Donoghue v. State

211 S.W.2d 623, 1948 Tex. App. LEXIS 1276
Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided May 5, 1948·No. No. 9718.·Published·Cited by 11 cases

Opinion

*624 McClendon, chief justice.

In this opinion for convenience we shall use the initials FC to designate the Federal Finance Cofnpany; the initials ATSB and the Bank to designate the Avoyelles Trust and Savings Bank (a banicing corporation chartered under the laws of Louisiana and located in the town of Bunkie, Avoyelles Parish, in that State); and the initials DP and DL to designate, respectively, discount paper and direct loan.

The suit was brought by the State, under art. 4646b, Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St, Chap. 144, p. 227, Acts 48 Leg., 1943, Reg. Séss., sometimes referred to as “Anti-Usury Injunction Law,” or “Loan Shark Act”, against Donoghue (Mike E. Dono-ghue, d/b/a The Federal. Finance Company) to enjoin violation of the usury laws of the State. The text of art. 4646b is copied in Watts v. Mann, Tex.Civ.App., 187 S.W.2d 917 (error ref.), in which validity of the article was upheld. In a trial to the court the judgment was for the State granting the sought injunctive relief, and Donoghue has. appealed.

The controlling issue in the case is the correctness, vel non, of Donoghue’s contention to the effect that the business (here involved) conducted, by FC was that of loan broker, in which FC acted as the borrower’s agent to procure the loan under FC’s personal guarantee to the lender, for which services in procuring or “arranging” and guaranteeing the loan FC was paid a fee or commission by the borrower; that in no sense was FC the lender or the agent of the lender; and that FC’s fees or commissions were not paid by or shared in by the lender, and did not constitute interest. In addition to “arranging” loans for borrowers, FC also .dealt in automobile purchase notes which FC acquired from dealers. This phase of the business is not here involved.

The general principles of law relied upon by FC iti support of its above contention are well established in this State. Substantially stated (with cited supporting authorities listed in the order of their citation) ■ they are:

1. ' Charges paid by the borrower to a broker or other third party as compensation for services in procuring a loan are not properly to be considered as interest in determining whether the loan is usurious. Great Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, Tex.Civ.App., 135 S.W.2d 241 (error dismissed judgment correct); State v. Abbott Loan Service, Tex.Civ.App., 195 S.W.2d 416 (error ref. N.R.E.); National Life Ins. Co. v. Schroeder, Tex.Civ. App., 123 S.W.2d 374 (error dismissed); Eastern Mortgage & Securities Co. v. Collins, Tex.Civ.App., 118 S.W.2d 479 (error ref.); Trinity Fire Ins. Co. v. Kerrville Hotel Co., 129 Tex. 310, 103 S.W.2d 121, 110 A.L.R. 442; Leonard v. Smith, Tex.Civ.App., 99 S.W.2d 328; Sales v. Mercantile Nat. Bank, Tex.Civ.App., 89 S.W.2d 247; Noel v. Panhandle Building & Loan Ass’n, Tex.Civ.App., 85 S.W.2d 773 (error ref.); Adleson v. B. F. , Dittmar Co., 124 Tex. 564, 80 S.W.2d 939; Hughes v. Security Building & Loan Ass’n, Tex.Civ.App., 62 S.W.2d 219; Hudmon v. Foster, Tex.Civ.App., 210 S.W. 262 (reversed on issue of pleading, Tex.Com.App., 231 S.W: 346).

2. One may lawfully sell his credit by guaranteeing a loan, the compensation for which service is not properly chargeable as interest in determining whether the loan is usurious. Greever v. Persky, 140 Tex. 64, 165 S.W.2d 709.

3. Reasonable charges paid by the lender to a special agent for special services rendered in connection with the loan are not properly classified as interest (though charged to the borrower) in determing whether the loan is usurious. See Sales, Noel and Hughes cases cited under principle. 1, above; also Nevels v. Harris, 129 Tex. 190, 102 S.W.2d 1046, 109 A.L.R. 1464.

These relations, however, of broker, guarantor or special agent, compensation for whose services is charged to the borrower, must be bona fide, and not merely colorable “for the purpose of concealing a usurious loan.” Greever v. Persky, above [140 Tex. 64, 165 S.W.2d 711].

FC's above contention is to the effect •that the evidence conclusively shows that its ostensible relation of broker and guarantor for borrower in procuring or “ár- *625 ranging” loans in the transactions, and practices disclosed by the evidence, was a bona fide one; and that the judgment of the trial court predicated upon a contrary holding has no support in the evidence. It should be noted at the outset that it is not contended that loans in evidence were usurious unless FC’s commissions or fees properly constitued a part of the interest thereon.

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Donoghue v. State, 211 S.W.2d 623, 1948 Tex. App. LEXIS 1276 (Tex. Ct. App. 1948).

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