Dongsheng Huang v. Ultimo Software Solutions, Inc.

Ninth Circuit

Dongsheng Huang v. Ultimo Software Solutions, Inc.

577 F. App'x 669

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit·Decided May 30, 2014·No. No. 12-17605·Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

Footnotes

**

Dongsheng Huang appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing his action seeking enforcement of an order of the United States Department of Labor. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Robinson v. United States, 586 F.3d 683, 685 (9th Cir.2009), and we affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Huang’s action because Huang failed to allege facts showing that Ultimo Software Solutions, Inc. is a federal agency subject to review under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”). See 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (defining an “agency” as “each authority of the Government of the United States”). Moreover, Huang failed to show that he had exhausted administrative remedies before bringing his action. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (under the APA, agency action is subject to judicial review only when it is made reviewable by statute or a final agency order has issued); Buckingham v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 603 F.3d 1073, 1080 (9th Cir.2010) (“The APA requires plaintiffs to exhaust them administrative remedies before bringing suit in federal court.”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing without leave to amend because amendment would have been futile. See Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1129-30 (9th Cir.2013) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that leave to amend may be denied if amendment would be futile).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Huang’s motion for reconsideration because Huang failed to establish grounds for such relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir.1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for reconsideration).

Contrary to Ultimo Software Solutions, Inc.’s contention, Huang’s appeal of the district court’s dismissal order was timely. See Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(7)(A)(ii); Stephanie-Cardona LLC v. Smith’s Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc., 476 F.3d 701, 703 (9th Cir.2007) (“[I]f the district court does not set forth the judgment on a separate document, an appealable final order is considered entered when 150 days have run from the time the final order is docketed.”).

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM

Footnotes

**

Dongsheng Huang appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing his action seeking enforcement of an order of the United States Department of Labor. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Robinson v. United States, 586 F.3d 683, 685 (9th Cir.2009), and we affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Huang’s action because Huang failed to allege facts showing that Ultimo Software Solutions, Inc. is a federal agency subject to review under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”). See 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (defining an “agency” as “each authority of the Government of the United States”). Moreover, Huang failed to show that he had exhausted administrative remedies before bringing his action. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (under the APA, agency action is subject to judicial review only when it is made reviewable by statute or a final agency order has issued); Buckingham v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 603 F.3d 1073, 1080 (9th Cir.2010) (“The APA requires plaintiffs to exhaust them administrative remedies before bringing suit in federal court.”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing without leave to amend because amendment would have been futile. See Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1129-30 (9th Cir.2013) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that leave to amend may be denied if amendment would be futile).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Huang’s motion for reconsideration because Huang failed to establish grounds for such relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir.1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for reconsideration).

Contrary to Ultimo Software Solutions, Inc.’s contention, Huang’s appeal of the district court’s dismissal order was timely. See Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(7)(A)(ii); Stephanie-Cardona LLC v. Smith’s Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc., 476 F.3d 701, 703 (9th Cir.2007) (“[I]f the district court does not set forth the judgment on a separate document, an appealable final order is considered entered when 150 days have run from the time the final order is docketed.”).

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

Dongsheng Huang v. Ultimo Software Solutions, Inc., 577 F. App'x 669 (9th Cir. 2014).

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577 F. App'x 669 (Dongsheng Huang v. Ultimo Software Solutions, Inc.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

5 F.3d 1255 (Ninth Circuit, 1993)

Stephanie-Cardona LLC v. Smith's Food and Drug Centers, Inc., Stephanie-Cardona LLC v. Smith's Food and Drug Centers, Inc.

476 F.3d 701 (Ninth Circuit, 2007)

Shawna Hartmann v. California Department of Corr.

707 F.3d 1114 (Ninth Circuit, 2013)

Robinson v. United States

586 F.3d 683 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)

Buckingham v. Secretary of the U.S. Department of Agriculture

603 F.3d 1073 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)

Opinion

Footnotes

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