1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DONTAE ALFONSO WILBURN, No. 2:24-cv-03638 SCR P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 NAVARUS, 15 Defendant. 16 17 Plaintiff is incarcerated in state prison and proceeding pro se with a civil rights action 18 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 without a lawyer. Plaintiff’s complaint is before the undersigned for 19 screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons set forth below, the complaint fails to state 20 any cognizable claims for relief. Plaintiff will be given leave to file an amended complaint and 21 the legal standards for his potential claims. 22 IN FORMA PAUPERIS 23 Plaintiff has requested leave to proceed without paying the full filing fee for this action, 24 under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. (ECF No. 2.) He has submitted a declaration showing that he cannot 25 afford to pay the entire filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion to 26 proceed in forma pauperis is granted. This means that plaintiff is allowed to pay the $350.00 27 filing fee in monthly installments that are taken from the inmate’s trust account rather than in one 28 lump sum. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a). As part of this order, the prison is required to remove an initial 1 partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). A separate order 2 directed to CDCR requires monthly payments of twenty percent of the prior month’s income to be 3 taken from plaintiff’s trust account. These payments will be taken until the $350 filing fee is paid 4 in full. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 5 STATUTORY SCREENING 6 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against “a 7 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In 8 performing this screening function, the court must dismiss any claim that “(1) is frivolous, 9 malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief 10 from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. § 1915A(b). A claim is legally frivolous 11 when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 12 (1989). The court may dismiss a claim as frivolous if it is based on an indisputably meritless 13 legal theory or factual contentions that are baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. The critical 14 inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and 15 factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989). 16 In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than 17 “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 18 of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-557 (2007). In other words, 19 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 20 statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim upon which the 21 court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial 22 plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 23 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When 24 considering whether a complaint states a claim, the court must accept the allegations as true, 25 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007), and construe the complaint in the light most 26 favorable to the plaintiff, Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 27 //// 28 //// 1 PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 2 Plaintiff’s alleges that defendant Navarus, a correctional officer at High Desert State 3 Prison (“HDSP”), closed a cell door on plaintiff’s right hand. (ECF No. 1 at 3.) Defendant 4 Navarus was in the tower and controlled plaintiff’s cell door. Plaintiff was trying to get 5 defendant’s attention to let him know that he was going to charge his tablet. But Navarus was 6 doing two things at once and not paying attention to who was coming in and out of the cells that 7 he was opening and closing. (Id.) 8 Plaintiff suffered a hand injury with resulting pain that affects his handwriting and 9 prevents him from completing everyday activities like doing schoolwork, washing himself, 10 putting on his clothes, and writing songs to further his musical talents. (ECF No. 1 at 4-5.) 11 Plaintiff received an x-ray and a doctor prescribed a splint, Tylenol, and naproxen. (Id.) Plaintiff 12 alleges deliberate indifference, negligence, and malicious intent. (Id. at 4.) The complaint does 13 not include a specific request for relief. 14 LEGAL STANDARDS 15 I. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 16 A plaintiff may bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress violations of “rights, 17 privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and [federal] laws” by a person or entity, 18 including a municipality, acting under the color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim 19 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that (1) a defendant acting under color of state law 20 (2) deprived plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution or federal statutes. Benavidez v. 21 County of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1144 (9th Cir. 2021). 22 II. Linkage 23 Section 1983 requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions of the 24 defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell v. 25 Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 26 (1976). Plaintiff may demonstrate that connection by alleging facts showing: (1) a defendant's 27 “personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation,” or (2) that a defendant set “in motion a 28 series of acts by others” or “knowingly refus[ed] to terminate a series of acts by others, which 1 [the defendant] knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict a 2 constitutional injury.” Starr v.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DONTAE ALFONSO WILBURN, No. 2:24-cv-03638 SCR P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 NAVARUS, 15 Defendant. 16 17 Plaintiff is incarcerated in state prison and proceeding pro se with a civil rights action 18 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 without a lawyer. Plaintiff’s complaint is before the undersigned for 19 screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons set forth below, the complaint fails to state 20 any cognizable claims for relief. Plaintiff will be given leave to file an amended complaint and 21 the legal standards for his potential claims. 22 IN FORMA PAUPERIS 23 Plaintiff has requested leave to proceed without paying the full filing fee for this action, 24 under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. (ECF No. 2.) He has submitted a declaration showing that he cannot 25 afford to pay the entire filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion to 26 proceed in forma pauperis is granted. This means that plaintiff is allowed to pay the $350.00 27 filing fee in monthly installments that are taken from the inmate’s trust account rather than in one 28 lump sum. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a). As part of this order, the prison is required to remove an initial 1 partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). A separate order 2 directed to CDCR requires monthly payments of twenty percent of the prior month’s income to be 3 taken from plaintiff’s trust account. These payments will be taken until the $350 filing fee is paid 4 in full. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 5 STATUTORY SCREENING 6 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against “a 7 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In 8 performing this screening function, the court must dismiss any claim that “(1) is frivolous, 9 malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief 10 from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. § 1915A(b). A claim is legally frivolous 11 when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 12 (1989). The court may dismiss a claim as frivolous if it is based on an indisputably meritless 13 legal theory or factual contentions that are baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. The critical 14 inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and 15 factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989). 16 In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than 17 “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 18 of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-557 (2007). In other words, 19 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 20 statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim upon which the 21 court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial 22 plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 23 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When 24 considering whether a complaint states a claim, the court must accept the allegations as true, 25 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007), and construe the complaint in the light most 26 favorable to the plaintiff, Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 27 //// 28 //// 1 PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 2 Plaintiff’s alleges that defendant Navarus, a correctional officer at High Desert State 3 Prison (“HDSP”), closed a cell door on plaintiff’s right hand. (ECF No. 1 at 3.) Defendant 4 Navarus was in the tower and controlled plaintiff’s cell door. Plaintiff was trying to get 5 defendant’s attention to let him know that he was going to charge his tablet. But Navarus was 6 doing two things at once and not paying attention to who was coming in and out of the cells that 7 he was opening and closing. (Id.) 8 Plaintiff suffered a hand injury with resulting pain that affects his handwriting and 9 prevents him from completing everyday activities like doing schoolwork, washing himself, 10 putting on his clothes, and writing songs to further his musical talents. (ECF No. 1 at 4-5.) 11 Plaintiff received an x-ray and a doctor prescribed a splint, Tylenol, and naproxen. (Id.) Plaintiff 12 alleges deliberate indifference, negligence, and malicious intent. (Id. at 4.) The complaint does 13 not include a specific request for relief. 14 LEGAL STANDARDS 15 I. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 16 A plaintiff may bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress violations of “rights, 17 privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and [federal] laws” by a person or entity, 18 including a municipality, acting under the color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim 19 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that (1) a defendant acting under color of state law 20 (2) deprived plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution or federal statutes. Benavidez v. 21 County of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1144 (9th Cir. 2021). 22 II. Linkage 23 Section 1983 requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions of the 24 defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell v. 25 Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 26 (1976). Plaintiff may demonstrate that connection by alleging facts showing: (1) a defendant's 27 “personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation,” or (2) that a defendant set “in motion a 28 series of acts by others” or “knowingly refus[ed] to terminate a series of acts by others, which 1 [the defendant] knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict a 2 constitutional injury.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks 3 and citation omitted). In other words, “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a 4 constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates 5 in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that 6 causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th 7 Cir. 1978) (citation omitted). 8 DISCUSSION 9 I. Eighth Amendment 10 A. Legal Standard 11 The undersigned construes plaintiff’s “deliberate indifference” allegation as attempting to 12 state an Eighth Amendment claim. The Eighth Amendment imposes on prison officials a duty to 13 “take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 14 825, 833 (1994) (citations omitted); see also Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993) 15 (noting that the Eighth Amendment prohibits deliberate indifference that subjects an inmate to an 16 excessive risk of future harm). A prison official may be held liable for failing to ensure the safety 17 of inmates only where the inmate can show they were “incarcerated under conditions posing a 18 substantial risk of serious harm,” and that the prison official was deliberately indifferent to that 19 risk. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 837. Mere negligence on the part of the prison official is not 20 sufficient to establish Eighth Amendment liability. Id. at 835. 21 A prison official acts with deliberate indifference only if they “know[] of and disregard[] 22 an excessive risk to inmate health and safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which 23 the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw 24 the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. “Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge 25 of a substantial risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including 26 inference from circumstantial evidence . . . and a factfinder may conclude that a prison official 27 knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.” Id. at 842 (citations 28 omitted). 1 B. Analysis 2 Plaintiff’s complaint does not plausibly allege that defendant Navarus acted with 3 deliberate indifference. It states that Navarus was “not paying attention” and doing two things at 4 once when he closed the cell door on plaintiff’s hand (ECF No. 1 at 3), which at best support that 5 Navarus acted with negligence, not deliberate indifference. Plaintiff does allege that defendant 6 acted with “malicious intent,” but this conclusory allegation is not sufficient to survive screening. 7 See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiff will be given leave to amend this claim and is advised, if 8 such facts are true, that he may plead additional supporting facts that allow for the inference that 9 defendant Navarus acted with deliberate indifference as opposed to mere negligence. 10 II. Potential State Law Claims 11 The complaint also alleges that defendant Navarus acted with negligence in closing the 12 cell door on plaintiff’s right hand. (ECF No. 1 at 4.) Plaintiff is advised that negligence is not 13 actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 333 (1986). Negligence 14 is a state law claim that, under California law, requires the plaintiff to allege the following 15 elements: “(a) a legal duty to use due care; (b) a breach of such legal duty; [and] (c) the breach as 16 the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.” CACI No. 400 (citing Ladd v. County of 17 San Mateo, 12 Cal.4th 913, 917 (Cal. 1996)). 18 In addition, a plaintiff must also allege compliance with the claim presentation 19 requirements of the California Government Claims Act, Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 810 et seq. (“GCA”). 20 The GCA “requires, as a condition precedent to suit against a public entity, the timely 21 presentation of a written claim and the rejection of the claim in whole or in part.” Mangold v. 22 California Pub. Utilities Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995). “[A] plaintiff must allege 23 facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the claim presentation requirement. Otherwise, 24 his complaint is subject to a general demurrer for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a 25 cause of action.” Cardenas v. Cnty. of Tehama, 476 F. Supp. 3d 1055, 1070 (E.D. Cal. 2020) 26 (quoting State of California v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 4th 1234, 1243 (2004)). 27 Here, plaintiff has not alleged compliance with the GCA. He will be given leave to 28 amend his potential state law claims to allege that he timely presented a tort claim to the 1 appropriate government entity. He is further encouraged to consider the elements for a California 2 state law negligence claim that the undersigned has provided above. 3 III. Failure to State a Claim 4 Having conducted the screening required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court finds that the 5 complaint does not state a valid claim for relief pursuant to the Eighth Amendment against 6 defendant Navarus. The complaint also does not allege compliance with the Government Claims 7 Act as to any state tort claims against Navarus. Drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s 8 favor, the complaint at best establishes that defendant Navarus was negligent in closing the cell 9 door on plaintiff’s right hand. Because of these defects, the court will not order the complaint to 10 be served on defendants. 11 Plaintiff may try to fix these problems by filing an amended complaint. In deciding 12 whether to file an amended complaint, plaintiff is advised to consider the Eighth Amendment 13 legal standard and GCA requirements laid out above. In addition, if plaintiff chooses to file an 14 amended complaint, he must demonstrate how the conditions about which he complains resulted 15 in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 370-71. The complaint must also 16 allege in specific terms how each named defendant is involved. Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Machs. 17 Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981). There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 18 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed 19 deprivation. Id.; Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743. Furthermore, “[v]ague and conclusory allegations of 20 official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 21 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). 22 Plaintiff is also informed that the court will not refer to a prior pleading in order to make 23 his amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint be 24 complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a general rule, an 25 amended complaint supersedes any prior complaints. Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 26 1967) (citations omitted). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, any previous complaint no 27 longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original 28 complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 1 IV. Plain Language Summary of this Order for Party Proceeding Without a Lawyer 2 Your complaint will not be served because the facts alleged are not enough to state a 3 claim. Specifically, the complaint does not plead facts alleging that defendant Navarus was 4 deliberately indifferent as opposed to negligent or careless. The complaint as does not allege 5 compliance with the Government Claims Act. You are being given a chance to fix these 6 problems by filing an amended complaint. If you file an amended complaint, pay particular 7 attention to the legal standards above. Be sure to provide facts that show exactly what each 8 defendant did to violate your rights. Any claims and information not in the amended 9 complaint will not be considered. 10 CONCLUSION 11 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 12 1. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED. 13 2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff 14 is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 15 1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the 16 appropriate agency filed concurrently herewith. 17 3. Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, see 28 18 U.S.C. § 1915A, and will not be served. 19 4. Within thirty days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff may file an amended 20 complaint that complies with the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Federal Rules of Civil 21 Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must bear the docket 22 number assigned this case, 2:24-cv-03638 SCR P, and must be labeled “First Amended 23 Complaint.” 24 5. Failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a 25 recommendation that this action be dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 26 Procedure. 27 //// 28 //// 1 6. The Clerk of the Court is directed to send plaintiff a copy of the prisoner complaint 2 | form used in this district. 3 | DATED: November 5, 2025 4 md 5 SEAN C. RIORDAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 6 7 8 9 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28