Donna Kay Reed v. State
This text of Donna Kay Reed v. State (Donna Kay Reed v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NUMBER 13-07-338-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
DONNA KAY REED, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee.
On appeal from the 377th District Court of Victoria County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Yañez and Benavides Memorandum Opinion by Justice Yañez
Pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant, Donna Kay Reed, pleaded guilty on
October 10, 2006 to the offense of forgery.1 The trial court assessed punishment at two
years’ confinement in state jail, plus a fine and restitution,2 suspended the sentence, and
1 See TEX . PENAL CODE ANN . § 32.21 (b), (d) (Vernon Supp. 2008). 2 See id. § 12.35 (Vernon Supp. 2008). placed appellant on community supervision for five years. On March 6, 2007, the State
filed a motion to revoke appellant’s community supervision. Following a hearing, the trial
court revoked appellant’s community supervision, and imposed the two-year state jail
sentence. Appellant appeals the revocation of her community supervision.3
Appellant’s appellate counsel, concluding that there are “no reasonably arguable
factual or evidentiary issues disclosed by the record in this case which would rise to the
level of reversible error,” filed an Anders4 brief, in which she reviewed the merits, or lack
thereof, of the appeal. We affirm.
I. DISCUSSION
Pursuant to Anders v. California,5 appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel has
filed a brief with this Court, stating that her review of the record yielded no grounds or error
upon which an appeal can be predicated. Although counsel’s brief does not advance any
arguable grounds of error, it does present a professional evaluation of the record
demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced on appeal.6
3 We note that the record contains the trial court’s certification, which states that this case “is a plea-bargain case, and the defendant has NO right of appeal.” See TEX . R. APP . P. 25.2 (a)(2). 4 See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 5 See id. 6 See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“In Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities.”) (citing Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343-44 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.)); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
2 In compliance with High v. State,7 appellant's counsel has carefully discussed why,
under controlling authority, there are no errors in the trial court's judgment. Counsel has
informed this Court that she has: (1) examined the record and found no arguable grounds
to advance on appeal, (2) served a copy of the brief and counsel’s motion to withdraw on
appellant, and (3) informed appellant of her right to review the record and to file a pro se
response.8 More than an adequate period of time has passed, and appellant has not filed
a pro se response.9
II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW
Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the
proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous.10 We have reviewed the
entire record and counsel's brief and have found nothing that would arguably support an
appeal.11 Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW
7 High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978). 8 See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 510 n.3; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “the pro se response need not comply with the rules of appellate procedure in order to be considered. Rather, the response should identify for the court those issues which the indigent appellant believes the court should consider in deciding whether the case presents any meritorious issues.” In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 409 n.23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (quoting Wilson v. State, 955 S.W.2d 693, 696-97 (Tex. App.–Waco 1997, no pet.)). 9 See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409. 10 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988). 11 See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirement of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 509.
3 In accordance with Anders, appellant’s attorney has asked this Court for permission
to withdraw as counsel for appellant.12 We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. Within five
days of the date of this Court’s opinion, counsel is ordered to send a copy of the opinion
and judgment to appellant and to advise appellant of her right to file a petition for
discretionary review.13
LINDA REYNA YAÑEZ, Justice
Do not publish. TEX . R. APP. P. 47.2(b). Memorandum Opinion delivered and filed this the 13th day of August, 2009.
12 See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (citing Jeffery v. State, 903 S.W.2d 776, 779-80 (Tex. App.–Dallas 1995, no pet.) (noting that “[i]f an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he must withdraw from representing the appellant. To withdraw from representation, the appointed attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the appellate court that the appeal is frivolous”) (citations omitted)). 13 See TEX . R. APP . P. 48.4; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 412 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should appellant wish to seek further review of this case by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, he must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed within thirty days from the date of either this opinion or the last timely motion for rehearing that was overruled by this Court. See TEX . R. APP . P. 68.2. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed with this Court, after which it will be forwarded to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. See TEX . R. APP . P. 68.3; 68.7. Any petition for discretionary review should comply with the requirements of Rule 68.4 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. See TEX . R. APP . P. 68.4.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
Donna Kay Reed v. State, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/donna-kay-reed-v-state-texapp-2009.