Donna J. Davis v. Shirley S. Chater

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedSeptember 24, 1997
Docket97-1036
StatusPublished

This text of Donna J. Davis v. Shirley S. Chater (Donna J. Davis v. Shirley S. Chater) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Donna J. Davis v. Shirley S. Chater, (8th Cir. 1997).

Opinion

United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 97-1036 ___________

Donna J. Davis, * * Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Eastern District of Arkansas. 1 John J. Callahan, Acting Commissioner * of Social Security, * * Appellee. *

Submitted: June 12, 1997

Filed: September 24, 1997 ___________

Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, BEEZER,2 and WOLLMAN, Circuit Judges. ___________

1 John J. Callahan was named to serve as Acting Commissioner of Social Security effective March 1, 1997. He has been substituted for Shirley S. Chater pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c). 2 The HONORABLE ROBERT R. BEEZER, United States Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation. WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Donna Davis appeals from the district court’s order affirming the Commissioner’s denial of her application for Disability Insurance Benefits. We reverse and remand.

I.

Davis was thirty-three years old at the time she applied for benefits. She has her general equivalency degree and has employment experience as an order entry clerk, secretary, cashier, and assembly line worker.

Davis filed for benefits on May 20, 1993, claiming that she became disabled as the result of a fall at work on August 18, 1992, which exacerbated pain stemming from the spinal fracture she had sustained in a car accident some fifteen years earlier. At the hearing before the administrative law judge (ALJ), held on May 13, 1994, Davis testified that soon after the fall she began experiencing severe pain in her neck and upper back and continued to be in severe pain for the next few weeks. In addition to the pain in her neck and back, Davis found it painful to breathe. Also, her leg shook, making it difficult for her to control her walking. In an attempt to relieve her pain, Davis underwent surgery to remove the Harrington rods3 that had been inserted into her back to repair her spinal fracture. Davis testified that following that surgery the pressure in her lower back worsened, her legs began to shake severely all the time, her knees began to lock up, and her feet “quit working.” In addition, she testified that she experiences severe migraine headaches and numbness in her legs.

3 Harrington rods are “a system of metal hooks and rods inserted surgically in the posterior elements of the spine to provide distraction and compression in treatment of scoliosis and other deformities.” The Sloan-Dorland Annotated Medical-Legal Dictionary, p. 305 (1992 Supplement).

-2- The ALJ discredited Davis’s subjective complaints of disabling pain and found that although Davis suffered from a severe impairment, the medical evidence did not indicate an impairment of sufficient severity to meet a listed impairment. The ALJ concluded that Davis was restricted in her ability to perform heavy manual labor or work requiring frequent stooping or working in a bent-over position for prolonged periods of time, restrictions which would not preclude her from performing her past relevant work.

On appeal, Davis argues that the Commissioner’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence because it was based on the ALJ’s erroneous determination that Davis’s subjective complaints were not credible. II. We must affirm the Commissioner’s decision denying benefits if substantial evidence on the record as a whole exists. See Lawrence v. Chater, 107 F.3d 674, 676 (8th Cir. 1997). “Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but enough so that a reasonable mind might find it adequate to support the conclusion.” Id. (citations omitted). In determining whether substantial evidence exists, “we must consider both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the [Commissioner’s] decision, but we may not reverse merely because substantial evidence exists for the opposite decision.” Gwathney v. Chater, 104 F.3d 1043, 1045 (8th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). “An ALJ may discount a claimant’s subjective complaints of pain only if there are inconsistencies in the record as a whole.” Ostronski v. Chater, 94 F.3d 413, 418 (8th Cir. 1996). The ALJ must consider the claimant’s prior work history; daily activities; the duration, frequency, and intensity of pain; precipitating and aggravating factors; dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medication; and functional restrictions. See id. (citing Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984)).

-3- The ALJ discredited Davis’s subjective complaints of pain, finding them to be contradicted by medical evidence. He found that Davis’s “pain has not caused her to see a physician often and she has not been prescribed medication in such dosage or quantity so as to indicate severe disabling pain. There is no indication that she does not do her own household chores and other activities.” The ALJ based his determination that medical evidence contradicted Davis’s complaints in large part on the report of Dr. Leventhal, an orthopedic specialist. Dr. Leventhal noted that he was at a loss to explain all of Davis’s complaints, concluded that “her problem is complex and multifactorial,” and surmised that Davis had a considerable amount of symptom magnification with functional overlay. There is significant medical evidence, however, that supports Davis’s complaints of disabling pain, including Dr. Leventhal’s own findings. Dr. Leventhal’s examination of Davis revealed that Davis had marked limitation of forward bending and extension, restricted right and left lateral bending, moderate spasticity of her lower extremities with hyperreflexia in her knees and ankles, and sustained clonus4 of both lower extremities. Dr. Leventhal noted that Davis walked with a spastic gait, had a difficult time walking on her heels and toes, and that she complained bitterly of pain. He recommended a check for infection, an MRI of her thoracic and lumbar spine, and consideration of a Baclofen pump5 to help with her spasticity. He referred her to Dr. Feler, a neurosurgeon, for consultation about an implantable Baclofen pump. Davis was subsequently unable to complete the MRI due to extreme claustrophobia.

4 Clonus is “alternate muscular contraction and relaxation in rapid succession.” The Sloan-Dorland Annotated Medical-Legal Dictionary, p. 149 (1987). 5 Baclofen (Lioresal) “is useful for the alleviation of signs and symptoms of spasticity resulting from multiple sclerosis, particularly for the relief of flexor spasms and concomitant pain, clonus, and muscular rigidity.” Physician’s Desk Reference, p. 829 (50th ed. 1996). A Baclofen pump is recommended for chronic use of Baclofen injection, which “is indicated for use in the management of severe spasticity of spinal cord origin.” Id. at 1596.

-4- The findings of several other physicians likewise rebut the ALJ’s conclusion that the medical evidence contradicted Davis’s complaints of pain, and they also contradict the ALJ’s finding that Davis sought medical attention infrequently and was not prescribed medications in such dosage or quantity to support her allegations of pain. Immediately following her fall, Davis went to her family physician, Dr. Mitchell, who determined that Davis suffered muscle strain to her trapezius and mild contusion to her left hand and prescribed Dolobid and Parafon DSC6 for pain. The following day Davis saw an emergency room physician, Dr.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Donna J. Davis v. Shirley S. Chater, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/donna-j-davis-v-shirley-s-chater-ca8-1997.