NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________
No. 21-1356 __________
DONALD MILES, Appellant
v.
JEFFREY A. SMITH, Honorable Judge at Lackawanna County Courthouse; BRIAN GALLAGHER, Deputy District Attorney, Lackawanna County; JOHN & JANE DOE, Unlimited Attorneys, Judges and Detectives in Lackawanna County ____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 3:20-cv-01434) District Judge: Honorable Robert D. Mariani ____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) April 25, 2022 Before: MCKEE, SHWARTZ and MATEY, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: May 16, 2022) ___________
OPINION* ___________
PER CURIAM
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Donald Miles, proceeding pro se, appeals an order of the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania that dismissed his civil rights complaint.
For the following reasons, we will affirm.
While awaiting trial on state drug charges, Miles filed a complaint pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he was being detained and prosecuted in retaliation for his
refusal to serve as a material witness and confidential informant. (ECF 1.) He named as
defendants Jeffrey A. Smith, a Lackawanna County judge, and Brian Gallagher, a deputy
district attorney in Lackawanna County. Miles sought costs, declaratory and injunctive
relief, including orders to enjoin his prosecution and release him from custody, and any
other relief the District Court deemed just.
Deputy District Attorney Gallagher filed a motion to dismiss (ECF 8), which
Miles opposed. (ECF 12.) A Magistrate Judge determined that the complaint was both
malicious, as a duplicate of prior still-pending case, and legally frivolous, because it
raised claims barred by, inter alia, judicial and prosecutorial immunity. (ECF 15.) Over
Miles’ objections, the District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to
dismiss Miles’ complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and to dismiss Deputy
District Attorney Gallagher’s motion to dismiss as moot. (ECF 18.) In a separate
memorandum, the District Court concluded that abstention was required under Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), but even if Younger abstention were not appropriate, the
2 defendants were entitled to immunity for the reasons given by the Magistrate Judge.
(ECF 17.) Miles appealed.1 (ECF 19.)
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.2 We review de novo the
District Court’s dismissal of the complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). See Dooley v.
Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 373-74 (3d Cir. 2020). A complaint is considered frivolous if it
lacks an arguable basis in law or fact, and a suit may be considered frivolous where
defendants are clearly “immune from suit.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 327
(1989). We exercise plenary review over a determination that abstention under Younger
is proper. See PDX N., Inc. v. Comm’r N.J. Dep’t of Lab. & Workforce Dev., 978 F.3d
871, 881 n.11 (3d Cir. 2020).
To the extent that Miles sought to enjoin his continued prosecution, abstention
under the Younger doctrine was appropriate. The Younger abstention doctrine “reflects a
strong federal policy against federal-court interference with pending state judicial
proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances.” Middlesex County Ethics Committee
1 Although Miles’ notice of appeal was filed more than 30 days after the District Court entered its order dismissing the complaint, see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), the District Court subsequently granted his request for an extension of time to appeal, see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), and deemed his appeal timely filed. (ECF 35.) 2 The complaint also named John and Jane Doe defendants, who were identified only as “unlimited attorneys, judges, and detectives in Lackawanna County.” Because the Doe defendants were never served with process, they were never parties to the case within the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). See Gomez v. Gov’t of V.I., 882 F.2d 733, 735-36 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Studivant, 529 F.2d 673, 674 n.2 (3d Cir. 1976). Accordingly, the District Court’s order is final and appealable. See Gomez, 882 F.2d at 735-36. We note that Miles raises no claim of error regarding the John and Jane Doe defendants. 3 v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982). The Supreme Court has explained
that “Younger exemplifies one class of cases in which federal-court abstention is
required: When there is a parallel, pending state criminal proceeding, federal courts must
refrain from enjoining the state prosecution.” Sprint Commc’ns v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69,
72 (2013); see also Malhan v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of State, 938 F.3d 453, 462 (3d Cir.
2019) (emphasizing that Younger abstention aims to avoid federal-court interference in
ongoing state criminal proceedings). Miles’ request for an order preventing his
prosecution clearly involves just such a circumstance. His criminal prosecution was still
pending in the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County when he filed his
complaint. See PDX N., Inc., 978 F.3d at 885 (“‘[S]tate proceedings are ongoing for
Younger abstention purposes’ ... if the state proceeding ‘was pending at the time [the
plaintiff] filed its initial complaint in federal court.’” (quoting Addiction Specialists, Inc.
v. Twp. of Hampton, 411 F.3d 399, 408–09 (3d Cir. 2005))). Although the application of
Younger is limited when there is “a showing that the charges had been brought in bad
faith or with an intent to harass,” ACRA Turf Club, LLC v. Zanzuccki, 748 F.3d 127, 132
(3d Cir. 2014), Miles failed to make such a showing here. See Kugler v. Helfant, 421
U.S. 117, 126 n.6 (1975) (“‘[B]ad faith’ in this context generally means that a
prosecution has been brought without a reasonable expectation of obtaining a valid
conviction.”) (citing Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 85 (1971)).
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________
No. 21-1356 __________
DONALD MILES, Appellant
v.
JEFFREY A. SMITH, Honorable Judge at Lackawanna County Courthouse; BRIAN GALLAGHER, Deputy District Attorney, Lackawanna County; JOHN & JANE DOE, Unlimited Attorneys, Judges and Detectives in Lackawanna County ____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 3:20-cv-01434) District Judge: Honorable Robert D. Mariani ____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) April 25, 2022 Before: MCKEE, SHWARTZ and MATEY, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: May 16, 2022) ___________
OPINION* ___________
PER CURIAM
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Donald Miles, proceeding pro se, appeals an order of the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania that dismissed his civil rights complaint.
For the following reasons, we will affirm.
While awaiting trial on state drug charges, Miles filed a complaint pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he was being detained and prosecuted in retaliation for his
refusal to serve as a material witness and confidential informant. (ECF 1.) He named as
defendants Jeffrey A. Smith, a Lackawanna County judge, and Brian Gallagher, a deputy
district attorney in Lackawanna County. Miles sought costs, declaratory and injunctive
relief, including orders to enjoin his prosecution and release him from custody, and any
other relief the District Court deemed just.
Deputy District Attorney Gallagher filed a motion to dismiss (ECF 8), which
Miles opposed. (ECF 12.) A Magistrate Judge determined that the complaint was both
malicious, as a duplicate of prior still-pending case, and legally frivolous, because it
raised claims barred by, inter alia, judicial and prosecutorial immunity. (ECF 15.) Over
Miles’ objections, the District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to
dismiss Miles’ complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and to dismiss Deputy
District Attorney Gallagher’s motion to dismiss as moot. (ECF 18.) In a separate
memorandum, the District Court concluded that abstention was required under Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), but even if Younger abstention were not appropriate, the
2 defendants were entitled to immunity for the reasons given by the Magistrate Judge.
(ECF 17.) Miles appealed.1 (ECF 19.)
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.2 We review de novo the
District Court’s dismissal of the complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). See Dooley v.
Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 373-74 (3d Cir. 2020). A complaint is considered frivolous if it
lacks an arguable basis in law or fact, and a suit may be considered frivolous where
defendants are clearly “immune from suit.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 327
(1989). We exercise plenary review over a determination that abstention under Younger
is proper. See PDX N., Inc. v. Comm’r N.J. Dep’t of Lab. & Workforce Dev., 978 F.3d
871, 881 n.11 (3d Cir. 2020).
To the extent that Miles sought to enjoin his continued prosecution, abstention
under the Younger doctrine was appropriate. The Younger abstention doctrine “reflects a
strong federal policy against federal-court interference with pending state judicial
proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances.” Middlesex County Ethics Committee
1 Although Miles’ notice of appeal was filed more than 30 days after the District Court entered its order dismissing the complaint, see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), the District Court subsequently granted his request for an extension of time to appeal, see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), and deemed his appeal timely filed. (ECF 35.) 2 The complaint also named John and Jane Doe defendants, who were identified only as “unlimited attorneys, judges, and detectives in Lackawanna County.” Because the Doe defendants were never served with process, they were never parties to the case within the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). See Gomez v. Gov’t of V.I., 882 F.2d 733, 735-36 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Studivant, 529 F.2d 673, 674 n.2 (3d Cir. 1976). Accordingly, the District Court’s order is final and appealable. See Gomez, 882 F.2d at 735-36. We note that Miles raises no claim of error regarding the John and Jane Doe defendants. 3 v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982). The Supreme Court has explained
that “Younger exemplifies one class of cases in which federal-court abstention is
required: When there is a parallel, pending state criminal proceeding, federal courts must
refrain from enjoining the state prosecution.” Sprint Commc’ns v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69,
72 (2013); see also Malhan v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of State, 938 F.3d 453, 462 (3d Cir.
2019) (emphasizing that Younger abstention aims to avoid federal-court interference in
ongoing state criminal proceedings). Miles’ request for an order preventing his
prosecution clearly involves just such a circumstance. His criminal prosecution was still
pending in the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County when he filed his
complaint. See PDX N., Inc., 978 F.3d at 885 (“‘[S]tate proceedings are ongoing for
Younger abstention purposes’ ... if the state proceeding ‘was pending at the time [the
plaintiff] filed its initial complaint in federal court.’” (quoting Addiction Specialists, Inc.
v. Twp. of Hampton, 411 F.3d 399, 408–09 (3d Cir. 2005))). Although the application of
Younger is limited when there is “a showing that the charges had been brought in bad
faith or with an intent to harass,” ACRA Turf Club, LLC v. Zanzuccki, 748 F.3d 127, 132
(3d Cir. 2014), Miles failed to make such a showing here. See Kugler v. Helfant, 421
U.S. 117, 126 n.6 (1975) (“‘[B]ad faith’ in this context generally means that a
prosecution has been brought without a reasonable expectation of obtaining a valid
conviction.”) (citing Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 85 (1971)).
The District Court also properly determined that, to the extent that Miles sought
monetary damages, Judge Smith and Deputy District Attorney Gallagher were entitled to
immunity. Miles’ complaint was focused on actions that Judge Smith and Deputy
4 District Attorney Gallagher took in their judicial and prosecutorial capacities in
connection with Miles’ prosecution on drug charges. In particular, Miles alleged that
Judge Smith and Deputy District Attorney Gallagher prosecuted him in retaliation for
refusing to provide evidence against another individual.3 For instance, Miles claimed that
because he “refused to recite and state the criminal accusations made up by Judge Smith
and attorney Gallagher” and “refus[ed] to labor … as their material witness and
confidential informant,” “they are still prosecuting” him. (ECF 1, at 4.) Judge Smith is
immune, however, because “[a] judicial officer in the performance of his duties has
absolute immunity from suit and will not be liable for his judicial acts.” Azubuko v.
Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam); see also Capogrosso v. Supreme
Court of N.J., 588 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (holding that judicial
immunity extends to judicial officers, even if their actions were ‘“in error, w[ere] done
maliciously, or w[ere] in excess of [their] authority,’” unless the officers acted in clear
absence of all jurisdiction (quoting Azubuko, 443 F.3d at 303)). Similarly, prosecutors
are generally immune from liability for damages in actions brought pursuant to § 1983.
See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976). Miles did not allege that Judge Smith
acted in the absence of all jurisdiction or that Deputy District Attorney Gallagher’s
actions were not “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.”
Fogle v. Sokol, 957 F.3d 148, 159-61 (3d Cir. 2020).
3 Contrary to Miles’ argument on appeal, see Appellant’s Br., at 2, we agree with the District Court that Miles’ complaint belies his assertion that he brought a claim for “violation of the freedom of speech clause” of the First Amendment, rather than a retaliation claim. (ECF 17, at 3-4.) 5 Although “absolute judicial immunity extends only to claims for damages,”
Larsen v. Senate of the Commonwealth, 152 F.3d 240, 249 (3d Cir. 1998), “in any action
brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or
declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Nothing in Miles’ complaint
suggests that his exception applies. See Azubuko, 443 F.3d at 303-04. Likewise,
prosecutorial immunity does not apply to requests for declaratory or injunctive relief.
Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 736 (1980).
But Miles’ request for an order directing his release from custody must be pursued via a
request for a writ of habeas corpus, not in a § 1983 action. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 475, 500 (1973); cf. Allen v. Nix, 55 F.3d 414, 415-17 (8th Cir. 1995) (affirming
denial of habeas relief to petitioner who claimed, among other things, that his detention
on a state material witness warrant violated the Fourth Amendment).
In sum, the District Court did not err in dismissing the complaint under § 1915(e).
Furthermore, amendment of Miles’ complaint would be futile. See Grayson v. Mayview
State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment
of the District Court. Deputy District Attorney Gallagher’s “Motion for Leave to File
Supplemental Appendix,” construed as a motion to expand the record, is granted.