Donnarumma v. Boston Housing Authority

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Donnarumma v. Boston Housing Authority

682 N.E.2d 1344, 425 Mass. 1024, 1997 Mass. LEXIS 232

CourtMassachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

DecidedAugust 15, 1997

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 682 N.E.2d 1344 (Donnarumma v. Boston Housing Authority) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Donnarumma v. Boston Housing Authority, 682 N.E.2d 1344, 425 Mass. 1024, 1997 Mass. LEXIS 232 (Mass. 1997).

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Opinion

Rule 2:21 (2) requires that “the appellant ... set forth the reasons why review of the trial court decision cannot adequately be obtained on appeal from any final adverse judgment in the trial court or by other available means.” Although the petitioner devoted a portion of her memorandum of law to contending that “Relief Cannot Wait For the Normal Course of Appeal,” she has not explained why relief from the denial of her request for “injunctive relief” could not be obtained on an expedited basis under G. L. c. 231, § 118, second par.; or that relief under Mass. R. A. P. 6 (a), as amended, 378 Mass. 930 (1979), was not available. Moreover, she has not demonstrated that she is entitled to appellate review of the denial of her request for “an emergency restraining order.” See Royal Dynasty, Inc. v. Chin, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 171, 172 (1994).

Judgment affirmed.

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Rule 2:21 (2) requires that “the appellant ... set forth the reasons why review of the trial court decision cannot adequately be obtained on appeal from any final adverse judgment in the trial court or by other available means.” Although the petitioner devoted a portion of her memorandum of law to contending that “Relief Cannot Wait For the Normal Course of Appeal,” she has not explained why relief from the denial of her request for “injunctive relief” could not be obtained on an expedited basis under G. L. c. 231, § 118, second par.; or that relief under Mass. R. A. P. 6 (a), as amended, 378 Mass. 930 (1979), was not available. Moreover, she has not demonstrated that she is entitled to appellate review of the denial of her request for “an emergency restraining order.” See Royal Dynasty, Inc. v. Chin, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 171, 172 (1994).

Judgment affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)

682 N.E.2d 1344, 425 Mass. 1024, 1997 Mass. LEXIS 232, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/donnarumma-v-boston-housing-authority-mass-1997.

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