Donald Quinn v. the State of Texas

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 2nd District (Fort Worth)
• Decided: May 7, 2026
• Docket: 02-25-00261-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________

No. 02-25-00261-CR ___________________________

DONALD QUINN, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 4 Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 1880151

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Bassel and Walker, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Bassel MEMORANDUM OPINION

The State indicted Appellant Donald Quinn for the third-degree felony offense

of failing to comply with sex-offender registration requirements, and the indictment

contained a habitual-offender paragraph.1 See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 62.102(a),

(b)(2). A jury found Quinn guilty. In the punishment phase, the trial court found true

the allegation that Quinn had previously been convicted of two felonies. This finding

raised the punishment range to confinement for life or any term of not more than 99

years or less than 25 years. See Tex. Penal Code § 12.42(d). The trial court sentenced

Quinn to thirty-five years’ imprisonment.

Quinn raises one point on appeal—that the sentence assessed was grossly

disproportionate to the offense and therefore violative of the Eighth Amendment’s

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. See U.S. Const. amend. VIII. We

have consistently held that a defendant must preserve error on a grossly-

disproportionate-sentence complaint by objecting in the trial court at the time the

sentence was imposed or, at the latest, raising the issue in a motion for new trial.2 See

Butler v. State, No. 02-23-00007-CR, 2023 WL 5767320, at *1 & n.2 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth Sept. 7, 2023, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (collecting

1 The indictment also alleged the offense of indecency with a child, but that count was dismissed upon Quinn’s conviction for failing to comply with his sex- offender registration requirements. 2 Quinn filed a motion for new trial, but it states merely that “[t]he verdict is contrary to the law and evidence” and prays that the trial court set aside his conviction. No mention is made of his sentence.

2 cases recognizing preservation requirements). Because Quinn did neither, he has not

preserved his complaint for our review.3

Having held that Quinn’s sole point of error was not preserved for our review,

we overrule that point and affirm the trial court’s judgment. 4

/s/ Dabney Bassel

Dabney Bassel Justice

Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: May 7, 2026

3 Even if we could reach the merits of Quinn’s argument, a punishment imposed within the statutory limits, as here, is generally not subject to challenge for excessiveness. See Kim v. State, 283 S.W.3d 473, 475 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. ref’d); see also Morgan v. State, No. 02-23-00269-CR, 2024 WL 976826, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 7, 2024, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). 4 Quinn’s counsel has twice previously raised an argument complaining about the gross disproportionality of a client’s punishment when the argument had not been preserved at sentencing or in a motion for new trial. See Reveron v. State, Nos. 02-23- 00041-CR, 02-23-00042-CR, 2023 WL 8467385, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 7, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Butler, 2023 WL 5767320, at *1. Counsel in this case, as well as in those cited, failed to address preservation. And counsel here failed to attempt to distinguish Reveron and Butler. Reveron, 2023 WL 8467385, at *2 n.3; Butler, 2023 WL 5767320, at *1. We understand that Quinn might want to contest the length of his sentences and that counsel’s duty is to zealously represent Quinn. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding). We also recognize that drawing the line between an arguable contention and a frivolous one is not always easy. See Alvarado v. State, No. 02-19-00401-CR, 2021 WL 5132530, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 4, 2021, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Nevertheless, a clearer line is counsel’s duty of candor toward the tribunal. See Tex. Disciplinary R. Prof’l Conduct 3.03.