Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 397 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION
No. CR-25-592
Opinion Delivered September 9, 2026
DONOVAN CHAZ DRAPER APPEAL FROM THE WASHINGTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
APPELLANT [NO. 72CR-23-759]
V. HONORABLE JOANNA TAYLOR, JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS AFFIRMED
APPELLEE
KENNETH S. HIXSON, Judge
Appellant Donovan Chaz Draper appeals after he was convicted by a Washington County Circuit Court jury of rape. He was sentenced to serve three hundred months’ incarceration. On appeal, appellant argues that (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction because the State failed to prove the date on which the rape occurred; (2) there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction because the minor victim’s (MV’s) testimony was equivocal; and (3) the circuit court abused its discretion when it did not excuse juror number eleven (Juror Eleven) for cause. We affirm.
I. Relevant Facts
Appellant raped MV while she was in his care. In 2021, appellant started dating Jessicah Johnson. Appellant and Jessicah eventually started living together, and they have
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two children together. During their relationship, Jessicah’s niece (MV) and nephew lived with Jessicah’s mother, Connie Johnson. Throughout 2022 and into February 2023, appellant would periodically have sole care of Jessicah’s niece and nephew, Jessicah’s and appellant’s two biological children, and appellant’s children from a prior relationship. At some point before February 2023, Rosie Davis, the great grandmother of appellant’s children from a prior relationship, made a hotline report regarding appellant and MV.
After an investigation during which both MV and appellant were interviewed, appellant was arrested on March 3, 2023. He was charged by felony information with rape, a Class Y felony, in violation of Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-14-103(a)(3)(A) (Supp. 2025), and second-degree sexual assault, a Class B felony in violation of Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-14-125(a)(3)(A) (Repl. 2024). The information alleged that the offenses occurred “on or about February 18, 2023.” The day before trial, the State filed an amended felony information charging appellant with only one offense,––rape, a Class Y felony––in violation of Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-14-103(a)(3)(A) and alleging that the offense occurred “in or about 2022.” A jury trial was held on March 13–14, 2025.
During jury voir dire, the State asked Juror Eleven whether listening to a victim and believing the victim beyond a reasonable doubt was enough to convict someone. The following colloquy ensued:
[JUROR ELEVEN]: Yes. But, I may need to bring up, my husband and I are both in ministry. And, we ran over 25 years a national campus for abused, and neglected, trafficked kids.
[THE STATE]: Okay.
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[JUROR ELEVEN]: So, I worked with kids all the way from newborns to college-age that had experienced not the best situations. And I worked their education, their medical, the counseling.
[THE STATE]: Were you involved in court proceedings ever for those?
[JUROR ELEVEN]: My husband went. Mine, more, was with the medical, education. Of course, they lived on our campus. So, their behavior patterns, the incidences that occurred. And, then we also counseled the adults. I was not a counselor. We had social workers and doctors with that. But I’m not sure.
[THE STATE]: How’s that past experience going to affect you being on a jury like this?
[JUROR ELEVEN]: Well, that’s what I’m asking you, because doing that for over 25 years, and we were embedded with kids, there on the campus and stuff. After that many years you’re kind of, how can I say it, a little burned out of those scenarios. So, I don’t know. I mean, I can be objective, but I’m just giving you my total background.
[THE STATE]: Would you be able to kind of put, I don’t know how you put that to the side. But, put that to the side and listen to the testimony in this case today and look at it objectively?
[JUROR ELEVEN]: I can listen to both sides. We always did. But I’m just saying we’ve had huge, I’ve had a huge amount of work with neglected, abused, and battered, raped kids all the way from babies to college-age, and medical aspects of that, educational.
[THE STATE]: Okay. If you were to be on this jury listening to a child, what are the things that you would look for credibility, for judging the credibility?
[JUROR ELEVEN]: I’d leave that to you, the legal, and the Judge. [THE STATE]: As the jury, and you’re the judge of credibility of the witnesses. [JUROR ELEVEN]: Right.
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[THE STATE]: Who you believe is up to you and what you deliberate. What are you looking for of somebody on the stand if they’re credible or not?
[JUROR ELEVEN]: I mean, I can look at both parties, but I will say I’m kind of a little weary of these types of situations. We’re retired now. After doing that for so many years starting in the 80s. And of course, society change and development, so I’m not sure I’m the best for this case.
[THE STATE]: Okay. You mean you’re weary as like you’re kind of sick of hearing about these kinds of things?
[JUROR ELEVEN]: A little bit. I mean, to be honest, when you work, embedded every day, even, when you run a national campus, you get calls in even at Christmas people are flown in to your campus. It’s a residential. It’s not like you get to go fly off and ski or something. It’s every day for years and years.
[THE STATE]: That makes sense. Thank you for sharing.
(Emphasis added.)
Appellant’s counsel moved to strike Juror Eleven for cause on the following basis:
I believe that based on her history that she would be biased to the accuser in this matter, and she also justifiably expressed she’s just done with this question in her life.
Because of the possible bias and her history of advocating for children, and her distaste for spending any more time in this world, we would move to strike her for cause.
The State objected, and the circuit court denied the motion, noting that Juror Eleven did not say that she could not be fair and impartial. Juror Eleven was selected as a juror, and appellant’s counsel noted for the record that appellant was out of peremptory strikes and would have moved to strike Juror Eleven had there been a peremptory strike left.
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Although multiple witnesses testified regarding the investigation and family dynamics, only MV’s testimony is relevant to the sufficiency issues raised by appellant on appeal. MV was seven years old at the time of trial. During her testimony, MV initially said that no one had touched her “with a part that’s not okay to touch.” However, when asked whether appellant had ever given her “a not okay touch,” MV answered yes. When she had difficulty explaining what happened, the State asked whether seeing diagrams would help her to explain what happened. She agreed, and MV described certain body parts on the diagrams of a male and female body. MV went on to explain that she had seen appellant’s “private” one time. She pointed on the diagram that it had touched her mouth and went “inside [her] mouth.” She said the incident occurred in the bathroom at Jessicah’s house and that she did what appellant “told her to do.” Appellant told her to “suck on his private” and to “[j]ust keep going.” MV pointed to and identified appellant in the courtroom as the man who had raped her.
On cross-examination, MV admitted that she could not remember whether the rape happened before or after she was in kindergarten. She denied that anyone had told her to say that appellant had raped her.
Officer Jesse Vermillion testified regarding his investigation of the rape. He admitted that he had observed MV’s interview at the Children’s Safety Center and that he did not request any sexual-assault examination or try to collect DNA because of the delayed disclosure of the rape. Officer Vermillion further stated that he interviewed appellant on March 2, 2023. During that interview, appellant denied having raped MV.
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After the State rested, appellant’s counsel made the following motion for directed verdict:
The elements of rape are that, first, my client engaged in deviant sexual activity with [MV]. We don’t believe that [MV] sufficiently identified my client. Her failure of identity is a fatal flaw. Therefore, that element of proof fails and you should direct a verdict of not guilty.
Second, we don’t believe that the State has raised sufficient evidence that my client engaged in deviant sexual activity. [MV’s] testimony is the only evidence that the Court has heard. [MV’s] testimony amounted to, I don’t remember, no, I don’t want to say, no. And under extreme leading by [the State], she was able to formulate words that constitute descriptions of body and movement. But they failed to adduce sufficient proof that what she was describing was, in fact, deviant sexual activity: the penetration, however slight of her mouth by my client’s penis.
Specifically, there is lack of proof of penetration. When asked was it on the inside or outside, her response was equivocal. She said yes. They tried to clean that up, but the element of penetration is a specific failure of the State’s proof with regards to deviant sexual activity.
Also, she failed to properly identify the body part which the State claims penetrated her mouth, and we believe that that lack of specific identification of the penis of my client is a failure of proof. She couldn’t say, she wouldn’t say, she didn’t say, and then finally, she made equivocal identifications of a body part, but we don’t believe her testimony is sufficient to meet the burden that the State has in proving it was my client’s penis that did anything.
Finally, well there’s, I will concede the State has proof that [MV] was under the age of 14 today. Okay. So, she could not possibly have been over the age of 14, if this occurred, they’ve met their burden on the age element.
For these reasons, we’d ask the Court to direct a verdict of not guilty on the charge of rape. Thank you.
The State disagreed and argued that all elements had been satisfied. It explained that there was sufficient evidence because the defense conceded that MV was under the age of fourteen; MV identified appellant as the man who raped her; MV testified that appellant told her to
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“suck on his private,” which she did; and MV used a diagram to explain the terminology she used for certain body parts. The circuit court agreed and denied the motion.
Thereafter, the defense presented the testimony of two character witnesses. After the defense rested, and at the conclusion of all the evidence, appellant’s counsel renewed his motion for directed verdict, which the circuit court denied. The jury found appellant guilty of rape and recommended that appellant be sentenced to serve twenty-five years’ imprisonment, which the circuit court imposed. This appeal followed.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence Appellant first argues that there was insufficient evidence to support appellant’s conviction. We treat a motion for a directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Armstrong v. State, 2020 Ark. 309, 607 S.W.3d 491. In reviewing a sufficiency challenge, we assess the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and consider only the evidence that supports the verdict. Id. We will affirm a judgment of conviction if substantial evidence exists to support it. Id. Substantial evidence is evidence that is of sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one way or the other without resorting to speculation or conjecture. Id. Circumstantial evidence may provide a basis to support a conviction, but it must be consistent with the defendant’s guilt and inconsistent with any other reasonable conclusion. Collins v. State, 2021 Ark. 35, 617 S.W.3d 701. Whether the evidence excludes every other hypothesis is left to the jury to decide. Id. Further, the credibility of witnesses is an issue for the jury, not the court; the
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trier of fact is free to believe all or part of any witness’s testimony and may resolve questions of conflicting testimony and inconsistent evidence. Armstrong, supra.
This court has noted that a criminal defendant’s intent or state of mind is seldom apparent. Benton v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 223, 599 S.W.3d 353. One’s intent or purpose, being a state of mind, can seldom be positively known to others, so it ordinarily cannot be shown by direct evidence but may be inferred from the facts and circumstances. Id. Because intent cannot be proved by direct evidence, the fact-finder is allowed to draw on common knowledge and experience to infer it from the circumstances. Id. Because of the difficulty in ascertaining a defendant’s intent or state of mind, a presumption exists that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his or her acts. Id.
A. Failure to Prove the Date on Which the Rape Occurred Appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support appellant’s conviction because the State failed to prove the date on which the rape occurred. Although he acknowledges that the absence of a specific date on the information is not a fatal flaw, he complains that the State’s “vague references” that the offense occurred sometime before February 2023 and the “constant changing of dates” through the State’s filing of an amended information prevented him from mounting an effective alibi defense or challenge to MV’s testimony. As such, he argues that his conviction must be dismissed “because the absence of evidence providing some semblance of dates for this alleged incident amounts to the State’s failure to provide substantial evidence that is forceful enough to compel a conclusion beyond suspicion or conjecture.”
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The State correctly points out that appellant’s argument is not preserved. To preserve a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in a jury trial, a criminal defendant must move for directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered by the prosecution and at the close of all the evidence. Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1(a). A motion for directed verdict shall state the specific grounds therefor. Maxwell v. State, 373 Ark. 553, 559, 285 S.W.3d 195, 200 (2008). Without a circuit court ruling on a specific motion, there is nothing for this court to review. Id. Failure to abide by these procedural rules renders any sufficiency-of-the-evidence question waived on appeal. Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1(c); Bradley v. State, 2013 Ark. 58, 426 S.W.3d 363. An appellant must make a specific motion for a directed verdict that informs the circuit court of the exact element of the crime that the State has failed to prove. Palmer v. State, 2025 Ark. App. 236. Rule 33.1 is strictly construed. Id. Moreover, a party cannot enlarge or change the grounds for an objection or motion on appeal but is bound by the scope and nature of the arguments made at trial. Id.
Here, appellant failed to make any argument at trial that he was prevented from mounting a defense or that there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction on the basis of the State’s failure to prove the specific date on which the rape occurred. Therefore, his argument is not preserved for appeal and is barred from review by this court. See Curtis v. State, 2026 Ark. App. 94, 730 S.W.3d 70. Accordingly, we must affirm on this point.
B. MV’s Testimony
In relevant part, a person commits rape if he or she engages in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual activity with another person who is less than fourteen years of age. Ark. Code
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Ann. § 5-14-103(a)(3). “Sexual intercourse” is penetration, however slight, of the labia majora by a penis. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-101(13) (Repl. 2024). “Deviate sexual activity” is defined as any act of sexual gratification involving the penetration, however slight, of the anus or mouth of a person by the penis of another person; or the penetration, however slight, of the labia majora or anus of a person by any body member or foreign instrument manipulated by another person. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-101(1).
Appellant complains that the only evidence to support his conviction came from MV’s testimony. He argues that her testimony was “vague and unclear.” He explains that MV initially denied that anyone had touched her inappropriately when generically asked; however, she changed her answer when specifically asked whether appellant had touched her inappropriately. Appellant therefore argues that MV’s “equivocal answers without any other evidence to support the conviction of Rape are insufficient because the testimony does not amount to substantial evidence that is forceful enough to compel a conclusion beyond suspicion or conjecture.” We disagree.
We have repeatedly held that a victim’s testimony need not be corroborated to support a conviction. Washington v. State, 2024 Ark. App. 134, 686 S.W.3d 61; Compton v. State, 2023 Ark. App. 587, 682 S.W.3d 348. We have consistently held that a victim’s testimony alone amounts to substantial evidence that will support a conviction if the testimony adequately specifies the acts prohibited by law. Washington, supra. And such testimony is substantial evidence of guilt even when the victim is a child. Id. Moreover, the
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duty of resolving conflicting testimony and determining the credibility of witnesses is left to the discretion of the jury. Kelley v. State, 375 Ark. 483, 292 S.W.3d 297 (2009).
Here, MV, who was only seven years old at the time of trial, identified appellant as the man who had raped her. She testified that appellant’s “private” had gone “inside [her] mouth” after appellant told her to “suck on his private” and to “[j]ust keep going.” MV pointed to and identified appellant in the courtroom as the man who had raped her. MV’s testimony alone is sufficient to support appellant’s rape conviction, and any alleged inconsistency in her testimony was a matter for the jury to resolve. Accordingly, we affirm on this point.
III. Juror Eleven
Appellant’s final argument is that the circuit court abused its discretion in refusing to excuse Juror Eleven for cause. He explains that Juror Eleven was biased because she “confessed that she was weary of these types of issues given her history and that she was not the best for the case.” We disagree.
To challenge a juror on appeal, appellant must show he exhausted his peremptory challenges and was forced to accept a juror who should have been excused for cause. Williams v. State, 347 Ark. 728, 67 S.W.3d 548 (2002). The decision to excuse a juror for cause rests within the sound discretion of the circuit court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Nooner v. State, 322 Ark. 87, 907 S.W.2d 677 (1995). Persons comprising the venire are presumed to be unbiased and qualified to serve. Taylor v. State, 334 Ark. 339, 974 S.W.2d 454 (1998). The proper test for releasing prospective jurors is whether their views
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would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties as jurors in accordance with their instructions and oath. McGuire v. State, 2023 Ark. App. 542, 680 S.W.3d 63. The burden is on the party challenging a juror to prove actual bias, and when a juror states that he or she can lay aside preconceived opinions and give the accused the benefit of all doubts to which he is entitled by law, a circuit court may find the juror acceptable. Id. However, we have also recognized that the bare statement of a prospective juror that he can give the accused a fair and impartial trial is subject to question. Id. Any uncertainties that might arise from the response of a potential juror can be cured by rehabilitative questions. Id. Finally, even if the circuit court abuses its discretion, appellant must show prejudice, a prerequisite to a reversible-error claim. Williams, supra.
Here, Juror Eleven disclosed that she had worked with abused children in the past through a ministry operated by her and her husband. Although she honestly answered that she was “weary” of these types of cases and was concerned that she was not the “best [juror] for this case,” she clearly stated that she could be “objective” and could “listen to both sides.” In light of the foregoing, we cannot say that the circuit court’s refusal to excuse Juror Eleven for cause was an abuse of discretion. See Spencer v. State, 348 Ark. 230, 72 S.W.3d 461 (2002) (holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it did not excuse for cause a prospective juror who had worked with sexual-abuse victims when the juror said she could be unbiased). Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.
ABRAMSON and THYER, JJ., agree.
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Mitch Rouse, for appellant. Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Pamela Rumpz, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.