NUMBER 13-13-00359-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
DONNA TAYLOR, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 117th District Court of Nueces County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Rodriguez, Garza, and Benavides Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides
On May 9, 2013, a Nueces County jury convicted appellant, Donna Taylor, for the
murder of Floyd Scroggin, sentenced her to twenty years in prison, and assessed a
$5,000 fine. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b) (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d
C.S.). Taylor raises three issues on appeal: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of methamphetamine found at the scene of the crime; (2) the trial court
erred by denying her motion for directed verdict because the facts were legally insufficient
to sustain a murder conviction; and (3) the trial court improperly instructed the jury to
convict Taylor with proof other than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On January 16, 2013, William and Sandy Schroeder responded to Taylor’s cries
for help in a mobile home trailer park at 548 Stingray Street in Flour Bluff. When the
Schroeders arrived at Taylor’s mobile home, they discovered Floyd Scroggin’s fatally
wounded body. Sandy testified that Taylor was at the scene and stated, “I shot him. It
was an accident.” Under cross-examination, Sandy testified that Taylor said she was
“shaking her purse and [the gun] went off.” Wayne Zosche, supervisor of the trailer park
where the shooting occurred, stated that upon arrival at the scene, other residents told
him that an accident had taken place and somebody was shot. However, inside
Scroggin’s trailer, Zosche heard Taylor say, “He’s been shot” and “I shot him.”
Paramedic Billy Ross testified that when he arrived at the scene, Taylor ran up to him
saying, “He’s been shot. It was an accident.”
Police Officers Donna Dean Mays and John Schultz, with the Corpus Christi Police
Department, testified as follows:
Taylor and Scroggin had been arguing over some keys and he was looking for the keys, but they couldn't find the keys. She dumped her purse out to prove that she didn't have the keys and the pistol fell out of her purse and hit the ground and went off.
Mays found the pistol on a bed in the adjoining bedroom. Lead Detective Richard Garcia
was given information that Taylor “shook the purse” and the gun discharged inside the
2 purse. Detective Garcia testified that he found no bullet holes in Taylor’s purse. During
Detective Garcia’s testimony, the jury watched a video recording of Taylor’s statements
to police officers describing the night of Scroggin’s death.
Later, Corpus Christi Police Department victim’s advocate Genarose Pena, who
assisted Taylor at the police department, testified that she overheard Taylor’s phone
conversation with her sister where Taylor explained that the gun fired accidentally when
she dropped her purse. Pena testified, however, that Taylor’s version of the story
changed when she recounted her story to Detective Garcia:
[State]: How is it different than her first version?
[Pena]: Initially she said the gun was inside of her purse, the gun fell and the gun went off, that was her initial version. And then within that—
Q. And now at this point, what has it changed to?
A. That she was holding the gun and the gun just went off. At that point again she stated the gun —that the gun just went off.
At the scene, Pena found contents of a purse on the floor and on an ottoman.
David Curtis, a firearms expert for the Corpus Christi Police Department,
administered a gunshot residue test on Taylor’s hand. It revealed Taylor may have
discharged a firearm, handled a discharged firearm, or been in close proximity to a
discharging firearm. His report included a comment that read: “Subject says firearm
discharged after being dropped, then said [it] discharged in her hand.” Further, he
testified that this particular pistol was harder to fire because the axle was bent. He
reported that when he drop-tested the pistol twenty-four times from different positions, “at
no time did the firearm discharge.”
3 The jury found Taylor guilty of murder. The trial court sentenced Taylor to twenty
years’ imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice Institutional Division and
assessed a fine of $5,000. This appeal followed.
II. ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE
Taylor first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by improperly admitting
methamphetamine evidence found at scene that should have been excluded under Rules
401, 402, 403(b), and 404 of the Texas Rules of Evidence. See TEX. R. EVID. 401, 402,
403(b), and 404.
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence under an abuse of
discretion standard. Devoe v. State, 354 S.W.3d 457, 469 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Prible
v. State, 175 S.W.3d 724, 731 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The trial court has broad
discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence, and its ruling should not be set
aside absent a clear abuse of that discretion. Butterfield v. State, 992 S.W.2d 448, 458
(Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Allridge v. State, 850 S.W.2d 471, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)
(en banc). As long as the trial court's ruling is within the “zone of reasonable
disagreement,” there is no abuse of discretion, and the trial court's ruling will be upheld.
Prible, 175 S.W.3d at 731.
B. Procedural History
Before opening statements, the State sought permission from the trial court to
admit evidence of what was alleged to be methamphetamine found at the crime scene
under Rule of Evidence 404(b). See id. at R. 404(b). Taylor objected to the
admissibility of this evidence under the same rule because the evidence did not show
4 motive or intent. See id. Taylor also objected to the admissibility of the
methamphetamine evidence under rule 403 because the probative value did not outweigh
the prejudicial effect of admitting such evidence. See id. at R. 403. She further
objected that the methamphetamine was irrelevant to the charge of murder under rule
401. See id. at R. 401. The trial court admitted the evidence on the ground that it
provided context as to how the shooting occurred:
[Court]: I believe you can because it's contextual in nature. It is not an accusation, it's just that the officer is allowed to describe the scene as he found it and what they found on the scene.
[State]: And again, Your Honor, the State would want to go into it as the same transaction, contextual evidence under 404(b), and it also goes as to motive and intent.
[Defense]: And—
[Court]: And you have something to say about that?
[Defense]: Yes, Honor. I would object. I don't believe it goes to motive or intent with regards to the—
[Court]: Unfortunately it's contextual in nature. An officer is allowed to describe this and the—are you asking to, in effect, ask questions as to whether this was the motive of the—of the Defendant?
....
[Defense]: To be clear, Your Honor, I just want to preserve our— our objection with regards to the—to the mention of the drugs altogether—
[Court]: Okay.
[Defense]: with regards to 404(b) and with regards to—
[Court]: I understand.
5 [Defense]: —relevancy. And I would also object that the prej— the probative value is outweighed by the prejudicial effect—
[Defense]: —that arouses jury hostility and sympathy and—
[State]: Okay. Again, I think the law is very clear with regards to context—contextual—in other words, everything in the context of how this occurred. So, yes, I will allow the finding of methamphetamines on the scene to come in.
After admitting the evidence, the trial court ordered that no evidence would be
allowed to show that Taylor was in possession of those drugs until the court determined
that a valid exception to rule 404(b) applied. While discussing the pre-admission of
exhibits, the defense again objected to the admission of methamphetamine on the
grounds that it was extraneous. Both parties later stipulated to the fact that there were
6.76 grams of methamphetamine found on the ottoman chair at the scene. Further,
Taylor agreed to the introduction of the lab report showing the substance in question to
be methamphetamine. In addition, medical examiner Dr. Harminder Narula testified,
without objection, that Scroggin’s autopsy revealed the amount of methamphetamine
found in his body was at the level of an abuser.
C. Discussion
1. Texas Rules of Evidence 401 and 402
Taylor claims evidence of methamphetamine found at the scene was irrelevant
and more prejudicial than probative under Texas Rules of Evidence 401 and 403 and
therefore, inadmissible under rule 402. In deciding whether a particular piece of
evidence is relevant, a trial court judge should ask, “would a reasonable person, with
6 some experience in the real world[,] believe that the particular piece of evidence is helpful
in determining the truth or falsity of any fact that is of consequence to the lawsuit”?
Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 376 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (quoting United States
v. Brashier, 548 F.2d 1315, 1325 (9th Cir. 1976)). “Relevant evidence means having
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.” TEX. R. EVID. 401. If the trial court believes that a reasonable juror would
conclude that the proffered evidence alters the probabilities involved to any degree,
relevancy is present. Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 376. Once the proponent of
evidence shows it is logically relevant to some issue under Rule 401, it is admissible
under Rule 402 unless the defendant demonstrates that it should be excluded because
of some other provision, whether constitutional, statutory, or evidentiary. Id.
The jury is entitled to know all relevant surrounding facts and circumstances
regarding the charged offense. Wyatt v. State, 23 S.W.3d 18, 25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “it has long been the rule in this State
that the jury is entitled to know all relevant surrounding facts and circumstances of the
charged offense; an offense is not tried in a vacuum.” Moreno v. State, 721 S.W.2d 295,
301 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). The disputed issue at trial was whether the shooting was
intentional or accidental. The evidence of methamphetamine was relevant because a
jury could tend to establish a motive for Taylor’s actions and could tend to rebut her claim
of accidentally shooting Scroggin. See TEX. R. EVID. 404(b) (stating that evidence of
other crimes, wrongs, and acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in
order to show action in conformity therewith, but may be admitted for other purposes such
7 as motive, preparation, plan or intent). While motive may not be an element of murder,
it nonetheless reflects upon the mens rea of the defendant as a party to murder. Prewitt
v. State, 133 S.W.3d 860 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2004, pet. ref’d) (holding that buying and
selling drugs provides a link in the chain of motive in a murder prosecution). Moreover,
we note that the testimony merely stated that drugs were found at the scene, not that
Taylor was in possession of the drugs.
The trial judge is the person with the best vantage from which to decide relevancy.
Saxer v. State, 115 S.W.3d 765, 766 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). We conclude that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by overruling Taylor’s rule 401 and rule 402 objections
regarding the admission of the methamphetamine evidence.
2. Texas Rule of Evidence 403
Taylor claims that even if the trial court deemed the evidence of methamphetamine
relevant, it should have been excluded under rule 403. See id. at R. 403. Relevant
evidence should still be excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Id.
The court of criminal appeals has held that a proper rule 403 analysis includes the
following factors: (1) the inherent probative force of the proffered item of evidence along
with (2) the proponent's need for that evidence balanced against (3) any tendency of the
evidence to suggest that a decision was made on an improper basis, (4) any tendency of
the evidence to confuse or distract the jury from the main issues, (5) any tendency of the
evidence to be given undue weight by a jury that has not been equipped to evaluate the
probative force of the evidence, and (6) the likelihood that presentation of the evidence
8 will consume an inordinate amount of time or merely repeat evidence already admitted.
Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 641–42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
In this case, the drug evidence was relevant to determining whether the shooting
was accidental or intentional. Rule 403 favors the admission of relevant evidence and
carries a presumption that relevant evidence will be more probative than prejudicial.
Hayes v. State, 85 S.W.3d 809, 815 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Because the issue in this
case was one of accident or intent, the State urged every relevant piece of background
evidence to disprove accident and prove an intentional act. In a murder prosecution, the
evidence of drugs found at the scene is admissible to disprove accident because a jury
is entitled to hear what occurred immediately prior to and subsequent to the commission
of the act. Albrecht v. State, 486 S.W.2d 97, 100 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). See TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.36 (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.).
Furthermore, evidence of methamphetamine at the scene did not have a tendency
to suggest a decision based on an improper basis. See Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at
641–42. Most of the evidence presented by the state did not involve the drugs, including
Taylor’s purse, which did not have a bullet hole, as well as her own inconsistent
statements. Hence, we cannot conclude that evidence of methamphetamine found at
the scene would have diverted the jury’s attention from the central issue of whether Taylor
intentionally or accidentally shot Scroggin.
We further find that the evidence found at the scene did not tend to confuse or
distract the jury. See TEX. R. EVID. 403. In this case, the testimony merely established
that drugs were found at the scene; there was no evidence that Taylor was in possession
of those drugs. Thus, the risk did not substantially outweigh the probative value of the
9 evidence when the evidence pertained to the context of the murder. See id. There was
no need to elaborate on the explanation of drugs found at the scene for the jury to
evaluate its probative force. Indeed, given its tendency to prove motive and intent, one
could reasonably conclude that it actually served to focus the jury's attention on the
underlying crime and why it occurred. Prewitt, 133 S.W. 3d at 865.
Finally, the evidence did not consume an inordinate amount of trial time. See
Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641–42. It was not repetitive in nature, and the time needed
to develop the evidence was not significant. In light of the foregoing reasons, we hold
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence of
methamphetamine over Taylor’s rule 403 objection.
3. Texas Rules of Evidence 404
Taylor also claimed that the evidence of methamphetamine found at the scene
was proof of an extraneous offense. Extraneous-offense evidence may be admissible
for purposes other than showing character conformity, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident. TEX. R. EVID. 404(b). Rebuttal of a defensive theory is also a permissible
purpose under rule 404(b). See Moses v. State, 105 S.W.3d 622, 626 (Tex. Crim. App.
2003). Accordingly, the State may introduce extraneous offense evidence to rebut a
defensive theory that was raised in the defendant's opening statement. Powell v. State,
63 S.W.3d 435, 439 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Lopez v. State, 288 S.W.3d 148, 171 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi 2009, pet. ref’d).
Rule 404 provides that evidence of another crime, wrong, or act also may be
admissible as same–transaction contextual evidence where several crimes are
10 intermixed, blended with one another, or connected so that they form an indivisible
criminal transaction. Wyatt, 23 S.W.3d at 25. However, under rule 404(b), same-
transaction contextual evidence is admissible only when the offense would make little or
no sense without also bringing in that evidence, and it is admissible only to the extent that
it is necessary for the jury to understand. Id.
The code of criminal procedure specifically allows for the admission of evidence
in a murder prosecution of “all relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the killing
and the previous relationship existing between the accused and the deceased, together
with all relevant facts and circumstances going to show the condition of the mind of the
accused at the time of the offense.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 38.36(a) (West,
Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.). However, article 38.36 remains subject to rules of
evidence 404(b) and 403, such that, if an objection is properly made, the trial court must
find a relevant and material non-character conformity purpose for which such evidence is
offered. Smith v. State, 5 S.W.3d 673, 679 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
The State presented evidence that methamphetamine was found at the scene and
that the victim had an excessive amount of methamphetamine in his system. Such
evidence was admissible because the jury could reasonably infer the prior relationship
between the victim and Taylor was one that involved drugs. See Carmouche v. State,
10 S.W.3d 323, 330 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (noting weapons, violence, and drugs go
hand in hand); Wilson v. State, 132 S.W.3d 695, 700 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2004, pet.
ref’d) (finding that weapons and drugs are associated with the drug trade). Accordingly,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence of methamphetamine
over Taylor’s rule 404 objection. We overrule Taylor’s first issue.
11 III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Taylor’s second issue argues that the denial of her motion for a directed verdict
was in error because the facts were legally insufficient for a murder conviction.1
We apply the standard articulated in Jackson v. Virginia to determine whether the
evidence is sufficient to support a criminal conviction. See 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979);
see also Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.)
(holding that the Jackson standard of review is the “only standard” that should be applied
in a sufficiency review). Under Jackson, we examine the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 443 U.S. at 319.
The elements of the offense are measured as defined by a hypothetically correct
jury charge. Villarreal v. State, 286 S.W.3d 321, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (citing Malik
v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App.1997)). Such a charge “[is] one that
accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily
increase the State's burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State's theories of
liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was
tried.” Villarreal, 286 S.W.3d at 327. Under a hypothetical murder charge, Taylor would
be guilty of murder if she:
(1) intentionally or knowingly caused the death of Scroggin;
(2) intended to cause serious bodily injury and committed an act clearly dangerous to human life that caused Scroggin’s death; or
1 We construe Taylor’s second issue as a legal sufficiency challenge to the evidence supporting the verdict.
12 (3) committed or attempted to commit a felony, other than manslaughter, and in the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempt, or in immediate flight from the commission or attempted, he committed or attempts to commit an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual
See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 19.02.
We defer to the jury's determinations of credibility and weight to be given to the
evidence because jurors are the sole fact-finders. See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899; see
also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.04 (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.) (“The
jury, in all cases, is the exclusive judge of the facts proved, and of the weight to be given
to the testimony . . . .”). Each fact need not point directly and independently to the guilt
of Taylor, as long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is
sufficient to support the conviction. See Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (2007).
Therefore, in analyzing legal sufficiency, we determine whether the necessary
inferences are reasonable based upon the combined and cumulative force of all the
evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Clayton v. State, 235
S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Our review of “all of the evidence” includes
evidence that was properly and improperly admitted. Id. When the record supports
conflicting inferences, we presume that the fact finder resolved the conflicts in favor of the
prosecution and therefore defer to that determination. Id. Direct and circumstantial
evidence are treated equally in establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial
evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt. Id.
B. Discussion
13 The jury was presented with two conflicting theories upon by which to assess the
credibility and demeanor of the witnesses who testified at trial. The jury heard testimony
that Taylor described several different versions of what transpired the night Scroggin died.
Initially, Taylor claimed the firearm accidentally discharged while she shook her purse,
yet there was no bullet hole found in her purse. Then, she said the firearm discharged
on the ground after she dumped contents from her purse. Lastly, she said the firearm
discharged in her hand after it fell out of her purse as she picked it up. However, the
heavy trigger pull on the pistol in question and the absence of a discharge in a drop test
refuted her version of the events. The jury was free to discredit Taylor’s claim that the
shooting was an accident when Taylor’s own inconsistent statements and the physical
evidence suggested otherwise. See Turner v. State, 805 S.W.2d 423, 427 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1991); Cantu v. State, 395 S.W.3d 202, 208–09 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2012, pet. ref’d). The fact finder may consider a defendant’s implausible and
inconsistent statements as affirmative evidence of guilt. See Gear v. State, 340 S.W.3d
743, 747 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Padilla v. State, 326 S.W.3d 195, 201 (Tex. Crim. App.
2010). By its verdict, the jury rejected Taylor's statements about the firearm accidentally
discharging either in her purse, on the ground, or in her hand.
Moreover, during Detective Garcia’s testimony, the State played a DVD of Taylor’s
recorded statements to the police. As the court of criminal appeals has noted, “the
carriage, behavior, bearing, manner and appearance of a witness—in short, his
‘demeanor’—is a part of the evidence.” Padilla v. State, 326 S.W.3d 195, 201 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2010) (quoting Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265, 268–69 (2nd Cir. 1952)).
Here, inconsistent and implausible statements, in combination with the jury’s possible
14 assessment of Taylor’s visibly guilty demeanor, may be considered as affirmative
evidence of guilt. See Gear, 340 S.W.3d at 747; Padilla, 326 S.W.3d at 201–02 (citing
Dyer, 201 F.2d at 268–69).
We must defer to the jury’s interpretation of this evidence. See Brooks, 323
S.W.3d at 899. After considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict,
we conclude that a rational juror could have found that Taylor intentionally or knowingly
caused the death of Scroggin. Additionally, a rational juror could have found that Taylor
intended to cause serious bodily injury and thus committed an act clearly dangerous to
human life that caused the death of Scroggin. Because the evidence is legally sufficient
to support a murder conviction, we overrule Taylor’s second issue.
IV. JURY CHARGE
Taylor’s third issue is that the trial court improperly instructed the jury to convict
Taylor with proof other than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
In analyzing a jury-charge issue, we must first decide whether error exists.
Middleton v. State, 125 S.W.3d 450, 453 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (citing Hutch v. State,
922 S.W.2d 166, 170–71 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)). Then, if we find error, we analyze
that error for harm. Id. at 453. Preservation of charge error does not become an issue
until we assess harm. Id. at 202. The degree of harm necessary for reversal depends
on whether the appellant preserved the error by objection. Id. (citing Hutch, 922 S.W.2d
at 171).
Under Almanza, jury charge error requires reversal when the defendant has
15 properly objected to the charge and we find “some harm” to his rights. Almanza v. State,
686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985); see also Hutch, 922 S.W.2d at 171. When the
defendant fails to object or states that he has no objection to the charge, we will not
reverse for jury-charge error unless the record shows “egregious harm” to the defendant.
Bluitt v. Sate, 137 S.W.3d 51 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171.
Thus, we review alleged charge error by considering two questions: (1) whether error
existed in the charge; and (2) whether sufficient harm resulted from the error to compel
reversal. See Posey v. State, 966 S.W.2d 57, 60 & n.5 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
B. The Charge
The court instructed the jury as follows:
The prosecution has the burden of proving the defendant guilty and it must do so by proving each and every element of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt and if it fails to do so, you must acquit the defendant.
It is not required that the prosecution prove guilt beyond all doubt; it is only required that the prosecution's proof excludes all "reasonable doubt" concerning the defendant's guilt.
Taylor argues that this charge allowed the jury to convict her by proof less than proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that the inclusion of a “beyond all
possible” instruction is not an abuse of discretion. See Mays v. State, 318 S.W.3d 368,
389 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Woods v. State, 152 S.W.3d 105, 114–16 (Tex. Crim. App.
2004). Nor does such an instruction lessen the State's burden of proof, confuse the jury,
or negate the statutory burden of proof language. See Ruiz v. State, 228 S.W.3d 691,
692 n.1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2005, no pet.); see also O'Canas v. State, 140 S.W.3d
16 695, 699–702 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pet. ref'd) (holding that “all possible doubt”
language is not a definition of reasonable doubt); Ochoa v. State, 119 S.W.3d 825, 829
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, no pet.) (same); Best v. State, 118 S.W.3d 857, 865 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (holding that trial court did not err by submitting a jury
charge distinguishing reasonable doubt from possible doubt); Torres v. State, 116 S.W.3d
208, 212 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2003, no pet.) (holding the challenged instruction regarding
“all possible doubt” does not constitute a definition of reasonable doubt). The
complained of charge includes the sort of “beyond of all doubt” language held to be
permissible by all of the foregoing courts; therefore, we reach the same conclusion as
those courts and hold that no error existed in the trial court’s jury charge. We overrule
Taylor’s third issue.
V. CONCLUSION
Having overruled all of Taylor’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
__________________________ GINA M. BENAVIDES, Justice
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).
Delivered and filed the 3rd day of July, 2014.