COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH
NOS. 02-07-308-CR 02-07-309-CR 02-07-310-CR 02-07-311-CR 02-07-312-CR 02-07-313-CR 02-07-314-CR 02-07-315-CR 02-07-316-CR
DONN DEVERAL MARTIN APPELLANT A/K/A DON DEVERAL MARTIN
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE ------------
FROM THE 372ND DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
------------ MEMORANDUM OPINION 1 ------------
I. Introduction
In six issues, Appellant Donn Deveral Martin appeals his nine convictions.
We affirm.
1 … See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4. II. Factual and Procedural Background
Martin, a resident of Abilene, occasionally slept over at his daughter’s
house in Arlington. At times, Martin was alone behind closed doors with S.S.,
his five-year-old granddaughter. On the morning of March 6, 2006, S.S. told
her mother that Martin had come into her room the previous night and licked
her “butt.” 2 During the investigation, the police discovered hundreds of child
pornography images on Martin’s computer, including photographs of S.S.
Following the investigation, the State charged Martin, by multiple
indictments, with four counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child under
fourteen years of age, three counts of sexual performance by a child, and two
counts of indecency with a child. Martin pleaded not guilty, and the case
proceeded to trial. After hearing the evidence, the jury found Martin guilty as
charged on all counts and in a separate punishment hearing sentenced him to
life on each of the four counts, of aggravated sexual assault and to twenty
years on each of the remaining counts. This appeal followed.
III. Motion to Suppress
In his first issue, Martin contends that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to suppress evidence obtained from the illegal search of his computer.
He argues that his wife did not have authority to consent to the search; and
2 … The evidence showed that S.S. was referring to her genitals when she said “butt.” therefore, the warrantless search by the police was unreasonable. Additionally,
Martin argues that because his wife lacked authority to consent and because
his oral consent was invalid 3 the police lacked effective consent to search his
computer. However, since Martin’s wife did have authority to consent and she
did, in fact, consent, the validity of Martin’s consent is moot and therefore, will
not be addressed.
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under
a bifurcated standard of review. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App.
1997). We must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s ruling. Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007);
State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). When the record
is silent on the reasons for the trial court’s ruling, or when there are no explicit
fact findings and neither party timely requested findings and conclusions from
the trial court, we imply the necessary fact findings that would support the trial
court’s ruling if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s ruling, supports those findings. Id.; see Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673;
Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at 25. We then review the trial court’s legal ruling de novo
3 … Martin claims that his oral consent is invalid because he was under the influence of pain medication at the time of his consent. unless the implied fact findings supported by the record are also dispositive of
the legal ruling. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d at 819.
We must uphold the trial court’s ruling if it is supported by the record and
is correct under any theory of law applicable to the case even if the trial court
gave the wrong reason for its ruling. State v. Stevens, 235 S.W.3d 736, 740
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Armendariz v. State, 123 S.W.3d 401, 404 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 974 (2004).
B. Applicable Law
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and
seizures by government officials. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Wiede, 214 S.W.3d
at 24. A warrantless search is unreasonable per se unless it fits into one of the
few specifically defined and well established exceptions. Minnesota v.
Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2135 (1993); see Estrada v.
State, 154 S.W.3d 604, 608 n. 12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). One such
exception is a warrantless search conducted after a person has given consent.
Brimage v. State, 918 S.W.2d 466, 480 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
A less common variation of the standard consent case is that of third
party consent. The Fourth Amendment recognizes a valid warrantless search
if the officers secure the consent of a third party who possesses common
authority over the premises or effects sought to be inspected. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171, 94 S. Ct. 988, 993 (1974). Whether common
authority exists, turns on evidence of “mutual use of the property by persons
generally having joint access or control for most purposes.” Id. at 171 n. 7;
Welch v. State, 93 S.W.3d 50, 52 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Furthermore, the
court of criminal appeals has emphasized that “the third party’s legal property
interest is not dispositive in determining whether he has the authority to
consent to a search.” Maxwell v. State, 73 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex. Crim. App.
2002).
C. Applicable Facts
In March, 2006, while investigating an outcry of sexual assault allegedly
committed by Martin against S.S., Detective Mike Weber of the Arlington police
department went to Martin’s home in Abilene and spoke with Martin’s wife
Beverly. Beverly discussed her and Martin’s family history with Detective
Weber. At some point, Detective Weber asked whether there were any
computers in the house. Beverly showed Detective Weber a computer located
in the downstairs hallway and Detective Weber asked if he could take it with
him. Beverly hesitated and said that she would need to call Martin, who was
in the hospital recovering from surgery, to ask his permission. She called
Martin and informed him that the police were at the house and were asking to
take his computer. Martin replied, “Well, Bev, if that will clear this up, give it to them.” Beverly then signed a written consent form and turned the computer
over to Detective Weber.
D. Analysis
Before trial, Martin filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from
his computer on the grounds that the evidence had been illegally obtained.
Specifically, he argued that the search of his computer was unreasonable
because the police lacked valid consent to search.
During the suppression hearing, Beverly testified that the title to the
house she and Martin lived in was solely in her name, that she could go into
any area of the house, and that she had authority to use Martin’s computer.
However, Martin argues that because Beverly never used the computer without
his help and because it belonged solely to him, she did not have authority to
consent to the search. We disagree.
The authority to consent is not determined by ownership or actual use but
by joint access or control. See Matlock, 415 U.S. 164. Here, Beverly shared
equal access with Martin. Martin’s computer was located in an open area of
the house and not behind locked doors; the computer did not have password
protection except for internet purposes; and there was no evidence in the
record, nor did Martin direct us to any, that Beverly was prohibited from using
his computer. Therefore, it does not matter that Beverly never used Martin’s computer
without his help.4 The fact remains that she had access to and authority to use
his computer. Martin also argues that Beverly acknowledged her lack of
authority to consent when she told the police she needed to call Martin to get
his permission. Again, we disagree.
The fact that Beverly called Martin to get his permission in no way
diminishes her authority to consent. See Welch, 93 S.W.3d 50 (holding that
third party consent—at least a third party that has mutual access—is valid even
when the owner is present and does not consent to the search). Here, we’ve
already established that Beverly had mutual access to Martin’s computer;
therefore, Beverly’s authority to consent is not contingent on Martin granting
permission. Id. In fact, Beverly only asked to call Martin because she was
worried about the integrity of his research, and not because she lacked
authority.5 Therefore, Beverly provided valid and effective consent when she
signed the written consent form.
4 … At trial, Beverly testified that the reason she did not use Martin’s computer without Martin being there was because she was not very good with computers. 5 … When asked if the reason she did not give consent right away was because the computer belonged to Martin, Beverly replied, “No. Well, the reason I didn’t want to do that was because of all of his research on the computer. Maybe I’ve watched too many shows, but I didn’t want to mess up years and years of research.” Because the record supports a finding that Beverly had joint access to
Martin’s computer, and because Martin’s arguments show, at most, a lack of
equal, but not joint, access over his computer, we conclude that Martin failed
to demonstrate that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress.
Accordingly, we overrule Martin’s first issue.
IV. Factual Sufficiency
In his second issue, Martin argues that the evidence, when viewed in a
neutral light, is factually insufficient to support his nine convictions. In the
alternative, Martin asserts that even if the evidence is factually sufficient to
support the conviction for the March 5, 2006, count of aggravated sexual
assault of a child under the age of fourteen, it is insufficient to support the
remaining eight convictions, arguing that the State failed to identify him as the
man in the photographs. We disagree.
When reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, we view all the evidence in a neutral light, favoring neither party.
Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Drichas v.
State, 175 S.W.3d 795, 799 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). We then ask whether
the evidence supporting the conviction, although legally sufficient, is
nevertheless so weak that the jury’s determination is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust or whether conflicting evidence so greatly outweighs the
evidence supporting the conviction that the jury’s determination is manifestly
unjust. Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 414–15, 417; Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d
1, 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). To reverse under the second ground, we must
determine, with some objective basis in the record, that the great weight and
preponderance of all the evidence, though legally sufficient, contradicts the
verdict. Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 417.
In determining whether the evidence is factually insufficient to support a
conviction that is nevertheless supported by legally sufficient evidence, it is not
enough that this court “harbor a subjective level of reasonable doubt to
overturn [the] conviction.” Id. We cannot conclude that a conviction is clearly
wrong or manifestly unjust simply because we would have decided differently
than the jury or because we disagree with the jury’s resolution of a conflict in
the evidence. Id. We may not simply substitute our judgment for the jury’s.
Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 12; Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1997). Unless the record clearly reveals that a different result is
appropriate, we must defer to the jury’s determination of the weight to be given
contradictory testimonial evidence because resolution of the conflict “often
turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor, and those jurors were in
attendance when the testimony was delivered.” Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 8. Thus, we must give due deference to the jury’s determinations, “particularly
those determinations concerning the weight and credibility of the evidence.”
Id. at 9.
An opinion addressing factual sufficiency must include a discussion of the
most important and relevant evidence that supports the appellant’s complaint
on appeal. Sims v. State, 99 S.W.3d 600, 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). As
a fact finder, the jury is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from
circumstantial evidence to ultimate facts. Villani v. State, 116 S.W.3d 297,
303 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d). Thus, identity of a
perpetrator can be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence; eyewitness
identification is not necessary. Earls v. State, 707 S.W.2d 82, 85 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1986); Couchman v. State, 3 S.W.3d 155, 162 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
1999, pet. ref’d).
C. Analysis
Out of Martin’s nine convictions, only one arose from S.S.’s outcry. The
remaining eight convictions were the result of photographs found on Martin’s
computer. Because Martin’s factual insufficiency argument is separated into
(1) the conviction that arose from S.S.’s outcry and (2) the convictions that
arose from the photographs, we will tailor our analysis to his arguments. 1. Conviction Arising From S.S.’s Outcry
Martin claims that the evidence is factually insufficient to support the
aggravated sexual assault conviction resulting from S.S.’s outcry because
S.S.’s testimony about the events that occurred were unclear and lacked
credibility.
S.S. was six years old at the time of trial. She testified that she could
not remember exactly what had happened to her when she was five years old
but, upon further questioning, she testified that she did remember telling her
mother that something bad had happened when her “granddaddy” had been in
the room with her. On cross, in response to the defense attorney’s questions,
S.S. testified that Ariel, King Triton, and Flounder, from the movie The Little
Mermaid, were real. On redirect, however, S.S. indicated that she had only
seen Disney characters in a movie and that a cartoon character, unlike her
family, had never visited her in her home or engaged in any real–life activities
with her. However, S.S.’s testimony was not the only evidence put before the
jury.
S.S.’s mother, testified that on March 5, 2006, her father Martin had
spent the night at her house. The following morning, her five-year-old
daughter, S.S., told her that Martin had “licked [her] butt . . . and [she] didn’t
like it.” Martin acknowledged sleeping over at his daughter’s house on the night of the alleged incident but denied doing anything inappropriate to his
granddaughter.
The State introduced evidence that during the subsequent sexual assault
exam at the hospital, S.S. repeated the same allegation to the doctor. The
doctor collected S.S.’s underwear as evidence and a forensic biologist for the
Tarrant County Medical Examiner’s Office examined them. The forensic
biologist testified that DNA comprised of matter consistent with female vaginal
secretions combined with saliva had been identified and that Martin could not
be excluded as a contributor. Martin testified that a “tummy-blowing” game
could have resulted in the saliva on S.S.’s underwear.
The State also introduced into evidence the child pornography found on
Martin’s computer. Martin responded by introducing evidence that his son-in-
law worked as a computer consultant and that, although highly unlikely, it was
possible for someone to remotely hack into a computer and download
photographs onto it. Martin’s defensive theory was that the allegations against
him had been contrived by his daughter and her husband because of an
argument over a house they were purchasing from him. To support this theory,
Martin introduced into evidence, by way of various persons’ testimony, that he
owned the house that his daughter and her family lived in and that he had had
a falling out with her over selling the house. The State responded by introducing into evidence two prior occasions where Martin had been involved
in misconduct with a child.
After examining all the evidence in a neutral light, we find that Martin’s
conclusion that the evidence is factually insufficient readily conflicts with the
standard of review for factual sufficiency. Martin argues the credibility of
S.S.’s testimony in isolation in order to arrive at his conclusion; however, the
factual sufficiency standard requires that we view all the evidence in a neutral
light. See Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 414. Therefore, after examining all of the
evidence in a neutral light, favoring neither party, we hold that the evidence
supporting Martin’s conviction for the March 5, 2006, aggravated sexual
assault charge is not so weak that the jury’s determination is clearly wrong or
manifestly unjust.
2. Convictions Arising From Photographs
Additionally, Martin argues that the State failed to identify him as the man
in the photographs found on his computer; therefore, the evidence is factually
insufficient to support the eight convictions that arose as a result of the
photographs. To support his argument, Martin claims that he did not take the
pictures, that he did not commit any of the alleged offenses, and that he was
out of the country on the dates that the alleged offenses occurred. The jury,
however, received the following direct and circumstantial evidence. Detective Mike Weaver of the Arlington police department testified that
a search of Martin’s computer turned up hundreds of child pornography
photographs. Martin testified that he did not know the photographs were on
his computer and that the computer was not password protected. Detective
Weaver also testified that he had identified the dates the photographs were
taken and the type of camera used to take them, a Sony Cybershot DSC-P32.
Martin responded that he was either in Abilene or out of the country on the
dates the photographs were taken. However, the State introduced evidence
that Martin’s passport revealed that he was unaccounted for during the times
he claimed to be out of the country. The State also entered into evidence a
Sony Cybershot DSC-P32 camera retrieved by the police from Martin’s home.
Martin responded that the camera belonged to his wife; however, his wife
testified that Martin was the primary user of the camera.
Some of the photographs discovered on Martin’s computer showed the
image of an adult male, whose face is unseen, performing sexual acts with S.S.
In a few of the photographs, the man’s shirt, hands, and sex organ can be
seen. Martin’s daughter and wife both testified that the man’s shirt in the
photograph looked like one owned by Martin. Martin denied owning the shirt
and the police were unable to find the shirt at Martin’s house. However,
Martin’s wife testified that she might have packed the shirt in Martin’s bag for his stay at the hospital. Furthermore, Martin’s daughter testified that the hand
shown in one of the photographs belonged to Martin. 6 Finally, Detective Weber
testified that the male’s sex organ in the photograph was circumcised, that he
photographed Martin’s sex organ, and that Martin was circumcised. Martin
testified that he had not been circumcised. However, Martin’s wife testified
that Martin had told her that he had had a partial circumcision.
After examining all the evidence in a neutral light, we cannot say that the
evidence in this case is so weak that the verdicts are clearly wrong and
manifestly unjust or that the conflicting evidence so greatly outweighs the
evidence supporting the verdict that the jury’s determination is manifestly
unjust. See Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 9. A decision is not manifestly unjust
merely because the jury resolved conflicting views of the evidence in favor of
the State. Cain, 958 S.W.2d at 410. Deferring, as we must, to the jury’s
resolution of contradictory testimony and evaluation of credibility and
demeanor, we conclude that the evidence, when viewed in a neutral light, is
factually sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Martin was the unidentified
man in the photographs; and therefore, the evidence is factually sufficient to
support the eight convictions that arose from the photographs. See Johnson,
6 … Martin’s daughter based her identification of his hand on a scar and freckle shown in the photograph that matched a scar and freckle on her father’s hand. 23 S.W.3d at 9.
Having found that the evidence is factually sufficient to support all nine
of Martin’s convictions, we overrule Martin’s second issue.
V. Competency of a Child Witness
In his third and fourth issues, Martin contends that the trial court erred
in allowing six-year-old S.S. to testify.
A trial court’s determination of whether a child witness is competent to
testify and its ruling on the issue will not be disturbed on appeal absent an
abuse of discretion. Broussard v. State, 910 S.W.2d 952, 960 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 826 (1996). We review the child’s
responses to qualification questions as well as the child’s entire testimony to
determine whether the trial court’s ruling constituted an abuse of discretion.
De Los Santos v. State, 219 S.W.3d 71, 80–81 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2006, no pet.).
Rule 601 of the Rules of Evidence, creates a presumption that a person
is competent to testify. Tex. R. Evid. 601. The trial court has no duty to
conduct a preliminary examination on its own motion. McGinn v. State, 961
S.W.2d 161, 165 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Once the competency of a child witness is challenged, the trial court must assure itself that the child has (1) the
ability to intelligently observe the events in question at the time of the
occurrence, (2) the capacity to recollect the events, and (3) the capacity to
narrate the events. Torres v. State, 33 S.W.3d 252, 255 (Tex. Crim. App.
2000) (quoting Watson v. State, 596 S.W.2d 867, 870 (Tex. Crim. App.
1980)). Inconsistencies or conflicts in a child’s testimony do not automatically
render the child incompetent to testify but, instead, affect the weight to be
given to the child’s testimony. See Upton v. State, 894 S.W.2d 426, 429
(Tex. App.—Amarillo 1995, pet. ref’d).
However, to preserve a complaint for our review, a party must have
presented to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion that states the
specific grounds for the desired ruling if they are not apparent from the context
of the request, objection, or motion. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Mosley v.
State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 265 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (op. on reh’g), cert.
denied, 526 U.S. 1070 (1999). An objection must be made as soon as the
basis for the objection becomes apparent. Tex. R. Evid. 103(a)(1); Lagrone v.
State, 942 S.W.2d 602, 618 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 917
(1997); Polk v. State, 729 S.W.2d 749, 753 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). Further,
the trial court must have ruled on the request, objection, or motion, either
expressly or implicitly, or the complaining party must have objected to the trial court’s refusal to rule. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(2); Mendez v. State, 138
S.W.3d 334, 341 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
Here, Martin complains that the trial court erred in finding S.S. competent
to testify and further erred in having overruled his motion to strike S.S.’s
testimony. However, Martin failed to timely preserve his complaint.
In a hearing held outside the presence of the jury, the trial court probed
S.S.’s ability to distinguish the truth from a lie by asking, “[I]f I said, how do
you like my white robe, would that be telling you the truth or would I be telling
you a lie?” S.S. correctly answered that it was a lie. Also, when asked by the
State, “[W]e know that you’re not supposed to tell lies, don’t we?”, S.S. replied
“yes.”
After asking her a series of questions, the trial court found S.S.
competent to testify. During the court’s questioning of S.S., Martin did not
object, nor did he object when the trial court made its finding of competency.
Furthermore, Martin did not make any objections when S.S. testified in the
presence of the jury. In fact, Martin’s only objection came after the witness
had been passed and the jury had left for the day. That was too late. See Tex.
R. Evid. 103(a)(1); Lagrone, 942 S.W.2d at 618 (holding that the objection was
untimely because appellant did not object until the prosecutor’s question had been asked and answered, and the prosecutor had passed the witness); Polk,
729 S.W.2d at 753 (holding that for an objection to be timely, it must be
lodged “at the earliest opportunity,” or “as soon as the ground for objection
becomes apparent”).
Because Martin failed to object at his earliest opportunity, he has
preserved nothing for appellate review on this point; therefore, we overrule
Martin’s third and fourth issues.
VI. Double Jeopardy
In his fifth issue, Martin complains that his nine convictions constitute
multiple punishments for the same offense; therefore, his right to be free from
double jeopardy was violated.
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution provides
that no person shall be subjected to twice having life or limb in jeopardy for the
same offense. U.S. Const. amend. V. Generally, this clause protects against
multiple punishments for the same offense. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161,
165, 97 S. Ct. 2221, 2225 (1977); Ex parte Herron, 790 S.W.2d 623, 624
(Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (op. on reh’g).
To determine whether offenses are the same, we must examine the
elements of the applicable statutes to determine whether each statute “requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not.” Blockburger v. United
States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S. Ct. 180, 182 (1932); see United States v.
Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2856 (1993); Parrish v. State,
869 S.W.2d 352, 353–55 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). However, in multiple
punishment cases, the court of criminal appeals has recognized that Blockburger
is not the exclusive test and that theses cases require a two-step analysis. The
first step is to examine the proof necessary to establish the statutory elements
of each offense as alleged in the indictment. Vineyard v. State, 958 S.W.2d
834, 836 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). The second step requires an analysis of the
legislative intent, i.e., whether it was the legislature’s intent to impose multiple
punishments or only one. Ex parte Ervin, 991 S.W.2d 804, 814 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1999).
A person commits aggravated sexual assault of a child under the age of
fourteen, if the person intentionally or knowingly: (1) causes the penetration of
the anus or sexual organ of a child by any means or (2) causes the anus of a
child to contact the mouth, anus, or sexual organ of another person, including
the actor. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.02(a)(1)(B)(i),(iv) (Vernon Supp. 2008).
A person commits the offense of indecency with a child younger the
seventeen years, if the person: (1) engages in sexual contact with the child or causes the child to engage in sexual contact or (2) with intent to arouse or
gratify the sexual desire of any person (A) exposes the person’s anus or any
part of the person’s genitals, knowing the child is present or (B) causes the
child to expose the child’s anus or any part of the child’s genitals. Tex. Penal
Code Ann. § 21.11(a)(1), (2) (Vernon 2003). Sexual contact means any
touching of any part of the body of a child, including touching through clothing,
with the anus, breast, or any part of the genitals of a person. Id. at (c)(2).
Courts have held indecency with a child to be a lesser included offense
of aggravated sexual assault in certain circumstances—namely, when the State
uses one act to prove both offenses. See, e.g., Ochoa v. State, 982 S.W.2d
904, 908 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); Beltran v. State, 30 S.W.3d 532, 534 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2000, no pet.). However, when evidence supporting an
indecency charge is not the same as that supporting the prosecution for
aggravated sexual assault, the former will not be deemed to be a lesser included
offense of the latter, and both may be prosecuted without violating the double
jeopardy clause. See, e.g., Bottenfield v. State, 77 S.W.3d 349, 358 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2002, pet. ref’d), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 916 (2003)
(evidence showed appellant touched victim’s “winkie” twice, thus supporting
convictions for both aggravated sexual assault and indecency).
C. Analysis Martin asserts that the trial court deprived him of his constitutional
protections against double jeopardy by allowing the State to prosecute and
punish him twice for the same offense. Specifically, Martin argues that the
State did not conclusively establish when the photographs found on his
computer were taken and, as a result, Martin received multiple punishments for
the same offense. In the alternative, Martin argues that, if the dates were
conclusively established, then the two photographs taken on December 16,
2004, constitute one offense; and therefore, the convictions he received for the
December 16, 2004, photographs—indecency with a child and aggravated
sexual assault—constitute multiple punishments. We disagree.
The following is a list of Martin’s convictions arising from the
photographs found on his computer:7
2-07-309-CR – 05/28/2005 Indecency with a Child (Fondling): Photo of a child laying between an adult male’s legs reaching up behind herself and grasping the adult male’s sex organ. 2-07-310-CR – 12/16/2004 Indecency with a Child (Fondling): Photo of a child’s hands grasping the end of an adult male’s sex organ. 2-07-311-CR – 05/28/2005 Aggravated Sexual Assault of a Child
7 … Detective Weaver testified that although some of the pictures did not show the face of S.S., other pictures taken around the same time and at the same location did. The jury could have reasonably inferred that the young female in the photographs was S.S. Furthermore, we have already held that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s determination that Martin is the male in the photographs. (under 14): Photo of an adult male’s sex organ touching the vagina of a young female. 2-07-312-CR – 04/18/2005 Aggravated Sexual Assault of a Child (under 14): Photo of an adult male’s sex organ touching the vagina of a young female. 2-07-313-CR –12/16/2004 Aggravated Sexual Assault of a Child (under age 14): Photo showing the mouth of a child being penetrated by an adult male’s sex organ. 2-07-314-CR –12/16/2004 Sexual Performance by a Child: Digital File of a young female ex– posing her genitals. 2-07-315-CR –01/08/2005 Sexual Performance by a Child: Digital File of a young female touching the outside of her vaginal area and spreading the vaginal area to some degree. 2-07-316-CR –12/11/2004 Sexual Performance by a Child: Digital File of a young female pulling back her panties and exposing her vaginal area.
At trial, the jury heard testimony by Detective Mike Weaver, a certified
forensic computer examiner with the Arlington police department. Detective
Weaver testified extensively on the methods he used to determine the dates
that the photographs were taken. On cross, Martin asked Detective Weaver
whether it was possible to manipulate the date and time on the image.
Detective Weaver’s reply was, “Is it possible, yes. Unlikely, no. It’s not likely
in this case in my opinion.”
Deferring, as we must, to the jury’s resolution of contradictory testimony and evaluation of credibility and demeanor, we conclude that the evidence
supports the jury’s reliance on the dates established by Detective Weaver’s
testimony. Consequently, because the photographs, with a few exceptions,
were taken on different dates, Martin’s convictions do not violate the double
jeopardy clause. However, since there were multiple punishments for
photographs taken on December 16, 2004, we must address Martin’s argument
that the State punished him twice for the same act.
In separate indictments, the State charged Martin with aggravated sexual
assault of a child under the age of fourteen and indecency with a child. The
charges stemmed from two photographs found on Martin’s computer; both
taken on December 16, 2004. The photographs clearly show two separate and
distinct acts; (1) contact between S.S.’s hands and Martin’s sex organ and (2)
contact between S.S.’s mouth and Martin’s sex organ. See, e.g., Murray v.
State, 24 S.W.3d 881, 889 (Tex. App.—Waco 2000, pet. ref’d) (holding that
defendant may be convicted of both indecency with a child and aggravated
sexual assault when evidence indicates that defendant penetrated victim’s
female sexual organ with his fingers and touched her genitals with his tongue).
Because the evidence supporting Martin’s indecency charge is not the same as
that supporting the evidence for his aggravated sexual assault charge, the
former will not be deemed to be a lesser included offense of the latter, and both may be prosecuted without violating the double jeopardy clause. Accordingly,
we overrule Martin’s fifth issue.
VII. Extraneous Offenses
In his sixth and final issue, Martin contends that the trial court abused its
discretion in admitting evidence of extraneous offenses.
A trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence is reviewed under an
abuse of discretion standard. Moses v. State, 105 S.W.3d 622, 627 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2003). If the trial court’s ruling was within the zone of reasonable
disagreement, there is no abuse of discretion. Id. Further, a trial court’s
decision regarding admissibility of evidence will be sustained if correct on any
theory of law applicable to the case, even when the court’s underlying reason
for the decision is wrong. Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543–44 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1990) (citing Spann v. State, 448 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. Crim. App.
1969)).
Pursuant to rule 404(b), evidence of extraneous offenses is not admissible
during the guilt-innocence phase of a trial to prove a defendant acted in
conformity with his bad character. Tex. R. Evid. 404(b). However, extraneous
offense evidence may be “admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence
of mistake or accident” when it has relevance beyond character conformity.
Id.; Moses, 105 S.W.3d at 626.
Rebuttal of a defensive theory is also one of the permissible purposes for
which evidence may be admitted under rule 404(b). Moses, 105 S.W.3d at
626. The court of criminal appeals has held that extraneous offense evidence
is admissible under rule 404(b) to rebut a defensive theory raised in an opening
statement. Ransom v. State, 920 S.W.2d 288, 301 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)
(op. on reh’g). In sexual assault cases, extraneous offense evidence may be
admitted under rule 404(b) to rebut defensive theories of retaliation or that the
defendant is an innocent victim of a “frame-up.” Wheeler v. State, 67 S.W.3d
879, 887 n. 22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (involving the defensive theory of
conspiracy or frame-up motivated by greed or money); Moses, 105 S.W.3d at
627 (involving a retaliation defensive theory); Dennis v. State, 178 S.W.3d
172, 178 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d) (involving frame-up
defensive theory motivated by anger or revenge).
Even if relevant evidence is offered and admissible under rule 404(b), a
trial court should nevertheless exclude it if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Tex. R. Evid. 403; Moses, 105
S.W.3d at 626. The trial court must conduct a rule 403 balancing test to make this determination. See Mozon v. State, 991 S.W.2d 841, 847 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1999); Bargas v. State, 252 S.W.3d 876, 890–91 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2008, no pet. h.). When undertaking a rule 403 analysis, a trial
court must balance (1) the inherent probative force of the proffered item of
evidence along with (2) the proponent’s need for that evidence against (3) any
tendency of the evidence to suggest decision on an improper basis, (4) any
tendency of the evidence to confuse or distract the jury from the main issues,
(5) any tendency of the evidence to be given undue weight by a jury that has
not been equipped to evaluate the probative force of the evidence, and (6) the
likelihood that presentation of the evidence will consume an inordinate amount
of time or merely repeat evidence already admitted. Gigliobianco v. State, 210
S.W.3d 637, 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
Martin contends that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the
State to question him regarding a statutory rape charge filed against him in
1983.8 He also argues that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the
testimony of Amanda Rogers.9 Martin complains that the evidence was too
8 … The statutory rape charge was later dropped when Martin pleaded guilty to a lesser charge of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. 9 … Rogers testified that in 1992, when she was around the age of nine or ten, Martin, while staying the night at her parent’s house, had kissed her, had inserted his finger into her vagina, and had touched her inappropriately on remote to be probative; or alternatively, that the probative value, if any, was
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The State however, argues
that it sought to admit the evidence of the extraneous offenses to rebut
Martin’s defensive theory that his daughter and son-in-law had “orchestrated
this event.” In his opening statement, Martin stated:
Keep an open mind until you’ve listened to all the evidence in this case, because there’s a lot that hasn’t been said. What you’re going to find out is that in 2001 [S.S.] and her parents moved into the house that was owned by [Martin] . . . They moved in and they decided that they wanted that house. Well, they were never able to get the money together to buy the house. What they did do, the house was damaged in 2002 by hail and rain . . . and there was substantial funds that were never given to [Martin]. [The funds] were put in [S.S.’s parents’] account and kept and some of the repairs were paid for. . . . They never came through.
Subsequent to that time[,] the two of them kept asking [Martin], “Why don’t you just give us the house? . . . And he said, “No, we had a deal that you were going to buy the house from me.”
And what has happened is [S.S.’s father], who is a computer expert, you’ll find worked on this computer that [Martin] had bought in 2005 at his house okay? These photos that are on this computer will give you a string of dates of when supposedly the photos were taken and when they were placed on the computer. You’ll find out that all those dates and times can be manipulated by an expert that knows how to manipulate them.
It is clear from his opening statement, that Martin raised a “frame-up”
defensive theory. Therefore, under Moses, we hold that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in determining that the statutory rape charge and Rogers’
other parts of her body. testimony were relevant rebuttal evidence to show the jury that S.S.’s parents
were not motivated by greed or money in making the allegations against Martin.
See Moses, 105 S.W.3d at 627. However, as previously noted, even if
relevant evidence is offered and admissible under rule 404(b), we must
nevertheless exclude it if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice. Tex. R. Evid. 403; Moses, 105 S.W.3d at 626.
Accordingly, we must conduct a 403 balancing test to determine whether the
probative value is outweighed by undue prejudice. See Mozon, 991 S.W.2d at
847; Bargas, 252 S.W.3d at 891–92.
The first of the three factors—the strength of the evidence to make a fact
of consequence more or less probable—weighs strongly in favor of
admissibility. This is so, primarily because the evidence of the statutory rape
charge and the testimony by Rogers were probative to rebut the defensive
theory that S.S.’s parents had framed Martin in order to get the house.
Therefore, the admission of this evidence makes it less likely that S.S.’s
allegations concerning the charged offenses were the result of a frame-up.
As to the second and third factors, although the evidence had the
potential to impress the jury in an indelible way, any unfair prejudice is
outweighed by the probative value of the evidence. See Bargas, 252 S.W.3d
at 893–94. Furthermore, the State did not elicit detailed accounts of the offenses, but only asked a few questions in order to show similarities to the
charged offenses.
Finally, other than the details and circumstances of the charged offenses,
the State had no other evidence to rebut Martin’s defensive theory. Therefore,
the State displayed a need for the evidence to counter Martin’s defensive
theory that S.S.’s parents were trying to frame him. 10
In balancing the above factors, we find that the trial court’s decision to
admit the extraneous offense evidence was within the zone of reasonable
disagreement. As such, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
under rule 403 in admitting the extraneous offense evidence; and accordingly,
we overrule Martin’s sixth and final issue.
10 … Martin elicited testimony from L.S. to support his theory that L.S., as a computer expert, had the ability to tamper with his computer. VIII. Conclusion
Having overruled all six of Martin’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
BOB MCCOY JUSTICE
PANEL: LIVINGSTON, DAUPHINOT, and MCCOY, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: November 6, 2008