Donna Lacour, in her Capacity as of Succession of Johnye Mae Madden,James D. Madden and Lyda Roberts Madden v. Mary Elizabeth Chumley

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: November 20, 2024
• Docket: 55,947-CA
• Status: Published

Opinion

Judgment rendered November 20, 2024. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 2166, La. C.C.P.

No. 55,947-CA

COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

DONNA LACOUR, IN HER Plaintiffs-Appellees CAPACITY AS EXECUTRIX OF SUCCESSION OF JOHNYE MAE MADDEN, JAMES D. MADDEN AND LYDA ROBERTS MADDEN

versus

MARY ELIZABETH CHUMLEY Defendant-Appellant

Appealed from the Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Webster, Louisiana Trial Court No. 80169

Honorable Allen Parker Self, Jr., Judge

HUDSON, POTTS & BERNSTEIN, LLP Counsel for Appellant By: Robert McCuller Baldwin Margaret H. Pruitt Jason R. Smith

KEVIN W. HAMMOND, APLC Counsel for Plaintiff- By: Kevin W. Hammond Appellee, Donna Lacour, J. Kyle McCotter in her capacity as executrix of the Succession of Johnye Mae Madden ATTORNEYS AT LAW Counsel for Plaintiffs- By: J. Schuyler Marvin Appellees, Lyda Madden J. Kyle McCotter and the Unopened Succession of James D. Madden

CAROL DENISE POWELL-LEXING Counsel for Defendants- Appellees, Jonathan Chumley, Mark Chumley, Ethan Chumley, and Charles Madden

Before STONE, STEPHENS, and ROBINSON, JJ. STEPHENS, J.,

This civil action arises from the 26th Judicial District Court, Parish of

Webster, State of Louisiana, the Honorable Parker Self, Judge, presiding. In

the latest chapter of this ongoing saga, the defendant, Mary Elizabeth

Chumley, appeals the judgment of the district court denying her motions for

summary judgment and granting, in part, summary judgment in favor of the

plaintiff, Donna LaCour. For the reasons expressed herein, we affirm in

part, reverse in part, and remand.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Johnye Mae Madden died on January 26, 2016, in Webster Parish,

Louisiana. Madden executed a last will and testament dated September 10,

2002, which was probated upon her death. The defendant, Mary Elizabeth

Chumley (“Ms. Chumley”), served as executrix of the succession until May

31, 2019, when the court removed her for cause and replaced her with the

plaintiff, Donna LaCour (“Ms. LaCour”).1 Following her appointment, Ms.

LaCour questioned why the interests in Madden Property Management, LLC

(“MPM”) were not listed as assets in the succession. Ultimately, Ms.

LaCour obtained evidence showing that the MPM interests should be

included in the succession.

On June 15, 2021, Ms. LaCour filed an amended detailed descriptive

list (“DDL 1”), asserting ownership of 74% of MPM. DDL 1 provided that

MPM terminated at Johnye Madden’s death, and following her death, the

assets were mismanaged, wasted, or disposed of improperly by Ms.

Chumley. DDL 1 estimated that Ms. Chumley owed the estate at least

1 See, Succession of Madden, 53,353 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/4/20), 293 So. 3d 665, writ denied, 20-00742 (La. 10/6/20), 302 So. 3d 535. $382,000.00. The district court held a status conference on November 8,

2021, where the court ordered Ms. Chumley to either concur or traverse

DDL 1 by December 8, 2021. The district court then set a hearing for

matters related to DDL for January 13, 2022. The trial court stated, in

pertinent part:

On December 8th, the traversal or the concurrence, whatever else he deems appropriate. And Mr. Hammond will have two weeks following that date to respond. Both sides will favor me with a pretrial memo-letter by January 6th, and we will proceed hearing this matter on the 13th of January.

An order reflecting these matters was signed by the district court on

November 30, 2021, and filed on December 1, 2021. The order provided, in

relevant part:

2. December 8, 2021, is the deadline for filing notice of any traversal of the amended detailed descriptive list filed herein on June 15, 2021.

3. Should any such traversal be filed on or before December 8, 2021, the executrix will have until December 22nd to file such response as she feels warranted.

4. If a traversal is filed, it will be heard on January 13, 2022, at 9:00 am. The parties may file any necessary pre-trial briefs by January 6, 2022.

On November 29, 2021, Ms. Chumley filed an exception to the

amended detailed descriptive list of assets in which she requested Ms.

LaCour to show cause why DDL 1 should not be dismissed or why the

action should not be stayed. The district court issued an order on that same

day ordering Ms. LaCour to show cause on January 13, 2022, why DDL

should not be dismissed or stayed based on Ms. Chumley’s exceptions.

However, on December 7, 2021, Ms. Chumley renounced and disclaimed

any and all of her interests in the succession. Ms. Chumley recorded her

2 renunciation on December 8, 2021, and she included the following language

in her notice of renunciation:

Please take note that any and all pending motions filed heretofore by Mary Elizabeth Madden Chumley are therefore now moot and abandoned, because she no longer has any interest in this succession proceeding and she is no longer called to this succession proceeding.

Following Ms. Chumley’s renunciation, the district court held a hearing on

January 13, 2022. Although Ms. Chumley failed to appear at the hearing,

the plaintiffs stated for the record that the purpose of the hearing was to

homologate DDL 1. Patricia Price testified at the hearing that she worked

with MPM while she was employed with Edward Jones. She stated that all

the transactions of MPM’s account were authorized by Ms. Chumley and no

one else as she was the manager of MPM. Ms. LaCour also testified at this

hearing and stated that in the initial DDL filed in the succession by Ms.

Chumley, Ms. Chumley failed to include MPM and Mrs. Madden’s

ownership interest therein at her time of death. Ms. LaCour further testified

that she found documentation showing Ms. Chumley as a 26% interest

holder in MPM, but these documents were never filed with the Secretary of

State. Ms. LaCour stated she discovered bank accounts associated with

MPM. In an Edward Jones account, Ms. LaCour testified that the account

consisted of approximately $288,000 at the time of Mrs. Madden’s death.

When she was appointed to the succession as executrix, Ms. LaCour stated

that the account balance consisted of about $35,000.

John McDaniel, who qualified as an accounting expert, also testified

at the hearing. McDaniel indicated that he had known Mrs. Madden for

many years and had helped her establish MPM. McDaniel indicated that a

change occurred to the ownership of MPM in 2007 which gave Ms. 3 Chumley a 26% interest in MPM. He stated that Ms. Chumley was the

manager of MPM and was the only person who had functioned as the LLC’s

manager. Also in his testimony, McDaniel detailed several transfers of

money to different accounts from MPM. Both McDaniel and Ms. LaCour

concluded that Ms. Chumley owes the estate around $530,000.

On February 22, 2022, the district court rendered an opinion detailing

its findings. According to the court, Ms. Chumley converted over a half

million dollars of Ms. Madden’s money for Ms. Chumley’s personal use

based on the testimony presented at the hearing, particularly that of

McDaniel. On March 14, 2022, the trial court signed a judgment

homologating DDL 1. Attached to the judgment was an amended and final

DDL (“DDL 2”) which provided that Ms. Chumley owes the succession

$531,838.49. The district court also imposed a 20% statutory penalty

according to La. C.C.P. art. 3222. In response, Ms. Chumley filed a writ

application with this Court seeking review of the judgment homologating

DDL; however, the writ was denied.

On April 14, 2022, Ms. LaCour, representing the succession, filed a

petition seeking to recover the property listed in DDL 2 which the district

court deemed Ms. Chumley to have deprived the succession of due to her

mismanagement. Ms. Chumley filed an exception of improper cumulation

of actions, and the district court ultimately severed Ms. LaCour’s petition to

enforce from the succession proceedings.

On November 14, 2022, Ms. LaCour filed a motion for summary

judgment and a motion to strike the jury demand. In her motion, Ms.

LaCour alleged that Ms. Chumley was served with a rule to show cause why

DDL filed should not be deemed final, and Ms. Chumley had notice of the 4 hearing that was set for January 13, 2022. Ms. LaCour further alleged that

there were no genuine issues of material fact, and that Ms. LaCour was

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ms. Chumley, in response, filed a

reconventional demand on December 8, 2022. In the demand, Ms. Chumley

argued that the March 2022 judgment homologating DDL 2 should be

annulled because the judgment contained vices of both form and substance.

On March 10, 2023, Ms. Chumley filed a motion for summary judgment on

her reconventional demand. In her memorandum, Ms. Chumley alleged that

summary judgment is appropriate because the March 2022 judgment is null

and void. Also on March 10, 2023, Ms. LaCour filed a second motion for

summary judgment, seeking to enforce the March 2022 judgment. In her

motion, Ms. LaCour again alleged that there were no genuine issues of

material fact because the March 2022 judgment made clear that the issues

have been litigated in the succession proceeding.

The summary judgment motions, as well as a few other motions or

exceptions, were heard on July 19, 2023. On September 20, 2023, the

district court issued an opinion/order in which it discussed its reasons for

disposing of each of the motions in the manner that it did. In this

opinion/order, the district court denied Ms. Chumley’s motion for summary

judgment, and it granted, in part, Ms. LaCour’s summary judgment motion.

The district court determined that there was no genuine issue of material fact

as to the value of MPM. However, the court denied the motion for summary

judgment as to Ms. Chumley’s ability to present evidence regarding her

actions that may serve to reduce her total liability. This opinion/order was

filed on October 5, 2023.

5 On November 27, 2023, the district court issued a judgment on

outstanding exceptions and motions heard on July 19, 2023. This order

clearly disposed of the motions and exceptions, but it included the following

language, “Further, this Court finds that there is no just reason for delay in

this matter. Accordingly, this Judgment is designated as a final judgment

pursuant to LCCP 1915(B).” Ms. Chumley appealed this judgment on

January 10, 2024. This Court, however, issued an order instructing the

district court to supplement the record with a per curiam opinion setting

forth reasons for its finding that no just reason for delay existed and for

certifying the judgment appealed as a partial final judgment. Following this

order, the district court filed the requested per curiam on July 3, 2024, and

this Court received a copy of that same filing on July 12, 2024, and

concluded that the matter should proceed as an appeal.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Ms. Chumley asserts several assignments of error. First,

Ms. Chumley maintains that the district court erred in denying her motions

for summary judgment. In her next four assignments of error, Ms. Chumley

argues that the district court improperly ruled that the March 2022 judgment

was a valid and final judgment. She also urges that the district court erred in

finding that she received sufficient notice for the January 13, 2022, hearing.

Finally, Ms. Chumley also asserts that the district court erred by assessing

penalties pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 3222 and by holding that she owed

$531,838.29. According to Ms. LaCour, the March 2022 judgment is valid

because Ms. Chumley had notice of the January 13, 2022, hearing and had

the opportunity to be heard on that date. Ms. LaCour suggests that the trial

court considered the testimony provided at the hearing on January 13, 2022, 6 and exercised its discretion in subjecting Ms. Chumley to the penalties under

La. C.C.P. art. 3222.

Appellate courts review motions for summary judgment de novo,

using the same criteria that govern the district court’s consideration as to

whether summary judgment is appropriate. Peironnet v. Matador Res. Co.,

12-2292 (La. 6/28/13), 144 So. 3d 791; Bess v. Graphic Packaging Int’l,

Inc., 54,111 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/17/21), 331 So. 3d 490; Succession of

Moore, 54,338 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/30/22), 339 So. 3d 12, writ denied, 22-

00973 (La. 10/4/22), 347 So. 3d 859. A motion for summary judgment is a

procedural device used when there is no genuine issue of material fact for all

or part of the relief prayed for by a litigant. Schultz v. Guoth, 10-0343 (La.

1/19/11), 57 So. 3d 1002; Succession of Moore, supra. The procedure is

favored and shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive

determination of actions. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(2).

A motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the motion,

memorandum, and supporting documents show there is no genuine issue as

to material fact, and the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La.

C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3). If the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial

on the issue that is before the court on the motion for summary judgment,

the mover’s burden on the motion does not require him to negate all

essential elements of the adverse party’s claim, action, or defense, but rather

to point out to the court the absence of factual support for one or more

elements essential to the adverse party’s claim, action, or defense. La.

C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1). The burden is on the adverse party to produce factual

support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material

fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. 7 Whenever an inventory of succession property otherwise would be

required by law, the person at whose instance the inventory would be taken

may file in the succession proceeding, in lieu of an inventory complying

with Articles 3131 through 3135, a detailed descriptive list of all succession

property. This list shall be sworn to and subscribed by the person filing it,

shall show the location of all items of succession property, and shall set forth

the fair market value of each item thereof at the date of the death of the

deceased. La. C.C.P. art. 3136(A).

The descriptive list of succession property authorized by Article 3136

shall be accepted as prima facie proof of all matters shown therein, unless

amended or traversed successfully. The court may amend the descriptive list

at any time to correct errors therein, on ex parte motion of the person filing

it. Any interested person may traverse the descriptive list at any time, on

contradictory motion served on the person filing it. If a descriptive list is

amended, or successfully traversed, a copy of the amended or traversed

descriptive list shall be filed with the Department of Revenue. The court

may order the reduction or increase of the security required of a succession

representative to conform to the corrected total value of the property of the

succession. La. C.C.P. art. 3137.

The purpose of the detailed descriptive list is to provide a complete,

concise evaluation of the property of the deceased thereby enabling the

succession representative to properly administer the succession and

informing heirs, creditors, and other interested parties to the nature and value

of the succession of property. In Succession of Reno, 15-0854 (La. App. 1

Cir. 9/12/16), 202 So. 3d 1147, writ denied, 16-2106 (La. 2/10/17), 215 So.

3d 701; Succession of Willis v. Martin, 228 So. 2d 732, 734 (La. App. 3 Cir. 8 1969), writ refused, 255 La. 244, 230 So. 2d 93 (1970). An inventory made

by an administrator is not conclusive as to the assets of the estate or their

value. Succession of Price, 197 La. 579, 583, 2 So. 2d 29, 30 (1941);

Succession of Pipkin, 7 La. Ann. 617, 1852 WL 3822 (La. 1852). Instead, an

inventory is subject to contradiction and change by proper proof. Succession

of Price, supra.

A succession representative may file a final account of his

administration at any time after homologation of the final tableau of

distribution and the payment of all estate debts and legacies as set forth in

the tableau. The court shall order the filing of a final account upon the

application of an heir or residuary legatee who has been sent into possession

or upon the rendition of a judgment ordering the removal of a succession

representative. La. C.C.P. art. 3332. An account shall show the money and

other property received by and in the possession of the succession

representative at the beginning of the period covered by the account, the

revenue, other receipts, disbursements, and disposition of property during

the period, and the remainder in his possession at the end of the period. La.

C.C.P. art. 3333.

An opposition to an account may be filed at any time before

homologation. An opposition shall be tried as a summary proceeding.

When no opposition has been filed, or to the extent to which the account is

unopposed, the succession representative may have the account homologated

at any time after the expiration of ten days from the date of service as

provided in Article 3335. La. C.C.P. art. 3336. A judgment homologating

any account other than a final account shall be prima facie evidence of the

9 correctness of the account. A judgment homologating a final account has the

same effect as a final judgment in an ordinary action. La. C.C.P. art. 3337.

Ms. Chumley’s arguments focus on her allegation that she lacked

sufficient notice of the hearing held on January 13, 2022, and that this lack

of notice invalidates the results of the hearing. We disagree. The record

shows that Ms. Chumley, on November 29, 2021, filed an exception to DDL

1 and requested that Ms. LaCour show cause why DDL 1 should not be

dismissed. The district court then ordered Ms. LaCour to show cause on

January 13, 2022. Although Ms. Chumley attempted to use her renunciation

as a “withdrawal” of this rule to show cause, the renunciation does not

negate that Ms. Chumley knew a hearing would take place on January 13,

2022, considering that she requested Ms. LaCour to be ruled into court on

that very date. It is a bit disingenuous for Ms. Chumley to claim lack of

notice under these circumstances. Therefore, the court correctly denied Ms.

Chumley’s motions for summary judgment.

Although we conclude that notice is not the determinative issue before

us, as it relates to Ms. Chumley’s other assignments of error, we cannot say

that the record unequivocally supports that the January 13, 2022, hearing

resulted in a valid, final judgment allowing Ms. LaCour to recover the

money allegedly owed by Ms. Chumley. Ms. LaCour urges that the January

13, 2022, hearing and the March 2022 judgment homologating DDL 2

essentially proves that Ms. Chumley owes money to the Madden succession,

thereby supporting the district court’s grant of partial summary judgment.

Although we concede that the hearing and DDL 2 shows the existence of a

debt, the record fails to show that there are no genuine issues of material fact

as it relates to DDL 2 vis-à-vis the debt. We recognize the desire of all 10 involved to bring this lengthy litigation to a conclusion. However,

jurisprudence makes clear that a DDL is merely a device used to inform

interested parties of the nature and the estimated value of succession

property; it is not a method to establish a final judgment against an

individual. Notwithstanding that the purported judgment fails to specifically

name Ms. Chumley and list a dollar amount owed, a DDL can be amended at

any time in compliance with La. C.C.P. art. 3137, only further proof that this

judgment is not valid or final as it could be subject to amendment at any

time.

In fulfilling her duties as the succession representative, Ms. LaCour

has merely proved the existence of a debt associated with Madden Property

Management. She must now prove the value of MPM at the time of Johnye

Mae’s death, the alleged decrease in that value, whether Ms. Chumley is

responsible for the alleged decrease in value following the decedent’s death,

and if so, how much Ms. Chumley depleted MPM’s assets. Given the record

before us, we cannot say that these issues have been properly determined at

this stage in the proceedings. Although the district court correctly denied

Ms. Chumley’s summary judgment motions, we conclude that the district

court improperly granted partial summary judgment in favor of Ms. LaCour.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment

of the district court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion. Costs of this appeal are assessed evenly between Ms. Chumley and

Ms. LaCour.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED.