DONNA TURNER AND PAUL TURNER NO. 19-CA-131
VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT
BOSLEY MEDICAL INSTITUTE, INC. AND COURT OF APPEAL DR. FRANK CAMPISI STATE OF LOUISIANA
ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 774-458, DIVISION "O" HONORABLE DANYELLE M. TAYLOR, JUDGE PRESIDING
October 16, 2019
JUDE G. GRAVOIS JUDGE
Panel composed of Judges Jude G. Gravois, Marc E. Johnson, and Hans J. Liljeberg
AFFIRMED JGG MEJ HJL COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT, DONNA TURNER AND PAUL TURNER Carl J. Rachal
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE, BOSLEY MEDICAL INSTITUTE, INC. AND DR. FRANK CAMPISI Stephen M. Pizzo Ashley R. Wilmore GRAVOIS, J.
In this medical malpractice action, plaintiffs, Donna and Paul Turner, seek
reversal of the trial court’s October 18, 2018 judgment which granted summary
judgment in favor of defendants, Dr. Frank Campisi and Bosley Medical Institute,
Inc., and dismissed all claims against defendants with prejudice. For the following
reasons, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In a petition for damages filed on July 27, 2017, plaintiffs stated that on
August 3, 2016, Dr. Campisi performed a hair restoration procedure on Ms.
Turner. As part of the procedure, Dr. Campisi removed and transplanted 1,771
hair follicles/grafts upon Ms. Turner’s scalp. Plaintiffs alleged that Dr. Campisi
failed to properly sanitize and close the wound site, and thus the wound site
became infected immediately following the procedure. Additionally, in their
petition, plaintiffs alleged that Dr. Campisi failed to take any corrective action to
treat the infected wound. This caused the infection to worsen and forced Ms.
Turner to undergo treatment for wound care.
On August 23, 2018, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment
arguing that plaintiffs failed to produce expert testimony to establish a breach of
the standard of care, causation, and damages. In support of their motion,
defendants attached responses to discovery requests issued to plaintiffs on
November 3, 2017 and answered on April 17, 2018. One interrogatory asked that
plaintiffs name the expert who would testify as to the applicable standard of care
and the specific breach that occurred. In response, plaintiffs stated that the request
was premature since discovery was ongoing. Plaintiffs noted that their expert
witness list was incomplete at that time, and no determination had been made as to
which expert, if any, they intended to call. They reserved their right to supplement
and amend their response at a later date. Thus, defendants argued that the record is
19-CA-131 1 devoid of any evidence to establish that there was a breach of the standard of care
or that any alleged breach caused injury to plaintiffs.
The record reflects that plaintiffs were served with the motion for summary
judgment on September 5, 2018. Plaintiffs did not file an opposition to the motion
for summary judgment.
At the hearing on the motion for summary judgment on October 9, 2018,
after defendants informed the trial court that no opposition had been filed, the trial
court granted the motion for summary judgment “after having received no
opposition.”1 A judgment was signed on October 18, 2018 granting the motion for
summary judgment and dismissing all claims against defendants with prejudice.
This appeal followed.
On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in granting the motion
for summary judgment when defendants failed to meet their burden to
affirmatively prove the absence of genuine issues of material fact. Plaintiffs
believe that summary judgment was granted solely because no opposition was filed
by plaintiffs’ counsel. They argue that no evidence was introduced into the record
to support defendants’ assertions by way of affidavit, deposition testimony, or
certified medical records. Further, plaintiffs argue that the filing of the motion was
premature. Plaintiffs note that at the time the discovery was answered, Ms. Turner
had not yet completed her medical treatment related to the injury. Plaintiffs
contend that they planned to hire an expert after taking Dr. Campisi’s deposition,
which they claim they never had the opportunity to do.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
A motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the motion,
memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue as to
1 In brief, plaintiffs’ counsel stated that the motion for summary judgment was unopposed “due to a calendaring mistake by plaintiff’s [sic] counsel.”
19-CA-131 2 material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La.
C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3). The burden of proof rests with the mover. La. C.C.P. art.
966(D). However, if the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the
issue that is before the court on the motion for summary judgment, the mover’s
burden on the motion does not require him to negate all essential elements of the
adverse party’s claim, action, or defense, but rather to point out to the court the
absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party’s
claim, action, or defense. Id. The burden is on the adverse party to produce
factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material
fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.;
Dillenkofer v. Marrero Day Care Ctr., Inc., 16-713 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/24/17), 221
So.3d 279, 282. The only documents that may be filed in support or opposition to
the motion are pleadings, memoranda, affidavits, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, certified medical records, written stipulations, and admissions. La.
C.C.P. art. 966(A)(4).
A motion for summary judgment, even if unopposed, requires the trial court
to determine that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the mover is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Caceres v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 14-0418
(La. App. 4 Cir. 11/5/14), 154 So.3d 584, 590.
Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo using the same criteria
applied by trial courts to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate.
Pizani v. Progressive Ins. Co., 98-225 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/16/98), 719 So.2d 1086,
1087. A de novo review or an appeal de novo is an appeal in which the appellate
court uses the trial court’s record, but reviews the evidence and law without
deference to the trial court’s rulings. Sarasino v. State Through Department of
Public Safety and Corrections, 16-408 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/15/17), 215 So.3d 923,
928. The decision as to the propriety of a grant of a motion for summary judgment
19-CA-131 3 must be made with reference to the substantive law applicable to the case. Muller
v. Carrier Corp., 07-770 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/15/08), 984 So.2d 883, 885.
In a medical malpractice action, such as the present case, a plaintiff must
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) the standard of care applicable to
the defendant; (2) that the defendant breached that standard of care; and (3) that
there was a causal connection between the breach and the resulting injury. La.
R.S. 9:2794. Because of the complex medical and factual issues involved, a
plaintiff will likely fail to sustain his burden of proving his claim under La. R.S.
9:2794’s requirements without medical experts. Pfiffner v. Correa, M.D., 94-0924
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DONNA TURNER AND PAUL TURNER NO. 19-CA-131
VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT
BOSLEY MEDICAL INSTITUTE, INC. AND COURT OF APPEAL DR. FRANK CAMPISI STATE OF LOUISIANA
ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 774-458, DIVISION "O" HONORABLE DANYELLE M. TAYLOR, JUDGE PRESIDING
October 16, 2019
JUDE G. GRAVOIS JUDGE
Panel composed of Judges Jude G. Gravois, Marc E. Johnson, and Hans J. Liljeberg
AFFIRMED JGG MEJ HJL COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT, DONNA TURNER AND PAUL TURNER Carl J. Rachal
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE, BOSLEY MEDICAL INSTITUTE, INC. AND DR. FRANK CAMPISI Stephen M. Pizzo Ashley R. Wilmore GRAVOIS, J.
In this medical malpractice action, plaintiffs, Donna and Paul Turner, seek
reversal of the trial court’s October 18, 2018 judgment which granted summary
judgment in favor of defendants, Dr. Frank Campisi and Bosley Medical Institute,
Inc., and dismissed all claims against defendants with prejudice. For the following
reasons, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In a petition for damages filed on July 27, 2017, plaintiffs stated that on
August 3, 2016, Dr. Campisi performed a hair restoration procedure on Ms.
Turner. As part of the procedure, Dr. Campisi removed and transplanted 1,771
hair follicles/grafts upon Ms. Turner’s scalp. Plaintiffs alleged that Dr. Campisi
failed to properly sanitize and close the wound site, and thus the wound site
became infected immediately following the procedure. Additionally, in their
petition, plaintiffs alleged that Dr. Campisi failed to take any corrective action to
treat the infected wound. This caused the infection to worsen and forced Ms.
Turner to undergo treatment for wound care.
On August 23, 2018, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment
arguing that plaintiffs failed to produce expert testimony to establish a breach of
the standard of care, causation, and damages. In support of their motion,
defendants attached responses to discovery requests issued to plaintiffs on
November 3, 2017 and answered on April 17, 2018. One interrogatory asked that
plaintiffs name the expert who would testify as to the applicable standard of care
and the specific breach that occurred. In response, plaintiffs stated that the request
was premature since discovery was ongoing. Plaintiffs noted that their expert
witness list was incomplete at that time, and no determination had been made as to
which expert, if any, they intended to call. They reserved their right to supplement
and amend their response at a later date. Thus, defendants argued that the record is
19-CA-131 1 devoid of any evidence to establish that there was a breach of the standard of care
or that any alleged breach caused injury to plaintiffs.
The record reflects that plaintiffs were served with the motion for summary
judgment on September 5, 2018. Plaintiffs did not file an opposition to the motion
for summary judgment.
At the hearing on the motion for summary judgment on October 9, 2018,
after defendants informed the trial court that no opposition had been filed, the trial
court granted the motion for summary judgment “after having received no
opposition.”1 A judgment was signed on October 18, 2018 granting the motion for
summary judgment and dismissing all claims against defendants with prejudice.
This appeal followed.
On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in granting the motion
for summary judgment when defendants failed to meet their burden to
affirmatively prove the absence of genuine issues of material fact. Plaintiffs
believe that summary judgment was granted solely because no opposition was filed
by plaintiffs’ counsel. They argue that no evidence was introduced into the record
to support defendants’ assertions by way of affidavit, deposition testimony, or
certified medical records. Further, plaintiffs argue that the filing of the motion was
premature. Plaintiffs note that at the time the discovery was answered, Ms. Turner
had not yet completed her medical treatment related to the injury. Plaintiffs
contend that they planned to hire an expert after taking Dr. Campisi’s deposition,
which they claim they never had the opportunity to do.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
A motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the motion,
memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue as to
1 In brief, plaintiffs’ counsel stated that the motion for summary judgment was unopposed “due to a calendaring mistake by plaintiff’s [sic] counsel.”
19-CA-131 2 material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La.
C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3). The burden of proof rests with the mover. La. C.C.P. art.
966(D). However, if the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the
issue that is before the court on the motion for summary judgment, the mover’s
burden on the motion does not require him to negate all essential elements of the
adverse party’s claim, action, or defense, but rather to point out to the court the
absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party’s
claim, action, or defense. Id. The burden is on the adverse party to produce
factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material
fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.;
Dillenkofer v. Marrero Day Care Ctr., Inc., 16-713 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/24/17), 221
So.3d 279, 282. The only documents that may be filed in support or opposition to
the motion are pleadings, memoranda, affidavits, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, certified medical records, written stipulations, and admissions. La.
C.C.P. art. 966(A)(4).
A motion for summary judgment, even if unopposed, requires the trial court
to determine that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the mover is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Caceres v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 14-0418
(La. App. 4 Cir. 11/5/14), 154 So.3d 584, 590.
Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo using the same criteria
applied by trial courts to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate.
Pizani v. Progressive Ins. Co., 98-225 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/16/98), 719 So.2d 1086,
1087. A de novo review or an appeal de novo is an appeal in which the appellate
court uses the trial court’s record, but reviews the evidence and law without
deference to the trial court’s rulings. Sarasino v. State Through Department of
Public Safety and Corrections, 16-408 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/15/17), 215 So.3d 923,
928. The decision as to the propriety of a grant of a motion for summary judgment
19-CA-131 3 must be made with reference to the substantive law applicable to the case. Muller
v. Carrier Corp., 07-770 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/15/08), 984 So.2d 883, 885.
In a medical malpractice action, such as the present case, a plaintiff must
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) the standard of care applicable to
the defendant; (2) that the defendant breached that standard of care; and (3) that
there was a causal connection between the breach and the resulting injury. La.
R.S. 9:2794. Because of the complex medical and factual issues involved, a
plaintiff will likely fail to sustain his burden of proving his claim under La. R.S.
9:2794’s requirements without medical experts. Pfiffner v. Correa, M.D., 94-0924
(La. 10/17/94), 643 So.2d 1228. Only in cases of obvious negligence, where the
trier of fact does not need an expert to assess the standard of care, breach, and
causation, is expert testimony unnecessary. Hastings v. Baton Rouge General
Hosp., 498 So.2d 713, 719 (La. 1986).
In the present case, plaintiffs argue that defendants failed to meet their
burden to affirmatively prove the absence of genuine issues of material fact and
failed to provide supporting evidence such as medical records, an affidavit, or
deposition testimony.
In Samaha v. Rau, 07-1726 (La. 2/26/08), 977 So.2d 880, the defendant filed
a motion for summary judgment in a medical malpractice case, contending that the
plaintiffs lacked the expert medical testimony necessary to support their claims
against him. In support of his motion, the defendant attached a certified copy of
the medical review panel opinion in which the panel found no deviation from the
standard of care; an affidavit of correction to the panel opinion by the attorney
chair of the medical review panel; and a copy of the plaintiffs’ answers to
interrogatories and a request for production of documents. The trial court granted
the motion for summary judgment. Id. at 881. The court of appeal reversed the
trial court ruling and found that the defendant did not properly support his motion
19-CA-131 4 for summary judgment with either an affidavit or deposition from an expert
medical provider to prove that his medical treatment was not below the applicable
standard of care. Id. at 881-82. The court found that without this evidence, the
defendant could not meet his initial burden of showing that he was entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 882.
The Louisiana Supreme Court disagreed and reversed the ruling of the court
of appeal. It found that the defendant did not bear the burden of proof at trial on
the issue of whether he committed medical malpractice, and thus he was under no
burden to present expert medical testimony. Id. at 887. The court found that the
defendant only had the burden of raising as the basis of his motion that plaintiffs
could not support their claim, and he did so by filing the motion and attaching the
plaintiffs’ discovery responses. Once the plaintiffs’ lack of proof was claimed and
supported by the plaintiffs’ answers to interrogatories, the burden shifted to the
plaintiffs to produce evidence sufficient to establish that they would be able to
satisfy their burden at trial. Id. at 887-88.
In the present case, defendants filed their motion for summary judgment,
claiming that plaintiffs failed to produce expert testimony to establish a breach of
the standard of care, causation, and damages. In support of their motion, they
attached plaintiffs’ answers to interrogatories and requests for production. In the
answers to interrogatories, plaintiffs stated that no determination had been made as
to which expert witnesses, if any, they intended to call. Therefore, upon our de
novo review, we find that defendants satisfied their initial burden on summary
judgment by filing the motion for summary judgment on the basis that plaintiffs
could not support their claim and attaching thereto the corresponding discovery
responses. The burden then shifted to plaintiffs to produce evidence sufficient to
establish that they would be able to satisfy their evidentiary burden of proof at trial.
19-CA-131 5 As shown above, plaintiffs failed to produce evidence sufficient to establish that
they would be able to satisfy their evidentiary burden of proof at trial.
Plaintiffs also argue on appeal that the motion was premature, and they did
not have adequate time for discovery. A defendant’s motion for summary
judgment may be made at any time. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(1). The trial court has
the discretion to render summary judgment, if appropriate, or to allow further
discovery. Sibert v. National Oilwell Varco, L.P., 48,789 (La. App. 2 Cir.
2/26/14), 136 So.3d 283, 291. The parties must be given the opportunity to
conduct “adequate discovery” to present their claims. Id.; La. C.C.P. art.
966(A)(3). However, there is no absolute right to delay action on a motion for
summary judgment until discovery is complete. Flowers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
12-140 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/31/12), 99 So.3d 696, 702. The only requirement is that
the parties be given a fair opportunity to present their claims, and unless a plaintiff
shows probable injustice, a suit should not be delayed pending discovery when it
appears at an early stage that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Johnson v.
Littleton, 45,323 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/19/10), 37 So.3d 542, 548. The mere
contention of an opponent that he lacks sufficient information to defend a summary
judgment motion and that he needs additional time to conduct discovery is
insufficient to defeat the motion. Williams v. A Day to Remember Invitations,
L.L.C., 06-757 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/13/07), 956 So.2d 30, 33.
In the present case, the record is devoid of any request by plaintiffs seeking
additional time to conduct discovery. At the time the motion for summary
judgment was filed, over two years had elapsed since the alleged incident occurred
and over one year had elapsed since suit was filed. There is no indication in the
record that plaintiffs attempted to conduct discovery since both the suit and the
motion for summary judgment were filed.
19-CA-131 6 Based upon our de novo review of the record, plaintiffs failed to establish
that they will be able to satisfy their evidentiary burden of proof at trial. Therefore,
defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment which granted
summary judgment in favor of defendants, Dr. Frank Campisi and Bosley Medical
Institute, Inc., and dismissed all claims against defendants with prejudice.
AFFIRMED
19-CA-131 7 SUSAN M. CHEHARDY MARY E. LEGNON
CHIEF JUDGE INTERIM CLERK OF COURT
FREDERICKA H. WICKER CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK JUDE G. GRAVOIS MARC E. JOHNSON ROBERT A. CHAISSON SUSAN BUCHHOLZ STEPHEN J. WINDHORST FIRST DEPUTY CLERK HANS J. LILJEBERG JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. FIFTH CIRCUIT MELISSA C. LEDET JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053) DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF POST OFFICE BOX 489 GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400
(504) 376-1498 FAX www.fifthcircuit.org
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY OCTOBER 16, 2019 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:
19-CA-131 E-NOTIFIED 24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK) HONORABLE DANYELLE M. TAYLOR (DISTRICT JUDGE) ASHLEY R. WILMORE (APPELLEE)
MAILED CARL J. RACHAL (APPELLANT) STEPHEN M. PIZZO (APPELLEE) ATTORNEY AT LAW ATTORNEY AT LAW 103 TIMBERLAND RIDGE BOULEVARD 3421 NORTH CAUSEWAY BOULEVARD LAFAYETTE, LA 70507 SUITE 900 METAIRIE, LA 70002