Dong v. Bondi

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedJune 3, 2025
Docket21-293
StatusUnpublished

This text of Dong v. Bondi (Dong v. Bondi) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dong v. Bondi, (9th Cir. 2025).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 3 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ZHIYONG DONG, No. 21-293 Agency No. Petitioner, A205-555-466 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted May 21, 2025**

Before: SILVERMAN, LEE, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.

Zhiyong Dong, a native and citizen of China, petitions pro se for review of

the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an

immigration judge’s decision denying Dong’s motion to reopen his in absentia

removal order. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen. Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d

785, 791 (9th Cir. 2005). We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for

review.

As to lack of notice, the agency did not abuse its discretion in denying

Dong’s motion to reopen where he failed to establish he provided a current address

to the government. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(2)(B); Velasquez-Escovar v. Holder,

768 F.3d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 2014) (notice required unless petitioner fails to

provide a current or updated address to the government).

As to exceptional circumstances, the agency did not abuse its discretion in

denying Dong’s motion to reopen as untimely, where it was filed two years after

the final removal order, and Dong did not show that any statutory or regulatory

exception applies. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(i) (motion to reopen in absentia

removal order based on exceptional circumstances must be filed within 180 days);

8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(iii) (listing examples of exceptional circumstances).

As to the agency’s order declining to reopen removal proceedings sua

sponte, we have jurisdiction to review this discretionary determination only for

legal or constitutional error. See Lona v. Barr, 958 F.3d 1225, 1227 (9th Cir.

2020). We find no legal or constitutional error underlying the agency’s decision.

See Martinez-Rosas v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 926, 930 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]raditional

abuse of discretion challenges recast as alleged due process violations do not

2 21-293 constitute colorable constitutional claims that would invoke our jurisdiction.”).

The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.

3 21-293

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