Donohue III v. Antioch Police Department

Opinion

KING DAVID LEVON DONAHUE No. C 23-05564 WHA Plaintiff,

v.

ANTIOCH POLICE DEPARTMENT; COUNTY OF CONTRA COSTA; CITY OF ANTIOCH; OFFICERS ORDER DENYING MOTION TO JOSHUA RIOSBAAS, KYLE SMITH, RYAN GEIS, RUDOLPH NIEVES, KOCH, BRANDON BUSBY, and JOSHUA EVANS; and PROSECUTOR HEATHER P. TURNER, Defendants.

In this pro se Section 1983 action, two defendants move to reconsider the Court’s order foreclosing further motions to dismiss. For reasons below, the motion to reconsider is denied. The parties know the history here (Dkt. No. 104). Its essentials are that in November 2024 the Court granted in part and denied in part multiple motions to dismiss, that in November, December, and January defendants did not provide basic information to permit plaintiff to amend, and that — after three such failures — the Court ordered defendants to turn over the information and answer the complaint as amended (ibid.). It was time to get on with discovery and to resolve the case on the actual facts, not the alleged facts, and on summary This prompted a motion to reconsider from Prosecutor Heather P. Turner and the County of Contra Costa (Dkt. No. 105). These defendants complained that the reasons for denying further motions to dismiss applied only to the other defendants, not to them. They said they could not understand the now-operative claims. Then, showing they understood the claims, they said they wished to bring a motion to dismiss just one for the same reason the same claim was dismissed before amendment: The prosecutor, they asserted, was absolutely immune from liability for failing to turn over Brady evidence in the state court criminal case against King David Levon Donahue III, our case’s pro se plaintiff (ibid.; Dkt. No. 89 at 18). In that regard, however, Donahue’s newly amended complaint alleged a new fact: A state court judge had ordered the prosecutor to turn over specific evidence, and the prosecutor had disobeyed not only a Brady duty but that specific state court order (Dkt. No. 90 at 6). In response to defendants’ motion to reconsider, the Court requested a copy of the state court order that was allegedly violated, plus the end date of the state proceedings allegedly prolonged by the violation (Dkt. No. 106). This information would clarify for the district court what the parties — both present in that state court proceeding — already knew. Now, for his part, Donahue succinctly complies with the Court’s request and attaches the state court order (Dkt. No. 109). For their part, however, Prosecutor Turner and the County send a long-winded response. They argue the merits of their proposed motion to dismiss (quoting authorities) while burying their answers about the state court order (Dkt. No. 111). This order denies the motion for reconsideration because the initial decision foreclosing further motions to dismiss was not manifestly inequitable or erroneous even considering the merits of absolute immunity raised by Prosecutor Turner and the County. See Civil L.R. 7- 9(b); Smith v. Pac. Props. & Dev. Corp., 358 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 2004). Notably, Prosecutor Turner does not state that she would seek dismissal for qualified immunity, and the County does not state that it would seek dismissal for any independent reason. Whether absolute immunity applies turns on the action performed, and defendants “bear[] the burden of showing that [absolute] immunity is justified for the function in question.” Genzler v. Longanbach, 410 F.3d 630, 636 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991)). Here, Donahue’s newly amended complaint alleged that the prosecutor violated not merely the background Brady duty (as the previous complaint had alleged), but also a state court judge’s specific order to turn over particular evidence (Dkt. No. 90 at 6). This raises a question: Does the prosecutorial function protected by absolute immunity include disobeying a specific court order? The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has answered as follows: “We can imagine few circumstances under which we would consider the act of disobeying a court order or directive to be advocative, and [so] we are loath to grant a prosecutor absolute immunity for such disobedience.” Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 214 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding no absolute immunity applied in two consolidated cases). The Supreme Court has not addressed the question. See Price v. Montgomery Cnty., 144 S. Ct. 2499, 2499–500 (2024) (Sotomayor, J., statement respecting denial of certiorari). Nor has our court of appeals. None of the decisions cited by Prosecutor Turner and the County grapple with the issue, either, as the closest cases consider violations of Brady, not violations of court orders. Our court of appeals’ first impression of this broader issue — a factually sensitive legal question for which defendants bear the burden — would benefit from a better record on the actual specifics of our own case. Moreover, this Court is not prepared to say just yet that the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit is wrong, or that its reasoning does not apply to any orders of the kind raised here. For example, what if a state court judge ordered a prosecutor to turn over specific body- worn camera footage recorded by an officer on the scene — evidence that turned out to be exonerating — and yet the prosecutor willfully disobeyed that order and went on to wrongfully convict a criminal defendant? In such circumstances, it could easily be imagined that the criminal defendant’s due process rights were violated by the prosecutor, and that the ] immunity. Our court of appeals teaches that absolute immunity is “an extreme remedy[ that] is 2 Justified only where ‘any lesser degree of immunity [w]ould impair the judicial process.’” 3 Lacey v. Maricopa Chty., 693 F.3d 896, 912 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (quoting Kalina v. 4 Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 127 (1997)); accord Garmon v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 828 F.3d 837, 5 843 (9th Cir. 2016). 6 That said, immunities are fact-dependent, and the present case may or may not be so 7 extreme. Defendants have not yet shown how they can now meet their burden: All we have 8 now are allegations on one side, and not enough on the other side to apply absolute immunity 9 in this posture. It would help our court of appeals and the district court to have specific facts 10 before we decide to what extent the Third Circuit rule should be adopted in this particular case. 1] Therefore, the original order stands — no more motions to dismiss, and these issues of 12 some importance will be decided on a summary judgment record (if then raised). E 13 CONCLUSION 14 The motion seeking reconsideration (Dkt. No. 105) is DENIED. 15 IT ISSO ORDERED.

17 Dated: January 20, 2025. 18 Pee 19 A = ILLIAM ALSUP 20 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28