Donald W. Weaver Jr. v. Sheriff John Doe

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: November 21, 2023
• Docket: 5:23-cv-01888
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DONALD W. WEAVER JR., ) NO. ED CV 23-1888-TJH(E) ) 12 Plaintiff, ) ) ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT 13 v. ) ) WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 14 SHERIFF JOHN DOE, ET AL., ) ) 15 Defendants. ) ___________________________) 16 17 18 For the reasons discussed below, the Complaint is dismissed with 19 leave to amend. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b)(1). 20 21 BACKGROUND 22 23 On September 13, 2023, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983, 24 Plaintiff filed a “Civil Rights Complaint” against two fictitiously 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 named Defendants: Nurse “Jane Doe,” and “Sheriff John Doe.”1 On 2 November 9, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff in forma pauperis 3 status. 4 5 SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 6 7 Plaintiff alleges that, when he was a detainee in the Robert 8 Presley Detention Center, he “requested to see the doctor” “so that 9 [Plaintiff] could get proper medical attention to treat my [left foot] 10 infection.” According to Plaintiff, Nurse “Jane Doe” denied 11 Plaintiff’s request to see the doctor. Plaintiff alleges that he then 12 wrote unspecified grievances. Plaintiff also alleges that “[f]inally 13 [Plaintiff] wrote to Sheriff Doe but never heard from him.” 14 /// 15 /// 16 /// 17 /// 18 /// 19 /// 20 /// 21 /// 22 /// 23 24 1 A plaintiff may name a fictitious defendant in the complaint if the plaintiff does not know the true identity of the 25 defendant prior to the filing of the complaint. Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999). However, 26 Plaintiff should be aware that, before the United States Marshal can serve process on any fictitiously named Defendant, Plaintiff 27 must provide identifying information sufficient to permit the service of process, such as the Defendant’s full name and 28 1 DISCUSSION 2 3 A pretrial detainee’s right to adequate medical care is protected 4 by the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive Due Process Clause. See 5 Gordon v. City of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2018), 6 cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 794 (2019).2 Such claims must be evaluated 7 under an objective deliberate indifference standard. Id.; Brown v. 8 Patterson, 2022 WL 1241362, at *2 (E.D. Cal. April 27, 2022) (citation 9 omitted). Under this standard, the detainee must allege facts 10 plausibly demonstrating: 11 12 (i) the defendant made an intentional decision with respect 13 to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; 14 (ii) those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk 15 of suffering serious harm; (iii) the defendant did not take 16 reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even 17 though a reasonable official in the circumstances would have 18 appreciated the high degree of risk involved—making the 19 consequences of the defendant's conduct obvious; and (iv) by 20 not taking such measures, the defendant caused the 21 plaintiff’s injuries. 22 23 Gordon v. City of Orange, 888 F.3d at 1125. The “mere lack of due 24 care by a state official does not deprive an individual of life, 25 26 2 The Court assumes Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee, and not a sentenced prisoner, at the time of the events alleged 27 in the Complaint. A different standard (under the Eighth Amendment) applies to a medical care claim brought by a sentenced 28 1 liberty, or property under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Castro v. City 2 of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. 3 denied, 580 U.S. 1099 (2017) (citations omitted). Thus, a plaintiff 4 must plead facts from which it plausibly may be inferred that a 5 defendant acted with “something akin to reckless disregard” for the 6 plaintiff’s health. Id. 7 8 Here, Plaintiff’s vague and conclusory allegations do not suffice 9 to state a claim against either Defendant. See Gordon v. City of 10 Orange, 888 F.3d at 1125; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 11 681 (2009) (conclusory allegations are “not entitled to be assumed 12 true”). Plaintiff fails to allege with any degree of specificity what 13 he allegedly advised Jane Doe concerning Plaintiff’s asserted need to 14 see a doctor. Thus, it cannot plausibly be inferred that a reasonable 15 official in Jane Doe’s circumstances would have appreciated that there 16 existed any high degree of risk to Plaintiff’s health, or that Jane 17 Doe’s mere asserted failure to summon the doctor actually caused 18 Plaintiff any injuries. Further, the extent and duration of any 19 alleged injuries are not adequately pleaded. 20 21 As to Sheriff John Doe, “[a] defendant may be held liable as a 22 supervisor under § 1983 if there exists either (1) his or her personal 23 involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient 24 causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the 25 constitutional violation.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th 26 Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 982 (2012). Plaintiff fails to 27 allege with any degree of specificity facts showing Sheriff John Doe’s 28 “personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation” or a 1 “sufficient causal connection between” John Doe’s “wrongful conduct 2 and the constitutional violation.” Plaintiff does not even allege 3 what he “wrote” to Sheriff John Doe. Contrary to Plaintiff’s evident 4 suggestion, John Doe’s status as Sheriff did not make John Doe liable 5 for Plaintiff’s medical care or for the alleged misconduct of the 6 Sheriff’s employees. “Government officials may not be held liable for 7 the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates on a theory of 8 respondeat superior.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; see Monell 9 v. New York City Dep’t. Of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). 10 Further, a supervisor’s mere knowledge of a subordinate’s alleged 11 misconduct is insufficient to hold the supervisor liable. Id. at 677. 12 13 ORDER 14 15 The Complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. If Plaintiff 16 still wishes to pursue this action, he is granted thirty (30) days 17 from the date of this Order within which to file a First Amended 18 Complaint. Any First Amended Complaint shall be complete in itself 19 and shall not refer in any manner to any prior Complaint. Plaintiff 20 may not add defendants without leave of Court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 21. Failure timely to file a First Amended Complaint in conformity 22 with this Order may result in the dismissal of the action. See 23 Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642-43 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. 24 denied, 538 U.S. 909 (2003) (court may dismiss action for failure to 25 follow court order); Simon v. Value Behav. Health, Inc., 208 F.3d 26 1073, 1084 (9th Cir.), amended, 234 F.3d 428 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. 27 denied, 531 U.S. 1104 (2001), overruled on other grounds, Odom v. 28 Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 541 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 985 (2007) (affirming dismissal without leave to amend where plaintiff failed to correct complaint’ s deficiencies, court had afforded 3] plaintiff opportunities to do so, and court had given plaintiff notice 4] of the substantive problems with his claims); Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. 5|| No. 40, Cty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 439 (9th Cir. 1997) (denial of 6|| leave of amend appropriate where further amendment would be futile). 7 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 10 DATED: November 21, 2023 11 =e —— □ CXlaC lee, 12 13 TERRY J. HATTER JR. 14 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 15 16] PRESENTED this 14th day of November, 2023 by: 18 /s/ 19 HON. CHARLES F. EICK UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28