Donohue III v. Antioch Police Department

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: January 20, 2025
• Docket: 3:23-cv-05564
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 KING DAVID LEVON DONAHUE 8 III, No. C 23-05564 WHA 9 Plaintiff,

10 v.

11 ANTIOCH POLICE DEPARTMENT; COUNTY OF CONTRA COSTA; 12 CITY OF ANTIOCH; OFFICERS ORDER DENYING MOTION TO JOSHUA RIOSBAAS, KYLE SMITH, 13 SHAWN MARQUES, JACOB KING, RECONSIDER RYAN GEIS, RUDOLPH NIEVES, 14 ARTURO BECERRA, MATTHEW KOCH, BRANDON BUSBY, and 15 JOSHUA EVANS; and PROSECUTOR HEATHER P. TURNER, 16 Defendants.

18 INTRODUCTION 19 In this pro se Section 1983 action, two defendants move to reconsider the Court’s order 20 foreclosing further motions to dismiss. For reasons below, the motion to reconsider is denied. 21 STATEMENT 22 The parties know the history here (Dkt. No. 104). Its essentials are that in November 23 2024 the Court granted in part and denied in part multiple motions to dismiss, that in 24 November, December, and January defendants did not provide basic information to permit 25 plaintiff to amend, and that — after three such failures — the Court ordered defendants to turn 26 over the information and answer the complaint as amended (ibid.). It was time to get on with 27 discovery and to resolve the case on the actual facts, not the alleged facts, and on summary 1 This prompted a motion to reconsider from Prosecutor Heather P. Turner and the County 2 of Contra Costa (Dkt. No. 105). These defendants complained that the reasons for denying 3 further motions to dismiss applied only to the other defendants, not to them. They said they 4 could not understand the now-operative claims. Then, showing they understood the claims, 5 they said they wished to bring a motion to dismiss just one for the same reason the same claim 6 was dismissed before amendment: The prosecutor, they asserted, was absolutely immune from 7 liability for failing to turn over Brady evidence in the state court criminal case against King 8 David Levon Donahue III, our case’s pro se plaintiff (ibid.; Dkt. No. 89 at 18). 9 In that regard, however, Donahue’s newly amended complaint alleged a new fact: A 10 state court judge had ordered the prosecutor to turn over specific evidence, and the prosecutor 11 had disobeyed not only a Brady duty but that specific state court order (Dkt. No. 90 at 6). 12 In response to defendants’ motion to reconsider, the Court requested a copy of the state 13 court order that was allegedly violated, plus the end date of the state proceedings allegedly 14 prolonged by the violation (Dkt. No. 106). This information would clarify for the district court 15 what the parties — both present in that state court proceeding — already knew. 16 Now, for his part, Donahue succinctly complies with the Court’s request and attaches the 17 state court order (Dkt. No. 109). For their part, however, Prosecutor Turner and the County 18 send a long-winded response. They argue the merits of their proposed motion to dismiss 19 (quoting authorities) while burying their answers about the state court order (Dkt. No. 111). 20 ANALYSIS 21 This order denies the motion for reconsideration because the initial decision foreclosing 22 further motions to dismiss was not manifestly inequitable or erroneous even considering the 23 merits of absolute immunity raised by Prosecutor Turner and the County. See Civil L.R. 7- 24 9(b); Smith v. Pac. Props. & Dev. Corp., 358 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 2004). Notably, 25 Prosecutor Turner does not state that she would seek dismissal for qualified immunity, and the 26 County does not state that it would seek dismissal for any independent reason. 27 1 Whether absolute immunity applies turns on the action performed, and defendants “bear[] 2 the burden of showing that [absolute] immunity is justified for the function in question.” 3 Genzler v. Longanbach, 410 F.3d 630, 636 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 4 478, 486 (1991)). Here, Donahue’s newly amended complaint alleged that the prosecutor 5 violated not merely the background Brady duty (as the previous complaint had alleged), but 6 also a state court judge’s specific order to turn over particular evidence (Dkt. No. 90 at 6). 7 This raises a question: Does the prosecutorial function protected by absolute immunity include 8 disobeying a specific court order? 9 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has answered as follows: “We can imagine 10 few circumstances under which we would consider the act of disobeying a court order or 11 directive to be advocative, and [so] we are loath to grant a prosecutor absolute immunity for 12 such disobedience.” Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 214 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding no absolute 13 immunity applied in two consolidated cases). The Supreme Court has not addressed the 14 question. See Price v. Montgomery Cnty., 144 S. Ct. 2499, 2499–500 (2024) (Sotomayor, J., 15 statement respecting denial of certiorari). Nor has our court of appeals. None of the decisions 16 cited by Prosecutor Turner and the County grapple with the issue, either, as the closest cases 17 consider violations of Brady, not violations of court orders. 18 Our court of appeals’ first impression of this broader issue — a factually sensitive legal 19 question for which defendants bear the burden — would benefit from a better record on the 20 actual specifics of our own case. 21 Moreover, this Court is not prepared to say just yet that the Court of Appeals for the 22 Third Circuit is wrong, or that its reasoning does not apply to any orders of the kind raised 23 here. For example, what if a state court judge ordered a prosecutor to turn over specific body- 24 worn camera footage recorded by an officer on the scene — evidence that turned out to be 25 exonerating — and yet the prosecutor willfully disobeyed that order and went on to wrongfully 26 convict a criminal defendant? In such circumstances, it could easily be imagined that the 27 criminal defendant’s due process rights were violated by the prosecutor, and that the ] immunity. Our court of appeals teaches that absolute immunity is “an extreme remedy[ that] is 2 Justified only where ‘any lesser degree of immunity [w]ould impair the judicial process.’” 3 Lacey v. Maricopa Chty., 693 F.3d 896, 912 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (quoting Kalina v. 4 Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 127 (1997)); accord Garmon v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 828 F.3d 837, 5 843 (9th Cir. 2016). 6 That said, immunities are fact-dependent, and the present case may or may not be so 7 extreme. Defendants have not yet shown how they can now meet their burden: All we have 8 now are allegations on one side, and not enough on the other side to apply absolute immunity 9 in this posture. It would help our court of appeals and the district court to have specific facts 10 before we decide to what extent the Third Circuit rule should be adopted in this particular case. 1] Therefore, the original order stands — no more motions to dismiss, and these issues of 12 some importance will be decided on a summary judgment record (if then raised). E 13 CONCLUSION 14 The motion seeking reconsideration (Dkt. No. 105) is DENIED. 3 15 IT ISSO ORDERED.

17 Dated: January 20, 2025. 18 Pee 19 A = ILLIAM ALSUP 20 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28