1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 DONALD ROBIN BARREN, Case No.: 2:23-cv-00792-APG-MDC
4 Plaintiff Order (1) Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, (2) Denying 5 v. Plaintiff’s Motion for Interpleader, (3) Granting Defendants’ Motion for 6 THE STATE OF NEVADA EX REL, et al., Summary Judgment, and (4) Dismissing Defendant Williams 7 Defendants [ECF Nos. 47, 48, 59] 8
9 Donald Robin Barren was an inmate at Three Lakes Valley Conservation Camp 10 (TLVCC) during the events at issue in this case. He sues Diane Hernandez, Kimberly McCoy, 11 Tim Carlson, and Officer L. Williams for allegedly raising his risk score and transferring him to 12 Southern Desert Correctional Center (SDCC) after he filed grievances against them. After 13 screening the claims under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), one claim remains for 14 Fourteenth Amendment equal protection. ECF No. 33 at 13. Barren moves for judgment on the 15 pleadings and interpleader. ECF Nos. 47; 48. The defendants move for summary judgment. ECF 16 No. 59. 17 I deny Barren’s motion for judgment on the pleadings because I take the defendants’ 18 denial of the allegations as true and therefore cannot grant judgment as a matter of law in 19 Barren’s favor. I construe Barren’s motion for interpleader as a motion for an injunction and 20 deny it as moot because Barren has been granted parole. I grant the defendants’ motion for 21 summary judgment because Barren’s claim is barred by the statute of limitations. Finally, I 22 dismiss all claims against Officer L. Williams because Barren did not serve him under Federal 23 Rule of Civil Procedure 4 and has failed to prosecute his claim against Williams. 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Barren claims that he filed grievances against the defendants, and in retaliation they 3 increased his risk score from 5 to 9 points and transferred him from a low-security facility 4 (TLVCC) to a medium-security facility (SDCC). ECF No. 47 at 1-2. He does not explain why
5 he filed grievances against the defendants. 6 The defendants state that the Offender Management Division (OMD) transferred Barren 7 because his risk score increased after he committed two violations of prison policy. ECF No. 59- 8 4 at 3. First, Barren was found guilty of stealing cleaning supplies. ECF No. 59-3 at 3. Second, 9 Barren was found guilty of misusing supplies because he did not remove his durag after being 10 repeatedly told to do so. Id. at 2-3. According to Donald Southworth, Chief of the OMD, an 11 “offender’s risk score can be increased based on guilty findings of prison regulations.” ECF No. 12 59-4 at 3. Accordingly, the prison raised Barren’s risk score from 3 to 15 points, and the OMD 13 transferred him to SDCC in May 2020. ECF Nos. 59-2 at 3; 59-4 at 3.1 Barren filed this suit in 14 May 2023. ECF No. 1.
15 II. I DENY BARREN’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS. 16 A party may move for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17 12(c) “[a]fter the pleadings are closed[,] but early enough not to delay trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 18 12(c). “[A] Rule 12(c) motion is functionally identical to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,” so “the same 19 standard of review applies to motions brought under either rule.” Gregg v. Haw., Dep’t of Pub. 20 Safety, 870 F.3d 883, 887 (9th Cir. 2017) (simplified). A “judgment on the pleadings is proper 21
1 Barren was found guilty of the second violation in June 2020 after he had already been 22 transferred in May 2020. ECF Nos. 59-2 at 3; 59-3 at 2-3. It is not clear how a subsequent guilty finding could have justified an already completed transfer. But it appears that the first violation 23 was sufficient to transfer Barren because “Institutional Transfer” was listed as a sanction for that violation. ECF No. 59-3 at 3. My decision does not turn on this uncertainty. 1 when, taking all the allegations in the non-moving party’s pleadings as true, the moving party is 2 entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Ventress v. Japan Airlines, 486 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th 3 Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). 4 Barren moves for judgment on the pleadings, stating that the defendants colluded to raise
5 his risk score and transfer him to SDCC due to his submission of grievances. He contends that 6 “the defendants[’] actions w[ere] carried out with the intent and purpose to discrim[]inate against 7 him based on his submission of grievances. Thus[,] the defendants purposefully treated the 8 Plaintiff differently than other minimum custody inmates without any rational basis for their 9 dispar[ity].” ECF No. 47 at 4. The defendants denied Barren’s allegations of the equal protection 10 claim in their answer. ECF No. 42 at 4. The defendants are the non-moving party, and I must 11 take their denials as true. Therefore, I cannot grant judgment as a matter of law in Barren’s 12 favor. 13 Barren also argues that the defendants did not disclose his grievances or his appeal of his 14 theft charge in their initial disclosures. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c) allows me to enter
15 sanctions against a party that fails to disclose information. However, case-terminating sanctions 16 require the moving party to meet a high standard. “Only willfulness, bad faith, and fault justify 17 terminating sanctions.” Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. New Images of Beverly Hills, 482 F.3d 1091, 18 1096 (9th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). To the extent that Barren is seeking default judgment 19 based on the defendants’ failure to comply with discovery requirements, he has provided no 20 evidence that the defendants willfully did not disclose the materials he sought, that they are at 21 fault, or that they acted in bad faith. Therefore, I do not enter default judgment in his favor on 22 this basis either. 23 / / / / 1 III. I DENY BARREN’S MOTION FOR INTERPLEADER. 2 Barren moves for interpleader under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 22. Rule 22 states, 3 “[p]ersons with claims that may expose a plaintiff to double or multiple liability may be joined as 4 defendants and required to interplead.” Barren does not explain what other parties expose him to
5 double or multiple liability and therefore should be joined as defendants. Instead, he states that 6 he is being “unlawfully held past his release date” set by the parole board. ECF No. 48 at 1. I 7 therefore construe Barren’s motion as a request for an injunction to release him on parole. 8 The defendants state, and Barren does not contest, that Barren was released on parole in 9 September 2025. ECF No. 57 at 2. Because Barren has already been granted parole, I deny his 10 motion as moot.2 11 IV. I GRANT THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 12 Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows “there is no genuine dispute as to 13 any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 14 56(a). A fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.”
15 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
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1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 DONALD ROBIN BARREN, Case No.: 2:23-cv-00792-APG-MDC
4 Plaintiff Order (1) Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, (2) Denying 5 v. Plaintiff’s Motion for Interpleader, (3) Granting Defendants’ Motion for 6 THE STATE OF NEVADA EX REL, et al., Summary Judgment, and (4) Dismissing Defendant Williams 7 Defendants [ECF Nos. 47, 48, 59] 8
9 Donald Robin Barren was an inmate at Three Lakes Valley Conservation Camp 10 (TLVCC) during the events at issue in this case. He sues Diane Hernandez, Kimberly McCoy, 11 Tim Carlson, and Officer L. Williams for allegedly raising his risk score and transferring him to 12 Southern Desert Correctional Center (SDCC) after he filed grievances against them. After 13 screening the claims under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), one claim remains for 14 Fourteenth Amendment equal protection. ECF No. 33 at 13. Barren moves for judgment on the 15 pleadings and interpleader. ECF Nos. 47; 48. The defendants move for summary judgment. ECF 16 No. 59. 17 I deny Barren’s motion for judgment on the pleadings because I take the defendants’ 18 denial of the allegations as true and therefore cannot grant judgment as a matter of law in 19 Barren’s favor. I construe Barren’s motion for interpleader as a motion for an injunction and 20 deny it as moot because Barren has been granted parole. I grant the defendants’ motion for 21 summary judgment because Barren’s claim is barred by the statute of limitations. Finally, I 22 dismiss all claims against Officer L. Williams because Barren did not serve him under Federal 23 Rule of Civil Procedure 4 and has failed to prosecute his claim against Williams. 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Barren claims that he filed grievances against the defendants, and in retaliation they 3 increased his risk score from 5 to 9 points and transferred him from a low-security facility 4 (TLVCC) to a medium-security facility (SDCC). ECF No. 47 at 1-2. He does not explain why
5 he filed grievances against the defendants. 6 The defendants state that the Offender Management Division (OMD) transferred Barren 7 because his risk score increased after he committed two violations of prison policy. ECF No. 59- 8 4 at 3. First, Barren was found guilty of stealing cleaning supplies. ECF No. 59-3 at 3. Second, 9 Barren was found guilty of misusing supplies because he did not remove his durag after being 10 repeatedly told to do so. Id. at 2-3. According to Donald Southworth, Chief of the OMD, an 11 “offender’s risk score can be increased based on guilty findings of prison regulations.” ECF No. 12 59-4 at 3. Accordingly, the prison raised Barren’s risk score from 3 to 15 points, and the OMD 13 transferred him to SDCC in May 2020. ECF Nos. 59-2 at 3; 59-4 at 3.1 Barren filed this suit in 14 May 2023. ECF No. 1.
15 II. I DENY BARREN’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS. 16 A party may move for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17 12(c) “[a]fter the pleadings are closed[,] but early enough not to delay trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 18 12(c). “[A] Rule 12(c) motion is functionally identical to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,” so “the same 19 standard of review applies to motions brought under either rule.” Gregg v. Haw., Dep’t of Pub. 20 Safety, 870 F.3d 883, 887 (9th Cir. 2017) (simplified). A “judgment on the pleadings is proper 21
1 Barren was found guilty of the second violation in June 2020 after he had already been 22 transferred in May 2020. ECF Nos. 59-2 at 3; 59-3 at 2-3. It is not clear how a subsequent guilty finding could have justified an already completed transfer. But it appears that the first violation 23 was sufficient to transfer Barren because “Institutional Transfer” was listed as a sanction for that violation. ECF No. 59-3 at 3. My decision does not turn on this uncertainty. 1 when, taking all the allegations in the non-moving party’s pleadings as true, the moving party is 2 entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Ventress v. Japan Airlines, 486 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th 3 Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). 4 Barren moves for judgment on the pleadings, stating that the defendants colluded to raise
5 his risk score and transfer him to SDCC due to his submission of grievances. He contends that 6 “the defendants[’] actions w[ere] carried out with the intent and purpose to discrim[]inate against 7 him based on his submission of grievances. Thus[,] the defendants purposefully treated the 8 Plaintiff differently than other minimum custody inmates without any rational basis for their 9 dispar[ity].” ECF No. 47 at 4. The defendants denied Barren’s allegations of the equal protection 10 claim in their answer. ECF No. 42 at 4. The defendants are the non-moving party, and I must 11 take their denials as true. Therefore, I cannot grant judgment as a matter of law in Barren’s 12 favor. 13 Barren also argues that the defendants did not disclose his grievances or his appeal of his 14 theft charge in their initial disclosures. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c) allows me to enter
15 sanctions against a party that fails to disclose information. However, case-terminating sanctions 16 require the moving party to meet a high standard. “Only willfulness, bad faith, and fault justify 17 terminating sanctions.” Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. New Images of Beverly Hills, 482 F.3d 1091, 18 1096 (9th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). To the extent that Barren is seeking default judgment 19 based on the defendants’ failure to comply with discovery requirements, he has provided no 20 evidence that the defendants willfully did not disclose the materials he sought, that they are at 21 fault, or that they acted in bad faith. Therefore, I do not enter default judgment in his favor on 22 this basis either. 23 / / / / 1 III. I DENY BARREN’S MOTION FOR INTERPLEADER. 2 Barren moves for interpleader under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 22. Rule 22 states, 3 “[p]ersons with claims that may expose a plaintiff to double or multiple liability may be joined as 4 defendants and required to interplead.” Barren does not explain what other parties expose him to
5 double or multiple liability and therefore should be joined as defendants. Instead, he states that 6 he is being “unlawfully held past his release date” set by the parole board. ECF No. 48 at 1. I 7 therefore construe Barren’s motion as a request for an injunction to release him on parole. 8 The defendants state, and Barren does not contest, that Barren was released on parole in 9 September 2025. ECF No. 57 at 2. Because Barren has already been granted parole, I deny his 10 motion as moot.2 11 IV. I GRANT THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 12 Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows “there is no genuine dispute as to 13 any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 14 56(a). A fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.”
15 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 16 The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of 17 the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence 18 of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The 19
20 2 Additionally, an injunction forcing the prison to comply with a parole schedule is outside the scope of Barren’s complaint. See Pac. Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queen’s Med. Ctr., 810 F.3d 21 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2015) (stating “there must be a relationship between the injury claimed in the motion for injunctive relief and the conduct asserted in the underlying complaint”). 22
23 1 burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts demonstrating there is a 2 genuine issue of material fact for trial. Sonner v. Schwabe N. Am., Inc., 911 F.3d 989, 992 (9th 3 Cir. 2018) (“To defeat summary judgment, the nonmoving party must produce evidence of a 4 genuine dispute of material fact that could satisfy its burden at trial.”). I view the evidence and
5 reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Zetwick v. Cnty. of 6 Yolo, 850 F.3d 436, 440-41 (9th Cir. 2017). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a 7 rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Scott v. 8 Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (quotation omitted). 9 “For actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, courts apply the forum state’s statute of limitations 10 for personal injury actions.” Klein v. City of Beverly Hills, 865 F.3d 1276, 1278 (9th Cir. 2017) 11 (quotation omitted). Nevada has a two-year limitation period for personal injury actions. Nev. 12 Rev. Stat. § 11.190(4)(e). “Federal law, however, governs when civil rights claims accrue.” 13 Klein, 865 F.3d at 1278. “Under federal law, a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has 14 reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.” Id. (quotation omitted).
15 Barren alleges that he was transferred to SDCC due to the defendants raising his risk 16 score because he filed grievances against them. Therefore, he knew or should have known of his 17 injury on the date of his transfer: May 6, 2020. Barren did not file suit until May 22, 2023, over 18 three years after his transfer. ECF No. 1. And Barren does not reply to the defendants’ argument 19 that the limitation period had passed. Barren’s suit is thus time-barred, and I grant the 20 defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this basis. I therefore need not address the 21 defendants’ arguments regarding qualified immunity or failure to exhaust administrative 22 remedies. 23 VV. I DISMISS ALL CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANT WILLIAMS FOR LACK OF 2 SERVICE. 3 The Nevada Attorney General’s Office did not accept service on behalf of Officer L. 4!| Williams because they could not identify him based on the allegations in Barren’s complaint. ECF No. 40 at 2. Barren did not make any further attempts to serve Williams even though over a year has passed since the Attorney General declined to accept service. Because Barren did not Williams under Rule 4 and has failed to prosecute his case against Williams, I dismiss all claims against Williams.* 9| VI. CONCLUSION 10 I THEREFORE ORDER that Donald Robin Barren’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (ECF No. 47) is DENIED. 12 I FURTHER ORDER that Donald Robin Barren’s motion for interpleader (ECF No. 48) DENIED. 14 I FURTHER ORDER that the defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 59) GRANTED. 16 I FURTHER ORDER that all claims against defendant Williams are dismissed for lack of 17]| service. 18 I FUTHER ORDER the clerk of court to enter judgment in favor of the defendants on all 19]| claims and to close this case. 20 DATED this 22nd day of April, 2026. OEE >] ANDREWP.GORDON sits CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 22 23 3 Because Barren’s claim against Williams is based on the same facts, it would be untimely even if he was given more time to accomplish service.