Donaven Markus Carrasco v. State of Washington, et al.
This text of Donaven Markus Carrasco v. State of Washington, et al. (Donaven Markus Carrasco v. State of Washington, et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
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5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 7 DONAVEN MARKUS CARRASCO, CASE NO. C26-5417 BHS 8 Plaintiff, ORDER 9 v. 10 STATE OF WASHINGTON, et al., 11 Defendants. 12
13 THIS MATTER is before the Court on pro se plaintiff Donaven Markus 14 Carrasco’s 109 page “ex parte omnibus motion for emergency temporary restraining 15 order and preliminary injunction and notice of removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 16 1442(a)(1) & 28 U.S.C. § 1455.” Dkt. 5. 17 District Court Judge Tiffany Cartwright denied Carrasco’s initial “emergency 18 petition to vacate competency evaluation” and for various other relief, Dkt. 1, because it 19 was not accompanied by a complaint, because he could not establish that he was likely to 20 succeed on the merits of his unidentified claim, and because he appeared to be asking this 21 Court to interfere with an ongoing state criminal investigation. Dkt. 2. Judge Cartwright 22 also ordered Carrasco to file a complaint and to properly open a civil case by May 12. 1 Carrasco has since filed this motion and an application to proceed in forma 2 pauperis,1 Dkt. 6, but he has not filed a complaint. 3 A court should “deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis at the outset if it appears
4 from the face of the proposed complaint that the action is frivolous or without 5 merit.” Tripati v. First Nat’l Bank & Tr., 821 F.2d 1368, 1369 (9th Cir. 1987) (citations 6 omitted); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). An in forma pauperis complaint is 7 frivolous if “it ha[s] no arguable substance in law or fact.” Id. at 1370 (citing Rizzo 8 v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 529 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d
9 1221, 1228 (9th Cir. 1984). 10 A pro se plaintiff’s complaint is to be construed liberally, but like any other 11 complaint it must nevertheless contain factual assertions sufficient to support a facially 12 plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic 13 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim for relief is facially plausible
14 when “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 15 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “[A] plaintiff’s 16 obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than 17 labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will 18 not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
19 level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations and footnotes omitted). This requires a 20 21 1 Carrasco alleges he is currently employed, netting $3200 per month. Leaving aside that 22 he does not appear to be indigent, he has not stated a plausible claim. 1 plaintiff to plead “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me 2 accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly at 555). 3 A TRO’s purpose is to preserve the status quo and prevent irreparable harm just so
4 long as is necessary to hold a hearing on the preliminary injunction application, and no 5 longer. Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers, 6 415 U.S. 423 (1974); see also Reno Air Racing Ass’n v. McCord, 452 F.3d 1126, 1130–31 7 (9th Cir. 2006). For a court to grant a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff “must establish 8 that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the
9 absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an 10 injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 11 (2008). When considering whether to grant this “extraordinary remedy, . . . courts must 12 balance the competing claims of injury and consider the effect of granting or withholding 13 the requested relief, paying particular regard to the public consequences.” Winter, 555
14 U.S. at 24. 15 Carrasco’s filing is difficult to follow. He alleges he is employed by the United 16 States Postal Service, and that on April 5, he was “kidnapped by Washington State 17 Troopers from Federal Enclave in violation of the Supremacy Clause,” which “caused a 18 criminal obstruction of mails (18 U.S.C. § 1701).” Dkt. 5 at 1. It appears he contends that
19 as a federal employee, he is immune from state law, that the State had no authority or 20 jurisdiction to apprehend him (apparently for reckless driving, after what he describes as 21 a “hot pursuit”) while he was on federal property (at work), and that the state has no 22 jurisdiction to prosecute him. Id. at 6. Carrasco seeks to remove the underlying state 1 criminal proceeding here under the “federal officer removal” statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442, 2 asserting that he is a “federal employee facing state prosecution for acts occurring while 3 on duty,” making “federal jurisdiction mandatory.” Id. at 7.
4 The remainder of his filing is equally without arguable substance in law or fact, 5 referencing the “ghost witness doctrine,” “zombie records,” and asserting that the state 6 court’s actions in his criminal prosecution are “void ab initio” because he is a federal 7 employee. Dkt. 5. He asks the Court to assume jurisdiction and enjoin the state court 8 proceedings.
9 Carrasco has failed to state a plausible or even a rational claim. He has not 10 articulated and cannot articulate facts supporting his erroneous legal theory that his status 11 as a federal employee makes him immune from state law. He has not shown that he is 12 likely to succeed on the merits of any claim, or that any other Winter factor supports an 13 injunction.
14 Carrasco has not filed a complaint, and the time for doing so has passed. He has 15 not stated and cannot state a plausible claim. His application to proceed in forma 16 pauperis, Dkt. 6, is DENIED. His emergency motion for injunctive relief, Dkt. 5, is 17 DENIED. His effort to remove his criminal case here is ineffective, and this case is 18 DISMISSED. Because Carrasco cannot cure the defects in his filing, the dismissal is
19 with prejudice and without leave to amend. 20 The Clerk shall enter a JUDGMENT and close the case. 21 // 22 // 1 IT IS SO ORDERED. 2 Dated this 13th day of May, 2026. A 3 4 BENJAMIN H. SETTLE 5 United States District Judge 6
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