allegation is therefore made, and upon that alone the charge of negligence is based.

The car did not belong to the defendant. It belonged to another company and came to the defendant for transportation over the railroad of the defendant in the regular course of its movement. The defendant was legally bound to receive and transport it under article XVII. sec. 1, of our constitution, which provides that railroads, “ Shall receive and transport each other’s passengers, tonnage and cars, loaded or empty, without delay or discrimination.”

When this case was here before, 164 Pa. 17, our brother Dean, delivering the opinion, said, “ While every road must obey the mandate of section 1, article XVII. of the constitution, ‘ to receive and transport .... cars loaded or empty, without delay or discrimination,’ of another connecting road, yet by no reasonable construction, can that be held to mean cars of another road not in a condition for transportation, or not provided with the appliances which ordinary care requires, for the reasonable safety of train crews in properly handling them.” He also said, “ The measure of duty of the receiving [588]*588road as to oars turned over to it for transportation by connecting roads is settled by many cases; ‘ it is bound to make such inspection as the nature of the transportation requires, and if it pass and haul cars faulty in construction, or dangerously out of repair it is answerable to its own employees who are thereby injured.’ ”

Of course, this measure of duty cannot be higher than the duty owing by railroad companies to their own employees in respect of the appliances which they are required to furnish on their own cars. That duty is fully discharged if the appliances are such as are in ordinary use though they may not be the best or the safest for the purpose. If the evidence in any given case shows that the appliance was such as was in common use, it is the duty of the court to pronounce upon the case on its merits, and not to send to the jury the question whether it was sufficient for the protection of the employee against accidents.

This consideration renders it necessary for us to examine the testimony and ascertain the state of the evidence on this question in the present case.

The plaintiff’s complaint is that the freight car in question was not provided with grab-irons or hand-holds on the end of the car sufficient for his protection from falling. The defendant’s reply is that it was provided with steps for the use of the brakemen which were so constructed as to answer the purpose of grab-irons or hand-holds, as well as of steps, and that freight cars having such appliances were in common use, and were sufficient for the protection of the brakemen, if used with ordinary care. There is no question that the iron steps on this car were so constructed that they could be used as hand-holds, and that they were sufficient if actually used. The plaintiff admitted on cross-examination, though with considerable reluctance, that in performing the act of uncoupling the car from the tender he did actually use one of the steps on the end of the freight car while he stooped down, reached the coupling pin and withdrew it, so that the uncoupling of the car was completed successfully and he resumed an erect position, using only the appliance provided. He was asked, “ Q. You pulled the pin with one hand? A. Yes, sir. Q. What did you take hold of with the other hand ? A. I had nothing to take hold of. Q. Did you [589]*589take bold of anything? A. When I pulled the pin I was against the car with my hand like that right on the step—on this lower step.' I had hold of the step when I pulled the pin. Q. Why did you say you hadn’t anything to take hold of? A. I had no handle; I had the iron step and that had a hole in it. Q. You had that iron step to take hold of? A. I had. Q. And you did take hold of it? A. I took hold of it while I pulled the pin. Q. Did you let go of the iron step when you went over to the side? A. Yes, sir. . . . Q. What did you take hold of when you walked over to the corner ? A. I walked right over with my back against the car, my face toward the tender. Q. You could have uncoupled that car and made that fly with perfect safety if you had held on to the ix-on step and told the engineer to go ahead ? A. If I told him. . . . Q. How many steps did you take toward the brake before you fell ? A. I gave the second step. Q. Before you fell? A. Yes, sir. Q. And that was the first time that you tried to find this hand-hold ? A. Yes, sii-.”

It is thus seen that, upon the plaintiff’s own testimony, after he pulled the pin he stood up on the narrow beam or deadwood with his back against the car, let go his hold of the step, stepped to the right side of the car, gave the signal to the engineer by moving his hand up and down beyond the side of the car, then endeavored to return to the iron step, took one step towards it and was taking the second when he lost his balance and fell. He had passed successfully from the iron step to the-side of the car on the beam and attempted to return in the same way when he fell in taking the second step. Of course he took the chances supposing that what he had just done he could do again. This is verified by his further direct examination: “ Q. What uses are made of these handles on the front end of the car? A. To steady yourself while you are there, to get-hold of to use for protection so you won’t fall off. Q. This car would have been all right then if it had this hand-hold that you talk about on the end of the car? A. Had something there to get hold of I don’t think I would fall off. The Court: Yes, if the witness can answer the question direct let him do so, if he cannot let him say so. A. On the front end of the car if there was a handle there I think it would be all right sure. Q. And you have seen plenty of cars like this, except you say, [590]*590this car, did not have the hand-hold? A. I have seen cars with iron steps but I always seen handles on the front end of the car. I often seen iron steps but I never saw iron steps as close to a brake wheel as those were on the car I was hurt on.” Recross-examination. “ Q.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
33 A. 415, 171 Pa. 581, 1895 Pa. LEXIS 1346, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dooner-v-president-of-delaware-pa-1895.