Donohue v. City of Long Beach

Opinion

Donohue v City of Long Beach

2026 NY Slip Op 04925

August 12, 2026

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Patrick J. Donohue, appellant,

v

City of Long Beach, respondent.

Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

Decided on August 12, 2026

2025-02119, (Index No. 617555/22)

Lara J. Genovesi, J.P.

Barry E. Warhit

Laurence L. Love

Susan Quirk, JJ.

Sullivan Papain Block McManus Coffinas & Cannavo, P.C., Garden City, NY (Christopher J. DelliCarpini and Stephen C. Glasser of counsel), for appellant.

Frank Dikranis, Corporation Counsel, Long Beach, NY (Charles M. Geiger of counsel), for respondent.

[*1]

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Gregg Roth, J.), entered February 3, 2025. The order granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant, City of Long Beach, to recover damages for personal injuries he allegedly sustained when he slipped and fell on ice while traversing a crosswalk. After discovery, the defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. In an order entered February 3, 2025, the Supreme Court granted the defendant's motion. The plaintiff appeals.

"A municipality that has enacted a prior written notification law may avoid liability for a defect or hazardous condition that falls within the scope of the law if it can establish that it has not been notified in writing of the existence of the defect or hazard at a specific location" (Cross v Town of Hempstead, 210 AD3d 864, 864 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Amabile v City of Buffalo, 93 NY2d 471, 474). "Where the municipality makes a prima facie showing that it lacked prior written notice of the alleged defect, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the applicability of one of two recognized exceptions to the rule—that the municipality affirmatively created the defect through an act of negligence or that a special use resulted in a special benefit to the locality" (Reynolds v City of Poughkeepsie, 230 AD3d 1260, 1261 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see D.D. v Incorporated Vil. of Freeport, 186 AD3d 795, 796). "The affirmative negligence exception is limited to work done by a municipality 'that immediately results in the existence of a dangerous condition'" (Wilson v Incorporated Vil. of Freeport, 212 AD3d 870, 871 [emphasis omitted], quoting Oboler v City of New York, 8 NY3d 888, 889).

Here, the defendant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint by submitting an affidavit of its Commissioner of Public Works, who averred that the defendant had no prior written notice of the alleged condition as required by section 256A(2) of the Charter of the City of Long Beach (see Banschick v City of Long Beach, 219 [*2]AD3d 792, 792; O'Connor v City of Long Beach, 218 AD3d 482, 483). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Jones v City of Long Beach, 242 AD3d 1068, 1069; Cross v Town of Hempstead, 210 AD3d at 865).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

GENOVESI, J.P., WARHIT, LOVE and QUIRK, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court