Donnelly v. Rochester Gas & Electric Corp.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Donnelly v. Rochester Gas & Electric Corp.

21 A.D.2d 740, 250 N.Y.S.2d 90, 1964 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3747

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMay 21, 1964

StatusPublished

This text of 21 A.D.2d 740 (Donnelly v. Rochester Gas & Electric Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Donnelly v. Rochester Gas & Electric Corp., 21 A.D.2d 740, 250 N.Y.S.2d 90, 1964 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3747 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1964).

Pincite

Opinion

Order unanimously reversed, without costs, and motion denied, without costs. Memorandum: It is not clear that the plaintiff cannot recover from the defendant Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation on the basis of passive negligence. That being so, the second cause of action in the third-party complaint was improperly dismissed as insufficient in law. This is particularly so when the cause of action which was dismissed is viewed in the light of 3013 and subdivision (a) of 3017 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. (See, also, 3 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, N. Y. Civ. Prac., par. 3013.03; also Foley v. D’Agostino, 21 A D 2d 60.) (Appeal by third-party plaintiff from order of Monroe Special Term granting third-party defendant’s motion to dismiss second cause of action.) Present—Williams, P. J., Bastow, Goldman, Henry and Del Yecchio, JJ.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Order unanimously reversed, without costs, and motion denied, without costs. Memorandum: It is not clear that the plaintiff cannot recover from the defendant Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation on the basis of passive negligence. That being so, the second cause of action in the third-party complaint was improperly dismissed as insufficient in law. This is particularly so when the cause of action which was dismissed is viewed in the light of 3013 and subdivision (a) of 3017 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. (See, also, 3 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, N. Y. Civ. Prac., par. 3013.03; also Foley v. D’Agostino, 21 A D 2d 60.) (Appeal by third-party plaintiff from order of Monroe Special Term granting third-party defendant’s motion to dismiss second cause of action.) Present—Williams, P. J., Bastow, Goldman, Henry and Del Yecchio, JJ.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

21 A.D.2d 740, 250 N.Y.S.2d 90, 1964 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3747, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/donnelly-v-rochester-gas-electric-corp-nyappdiv-1964.