Donshadric Boyd v. State of Arkansas

2019 Ark. App. 363

• Court: Court of Appeals of Arkansas
• Decided: September 11, 2019
• Status: Published

Opinion

Cite as 2019 Ark. App. 363 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS Digitally signed by Elizabeth Perry Date: 2022.07.25 11:09:14 -05'00' DIVISION III Adobe Acrobat version: No. CR-19-80 2022.001.20169

Opinion Delivered: September 11, 2019 DONSHADRIC BOYD APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE JEFFERSON V. COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 35CR-13-356] STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE HONORABLE ALEX GUYNN, JUDGE

REVERSED AND DISMISSED

RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge

Donshadric Boyd appeals the Jefferson County Circuit Court order revoking his

probation. On appeal, Boyd argues that the circuit court erred by denying his motion to

dismiss the petition and allowing testimony that violated his rights under the

Confrontation Clause. We reverse and dismiss.

On October 11, 2016, Boyd pled guilty to unlawful dogfighting. He was sentenced

to thirty-six months’ probation. On May 3, 2018, the State filed a petition to revoke

Boyd’s probation, and on September 11, the court held a revocation hearing. At the

hearing, Collin Frierson, Boyd’s probation officer, testified that Boyd had violated his

probation on January 21, 2017, when he committed the offense of driving while

intoxicated (DWI) in Desha County. Boyd objected to Frierson’s testimony and argued that Frierson could not testify about the DWI because he did not arrest Boyd and had no

knowledge of the arrest. The court overruled Boyd’s objection.

The State then moved to introduce the Dumas District Court docket sheet to

prove Boyd’s DWI conviction. Boyd objected and argued that pursuant to King v. State,

2018 Ark. App. 278, 549 S.W.3d 407, the State could not rely on an uncounseled

misdemeanor to revoke probation. The State requested time to research the case, and the

court responded that it would delay ruling on the issue but that the case would not

“change [its] opinion on which way . . . to rule.” The court did not admit the docket

sheet into evidence.

Boyd then moved to dismiss the petition. He asserted that the State offered no

proof that he committed a DWI offense and thus violated a condition of his probation.

The court denied the motion and revoked Boyd’s probation. He was sentenced to thirty-

six months’ probation. This appeal followed.

In order to revoke a probation, the circuit court must find by a preponderance of

the evidence that the defendant has inexcusably violated a condition of the probation or

suspension. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-308(d) (Supp. 2017). Thus, to sustain a revocation,

the State need only show that the defendant committed one violation. Prackett v. State,

2014 Ark. App. 394. Evidence that may not be sufficient to convict can be sufficient to

revoke due to the lower burden of proof required for revocation. Newborn v. State, 91

Ark. App. 318, 210 S.W.3d 153 (2005). A circuit court’s finding in revocation

proceedings will not be reversed on appeal unless it is clearly against the preponderance of

the evidence. Id. Because the preponderance of the evidence turns on questions of

2 credibility and weight to be given testimony, we defer to the superior position of the

circuit court to decide these matters. Mosley v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 353, 499 S.W.3d

226.

On appeal, Boyd first argues that the circuit court erred by denying the motion to

dismiss the petition because the State presented no proof that he committed the DWI

offense. He acknowledges that Frierson testified that he had a DWI conviction from the

Dumas District Court, but he points out that Frierson had no direct knowledge of his

arrest or the facts surrounding it. He further relies on King, 2018 Ark. App. 278, 549

SW.3d 407, and asserts that an uncounseled municipal court conviction cannot be used to

revoke probation.

In King, this court reversed a circuit court’s revocation of a defendant’s probation

that was based solely on a misdemeanor conviction. Id. The record was silent on whether

counsel represented the defendant when she pled guilty in district court, and the State

presented no evidence of the facts giving rise to the conviction. Id. Specifically, we relied

on our supreme court’s decision in Alexander v. State, 258 Ark. 633, 527 S.W.2d 927

(1975):

[A]n uncounseled municipal court conviction cannot be used for the purpose of revoking a suspended sentence as the net effect thereof is “the actual deprivation of a person’s liberty” without “the guiding hand of counsel.” Of course, this does not mean that the responsible officials cannot show that the facts giving rise to the municipal court conviction are sufficient themselves to revoke the suspended sentence.

King, 2018 Ark. App. 278, at 4, 549 S.W.3d at 409 (quoting Alexander, 258 Ark. at 637,

527 S.W.2d at 930).

3 In this case, we agree with Boyd that the evidence is insufficient to show that he

committed a DWI offense and thus violated his probation. Here, the record is devoid of

any evidence of Boyd’s DWI. The docket sheet was never admitted into evidence. The

State asserts that the probation officer’s testimony is sufficient to support the revocation.

We disagree. The officer had no knowledge of the facts giving rise to the district court

conviction; he merely testified that Boyd had been convicted. Accordingly, we hold that

the circuit court erred by denying Boyd’s motion to dismiss the State’s petition to revoke

his probation, and we reverse. Because we find that the evidence is insufficient to support

revocation, we need not address Boyd’s Confrontation Clause argument.

Reversed and dismissed.

HIXSON and MURPHY, JJ., agree.

Hancock Law Firm, by: Sharon Kiel, for appellant.

Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Michael L. Yarbrough, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.