Donald Maier v. Judy Smith

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
• Decided: January 11, 2019
• Docket: 18-2151
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the

United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 18-2151 DONALD MAIER, Petitioner-Appellant, v.

JUDY P. SMITH, Respondent-Appellee. ____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. No. 17-cv-365 — Barbara B. Crabb, Judge. ____________________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 25, 2018 — DECIDED JANUARY 11, 2019 ____________________

Before KANNE, ROVNER, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges. KANNE, Circuit Judge. Donald Maier appeals the district court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his conviction under Wisconsin’s stalking statute. Five years after a jury convicted Maier of threatening two Wisconsin state court judges, Maier sent two sets of letters to the former ju- rors—ostensibly seeking their help in his effort to obtain a governor’s pardon. Several of the jurors found the letters threatening or disturbing. Maier was charged and convicted 2 No. 18-2151

under Wisconsin’s stalking statute. After appealing his con- viction in the Wisconsin state courts, Maier brought this peti- tion. Because the Wisconsin Court of Appeals’ decision was not objectively unreasonable, we affirm the district court’s de- nial of Maier’s petition. I. BACKGROUND A jury convicted Donald Maier of threatening two Wis- consin state court judges in 2006. In November 2011, Maier mailed a handwritten letter to the men and women who served as jurors in that case. Due to a clerical error, Maier ob- tained the names and addresses of the jurors in his case. The jurors were not expecting his correspondence. The letter’s opening line announced, “Jury Duty is Not Over.” (all quota- tions include the letters’ original spelling, capitalization, and punctuation). The letter informed the jurors that after being “skrewed” and serving two years in prison, Maier was “going for a Pardon with the Governor’s office.” The letter included a handwritten questionnaire inviting the jurors to respond to a series of “yes” or “no” questions. The first question asked the jurors if they believed that Wood County “did a Profes- sional Job? Such as keeping your Name’s and addresses from someone like [Maier]?” Maier reminded the jurors that they helped put him in prison, and observed, “Real good people in there.” Maier’s next question asked the jurors whether he could give the list of their names and addresses to the “people [Maier] had to live with?” Maier’s questionnaire then ad- dressed a litany of injustices he believed he suffered during his prosecution, trial, and incarceration for the 2006 charges. Maier emphasized his mistreatment and mentioned his place- ment in mental institutions. No. 18-2151 3

After airing his grievances, Maier finally asked the jurors whether they believed they did the right thing in sending him to prison. Maier advised the jurors, “My story will be heard nation wide soon. Your names could be too. Because you helped in the Judge Zappen conspiracy[.]” He closed the letter by encouraging the jurors to “do the right thing” and to mail their questionnaires to the governor’s Pardon Advisory Board and a copy to Maier, himself. He assured the jurors, “The sooner I get justice will be when everybody in the Wisconsin Rapids police cover-up and the Judge Zappen conspiracy will get peace ‘No more letters’[.]” Maier mailed his missive, questionnaire, and pardon ap- plication to all 13 jurors. Three letters were returned as unde- liverable. Upon receipt, several of the former jurors immedi- ately called the police. One of the former jurors and her hus- band, a police officer, contacted the Wood County Sheriff’s Department to complain about the letter. She feared that Maier might retaliate against her for her role in his conviction. Sheriffʹs Deputy Scott Goldberg drafted a report documenting the complaint and in his report stated, ʺ[a]fter reading through the questions, none of the questions are actually threatening but Officer Machon said he and his wife were ex- tremely concerned about the questions that were asked and just the fact that they were being contacted by this subject.ʺ A local newspaper later ran a one-sentence bulletin noting that a female juror received a threatening letter from a man on whose trial she served. The newspaper account caught Maier’s attention. He clipped the item and included it in a sec- ond letter to the jurors, dated November 14, 2011. The second letter opened, “I read the paper too. My letter was not threat- ening in anyway. I just want to let you see what kind of Idiots 4 No. 18-2151

you helped put me in prison.” Maier then criticized the judges involved in the 2006 affair and wrote, “’You have Nothing to fear from me’[.]” He closed his second letter by encouraging the jurors to contact his state representative or the governor’s office, and signed off as “Your friend from Planet of the Apes Courthouse In downtown Zappenville[.]” After Maier sent the second letter, the state charged him with ten counts of stalking in violation of Wisconsin Statute § 940.32—one count for each of the jurors who received his letters. A new jury convicted Maier on six of the ten counts and acquitted him on four counts. Maier was sentenced to fifteen years in prison and twelve years of extended supervision. Maier moved the trial court for post-conviction relief. His motion raised a litany of arguments, including the same four arguments he brings in this petition. The trial court held a hearing and denied Maier’s motion. He then appealed both the trial court’s denial of his motion and his conviction to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals. State v. Maier, No. 2013AP1391– CR, 2014 WL 1810151 *1 (Wis. Ct. App. May 8, 2014). It af- firmed Maier’s conviction. Maier then appealed to the Wis- consin Supreme Court, which denied review of his case. Maier unsuccessfully petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. Maier v. Wisconsin, 136 S. Ct. 2011 (2016). Maier then petitioned for federal post-conviction re- view under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court denied his pe- tition and issued a certificate of appealability on May 2, 2018. Maier v. Tegels, No. 17-CV-365-BBC, 2018 WL 2049824, at *8 (W.D. Wis. May 2, 2018). This appeal followed. No. 18-2151 5

II. ANALYSIS We review a district courtʹs denial of a habeas petition de novo. Saxon v. Lashbrook, 873 F.3d 982, 987 (7th Cir. 2017). We review issues of fact for clear error. Adams v. Bertrand, 453 F.3d 428, 432 (7th Cir. 2006). Maier’s petition for habeas corpus re- lief is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Pen- alty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). AEDPA provides that habeas peti- tions shall not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision that was 1) contrary to, or 2) involved an unreasonable application of Federal law clearly estab- lished in the holdings of the Supreme Court, or 3) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). We review the Wisconsin Court of Appeals’ opinion, which was the last reasoned state-court decision on the mer- its. Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018). “[O]n habeas review, federal courts are usually limited to a deferential re- view of the reasonableness, rather than the absolute correct- ness, of a state court decision.” Mosley v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 838, 844 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Richter, 562 U.S. at 101–102 (2011)). “For purposes of reasonableness review, ‘a state pris- oner must show that the state courtʹs ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in ex- isting law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagree- ment.’” Id. (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 103). Wisconsin’s stalking statute prohibits, intentionally engag[ing] in a course of conduct di- rected at a specific person that would cause a 6 No. 18-2151

reasonable person under the same circumstances to suffer serious emotional distress or to fear bodily in- jury to or the death of himself or herself or a member of his or her family or household. Wis. Stat. § 940.32(2)(a). The state must prove the defendant knew or should have known that one of his or her acts would likely cause the victim serious emotional distress. Id. at § 940.32(2)(b). The acts must have also actually caused the vic- tim serious emotional distress. Id. at § 940.32(2)(c). Maier challenges his conviction in four ways. First, Maier claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to introduce evidence that Maier be- lieves would have negated crucial elements of the Wisconsin stalking statute. Second, he argues that the Wisconsin stalking statute—as it was applied to him—violated the First Amend- ment. Third, Maier contends that the jury instructions given by the trial court misstated Wisconsin law with respect to the “true threats” test. According to Maier, the erroneous jury in- structions failed to hold the state to its burden of proof and deprived him of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due pro- cess of law. Lastly, he claims the state presented insufficient evidence to support his conviction. We review each argument in turn under AEDPA’s deferential standard of review. A. Maier Received Effective Assistance of Counsel Maier argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney failed to introduce evidence that Maier believes would have aided his defense. Specifically, Maier claims that his trial counsel should have introduced ev- idence showing that he was genuinely applying for a pardon and evidence that a few people—including law enforcement officials—did not find the first letter threatening. No. 18-2151 7

ʺTo establish ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a peti- tioner must show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense.” Johnson v. Thurmer, 624 F.3d 786, 791 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689–92 (1984)). We start our review assuming that Maier’s counsel “rendered ade- quate assistance and made all significant decisions in the ex- ercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). To overcome that assumption, Maier must show that this trial counsel’s representation “‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness’ based on pre- vailing norms of professional conduct.” Id. (quoting Strick- land, 466 U.S. at 688). “In cases such as this, where counsel has succeeded in having his client acquitted of at least one of the charges brought, the presumption is likely to be even more difficult to rebut.” United States v. Banks, 405 F.3d 559, 568 (7th Cir. 2005). Maier must also establish that the deficient perfor- mance prejudiced him by demonstrating that, “there is a rea- sonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional er- rors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to under- mine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. In this case, Maier contends that two types of evidence should have been introduced to help negate the stalking stat- ute’s mens rea element. First, Maier believes that his attorney should have introduced testimony from Maier’s neighbor and documents related to his pardon application. Maier explains that he discussed his pardon application and the letters with his neighbor and that the two traveled to Madison together to pick up the necessary paperwork. According to Maier, his neighbor could have testified to Maier’s sincerity in seeking the pardon and his lack of animosity toward the jurors. 8 No. 18-2151

Similarly, his attorney could have identified documents sub- stantiating his pursuit of a pardon. Maier believes this evi- dence could have helped prove that he did not actually intend for the letters to threaten. Second, Maier believes that his attorney performed defi- ciently by not introducing evidence of Wisconsin law enforce- ment officials’ reactions to the letters. Specifically, Maier thinks his attorney should have introduced Deputy Gold- berg’s incident report into evidence. Maier argues this was relevant to show that at least one person who read the first letter did not find it threatening. Maier also argues that the fact that he was not contacted by law enforcement after send- ing the first letter indicates that letter was not threatening. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals addressed and rejected these arguments. With respect to evidence of Maier’s desire for a pardon, the court determined that Maier was not preju- diced by his counselʹs failure to put on the evidence, noting that whether Maier earnestly desired a pardon is irrelevant to the fact that he should have known that jurors would perceive his letters as threatening. Further, the court of appeals rea- soned that Maier could have simultaneously sincerely desired a pardon and intended to threaten the jurors into supporting his application. The court of appeals also rejected Maier’s argument that his trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to introduce evidence of law enforcement officials’ reactions to the letters. The court of appeals observed that the reportʹs significance paled in comparison to the letters themselves and the jurors’ testimony about the letters’ impact. Further, the court pointed out that the deputy sheriff’s report only stated that none of the first letterʹs questions were actually threatening—the No. 18-2151 9

report did not characterize the first letter as a whole or both letters taken together as non-threatening. The district court similarly remarked that it is hard to know, exactly, how this evidence would have helped Maier: the impressions of law enforcement officers provide little perspective on whether Maier should have known that his letters would have been perceived as threatening by the jurors. We agree. As noted above, the statute criminalizes behav- ior that ʺwould cause a reasonable person under the same cir- cumstances to suffer serious emotional distress[.]” Wis. Stat. § 940.32(2)(a) (emphasis added). Given that the statute fo- cuses on the impact of Maier’s conduct on those it targeted, it is hard to understand how failing to introduce evidence of non-jurors’ impressions could have harmed Maierʹs defense to such an extent that it changed the outcome. Consequently, Maier fails to show that the court of appeals’ determination that he received effective assistance of counsel was unreason- able. B. The Court of Appealsʹ First Amendment Analysis was Rea- sonable Maier urges that Wisconsin’s stalking statute was uncon- stitutional as the state applied it against him. Specifically, Maier argues that his conviction under the statute punished him for unintentional threats: speech protected by the First Amendment. In support of his claim, Maier contends the Su- preme Court has established that the ʺtrue threatsʺ exception to the First Amendment requires the state to prove that the speaker actually intends to threaten others. Unfortunately for Maier, we do not agree that the Supreme Court clearly estab- lished a standard for the true threats doctrine, and conse- quently his claim fails. 10 No. 18-2151

Although the First Amendment generally protects the right to free speech, this protection does not extend to all speech. “[T]he First Amendment does not preclude re- strictions on certain categories of speech having little or no social value, and threats are one such category.” United States v. Parr, 545 F.3d 491, 496–497 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358–59 (2003)). “A statement qualifies as a ‘true threat,’ unprotected by the First Amendment, if it is ‘a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.’” Id. at 497 (quoting Black, 538 U.S. at 359). Black involved a con- stitutional challenge to Virginiaʹs cross burning statute and the Supreme Court produced a handful of splintered opinions attempting to articulate the proper standard. Before Black, this and other circuits employed an objective “reasonable person” standard to determine whether speech constituted a true threat. See id. at 499; see also United States v. Fuller, 387 F.3d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he objective, rea- sonable person standard does not tread on free speech.”). Un- der that approach, courts would ask whether either a reason- able speaker would expect his words to be interpreted as a threat or whether a reasonable listener would interpret the speaker’s words to be a threat. Parr, 545 F.3d at 499. After Black, however, we and other courts have wondered whether speech only qualifies as a true threat if the speaker subjec- tively intended his words to be threatening. Id. at 499–500. The Wisconsin courts employed a double-objective stand- ard in Maier’s case—meaning the state had to satisfy the ob- jective standard from the perspectives of both the speaker and the listener. Maier contends Black rendered this approach un- constitutional and that the state should have been required to No. 18-2151 11

meet its burden of proof under the subjective standard. Alt- hough our opinion in Parr recognized that “it is more likely [after Black] that an entirely objective definition [of true threats] is no longer tenable[,]” the Supreme Court has not made that ultimate determination. Id. at 500. In this habeas corpus action, Maier must show that the state courtʹs adjudication of his case resulted in a decision that was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Additionally, as the Wisconsin Court of Appeals noted, a majority of courts that addressed the issue determined that the objective approach remains vi- able after Black. See Maier, 2014 WL 1810151 at *5; see also United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 330 (3d Cir. 2013). Because the Supreme Court has not definitively answered the ques- tion, Wisconsin’s interpretation of that doctrine is not con- trary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law. C. The Jury Instructions Held the State to Its Burden of Proof Maier also argues he was deprived of his right to due pro- cess because the jury instructions allegedly misstated Wiscon- sin law and effectively relieved the state of its burden of proof. Maier contends that the instructions failed to properly articu- late Wisconsin’s “true threat” standard, as established by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in State v. Perkins, 626 N.W.2d 762, 770 (Wis. 2001). A defendant’s right to due process guarantees that the state must prove every element of the alleged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437 (2004). A jury instruction violates due process if it fails to give 12 No. 18-2151

effect to this requirement. Id. However, habeas precedent places an especially heavy burden on a defendant seeking to show constitutional error from a jury instruction that quotes state law. Waddington v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179, 190 (2009); Bur- ris v. Smith, 819 F.3d 1037, 1041 (7th Cir. 2016). “[N]ot every ambiguity, inconsistency, or deficiency in a jury instruction rises to the level of a due process violation.” Middleton, 541 U.S. at 437. Maier must show both that the instruction was deficient and that “there was a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the instruction in a way that relieved the State of its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Waddington, 555 U.S. at 190 (internal quo- tations omitted). We must determine, “whether the ailing in- struction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991). In Perkins, the Wisconsin Supreme Court addressed jury instructions administered in the trial of a man accused of threatening a judge in violation of state law. See Wis. Stat. § 940.203. Under that statute, the state bore the burden of proving the defendant threatened to cause bodily harm to a judge. See Perkins, 626 N.W.2d at 771. The Wisconsin Supreme Court deemed the jury instructions in that case insufficient because they failed to define “threaten[ing] to cause bodily harm.” Id. at 772. Specifically, the jury was not instructed that it had to apply an objective test in the first element to determine whether the defendant had ‘threatened to cause bodily harm,’ that is, that a speaker would reasona- bly foresee that a listener would reasonably inter- pret the statement to be a serious expression of a purpose to inflict bodily harm, as distinguished No. 18-2151 13

from hyperbole, jest, innocuous talk, expressions of political views, or other similarly protected speech.

Id. The Perkins court held that without language explaining the statuteʹs use of the narrower, legal definition of “threaten,” a reasonable likelihood existed that the jury inter- preted and applied the given instruction to the detriment of Perkins’ right to free speech. Id. at 773. According to Maier, a similar thing happened here. He pins the jury instructions’ deficiency on their definition of “se- rious emotional distress.” The instructions quoted the stalk- ing statute and explained that a defendant causes the victim to experience serious emotional distress if his course of con- duct caused the victim to “feel terrified, intimidated, threat- ened, harassed, or tormented.” Wis. Stat. § 940.32(1)(d). Maier claims that this definition of serious emotional distress in the instructions effectively allowed the jury to convict him for generally threatening (but constitutionally protected) lan- guage. He insists the instructions should have included the Perkins language distinguishing a serious expression of a pur- pose to inflict bodily harm from “hyperbole, jest, innocuous talk, expressions of political views, or other similarly pro- tected speech.” Perkins, 626 N.W.2d at 772. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals disagreed. It explained that Perkins required that the state must prove true threats on an objective standard from the perspective of both the listener and the speaker. See Maier, 2014 WL 1810151 at *4. The court noted that the instructions told the jury to find Maier guilty only if his letters would have caused a reasonable person in the position of the 2006 jurors to experience serious emotional distress and explained that this satisfied the objective 14 No. 18-2151

standard from the jurors’ perspective. The court also observed that the instructions told the jury to find Maier guilty only if he knew or should have known that his letters would have caused the 2006 jurors to suffer serious emotional distress. Thus, the court determined that the instructions administered in this case met Perkinsʹ demand by applying the objective ap- proach to both the speaker (Maier) and the listeners (the 2006 jurors). Lastly, as to Maierʹs argument that he was entitled to an instruction with verbiage from the Perkins decision, the court of appeals distinguished between Wisconsin’s stalking statute and the statute at issue in Perkins, noting that the Perkins opin- ion itself acknowledged that the true threats test required modification for different statutes. See Perkins, 626 N.W.2d. at 770. We agree that the jury instructions accurately stated the elements of the crime. With respect to the true threats stand- ard, the instructions included the essential elements of the double objective standard articulated by the Wisconsin Su- preme Court. In Perkins, the Wisconsin Supreme Court ex- pressed concern that jury instructions did not inform the jury that it had to apply an objective test to determine whether the defendant in that case threatened a judge. Perkins, 626 N.W.2d at 772. In this case, the jury instructions included the double objective standard demanded by Perkins. Although the jury instructions did not mirror the language used in Perkins, the court of appeals made a reasonable determination that the given instructions provided a sufficient, albeit modified, ar- ticulation of the Perkins true threats standard in the context of the stalking statute. Because Perkins is not an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent, No. 18-2151 15

and because the jury instruction was consistent with Perkins, the jury instructions did not violate due process. D. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence to Convict Maier Finally, Maier contends that, even if an objective-intent standard is permissible, the state produced insufficient evi- dence to support his conviction under that standard. He ar- gues the court of appeals’ opinion fails in three main ways. First, the court of appeals failed to apply the sufficiency stand- ard with explicit reference to the Perkins standard, and its opinion is therefore contrary to Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316 (1979). Second, the court of appeals only considered isolated passages from Maier’s letters to the jurors and not “all of the evidence at trial” that should have been considered. Lastly, Maier attempts to argue that the court of appeals’ opinion relied on an unreasonable reading of his letters. All these arguments fail. Fourteenth Amendment due process requires that the state must present sufficient evidence to prove each element of an alleged crime. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326. The crime’s substantive elements are defined by state law. Id. at 324 n.16. Sufficiency of the evidence is reviewed under a different standard on federal habeas review than on direct appeal be- fore the state court. “[T]he state appellate court determines whether any rational trier of fact could have found the evi- dence sufficient; … a federal court may only overturn the ap- pellate courtʹs finding of sufficient evidence if it was objec- tively unreasonable.” Saxon, 873 F.3d at 988. To warrant relief, the state court’s application of federal law “must be ‘some- thing like lying well outside the boundaries of permissible differences of opinion.’” Id. at 987 (quoting Jackson v. Frank, 348 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2003)). 16 No. 18-2151

Maier contends that the court of appeals failed to specifi- cally find that the evidence satisfied the Perkins standard. His argument here is hard to follow. We understand his argument to be similar to his objection to the jury instructions: the court of appeals failed to apply the “true threats” language used in Perkins, and the evidence presented could not satisfy the standard articulated in that case. However, we believe the court of appeals reasonably applied Perkins’ requirements. Maier might also be arguing that, because Perkins violates Su- preme Court precedent, the court of appeal’s sufficiency of the evidence analysis was fatally flawed. In any event, we conclude that the court of appeals’ analysis was not objec- tively unreasonable. The court of appeals’ decision effectively applied the suf- ficiency standard in this case with reference to each of the el- ements of the stalking statute—including Perkins’ double ob- jective standard. Moreover, the opinion points to evidence that satisfies the objective standard from the perspective of a reasonable listener. The court of appeals’ opinion identified specific language in both letters and gave examples of how that evidence supported the jury’s finding that “a reasonable person in the position of the 2006 jurors would have under- stood the letters to be threatening.” State v. Maier, 2014 WL 1810151 at *9. And the court of appeals’ opinion implicitly but neces- sarily found that the evidence satisfied the objective standard from Maier’s perspective. The court held that the jury could have reasonably determined that each letter was inde- pendently threatening. Id. at *10. As the state points out, Maier sent a second letter to the jurors after learning from the newspaper that at least one of the jurors found his first letter No. 18-2151 17

to be threatening and called law enforcement. This suggests that at least with respect to the second letter, Maier was on notice that the jurors would suffer serious emotional distress because of his communications. Significantly, one of Maier’s questions in the first letter—the question asking jurors whether they thought that Wood County acted professionally by distributing their names and addresses to Maier—indi- cates that Maier likely knew he should not be writing the ju- rors in the first place. And even aside from the content of Maier’s letters, consider, for example, what his very act of mailing the first letter communicated to the jurors: I know who you are, I know you helped put me behind bars, and I know where you live. Likewise, and without considering the content of Maier’s written words, his second letter communi- cated that he knew one of the jurors complained and that he was paying attention. The court of appeals reasonably con- cluded that the state presented sufficient evidence to support Maier’s conviction. Maier also claims the court of appeals failed to consider all the evidence available at trial, and instead only focused on isolated passages in his letters. He argues that, when the to- tality of the evidence is considered, the letters could have been viewed as nonthreatening. The Wisconsin Court of Ap- peals’ opinion focused on whether the facts presented at trial justified the juryʹs determination; it likewise focused on the portions of the record that support the juryʹs finding. This was appropriate because the court of appeals was required to view all the evidence in a manner favorable to the state and the con- viction. See State v. Poellinger, 451 N.W.2d 752 (Wis. 1990); see also McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120, 133 (2010). This focus does not, as Maier argues, ignore evidence more favorable to him. Instead, the court acknowledged—but rejected—Maier’s 18 No. 18-2151

characterization of the letters. See Maier, 2014 WL 1810151 at *8-9. None of Maier’s alternative explanations for his letters provides so convincing an explanation that we deem the court of appeals’ opinion to be objectively unreasonable. Lastly, Maier attempts to argue that the court of appeals’ opinion reflects an unreasonable interpretation of his letters. Consequently, he contends the opinion provides an unrea- sonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence pre- sented. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Again, the court of appeals properly reviewed the record in a light most favorable to the prosecution and conviction. The court’s opinion was not un- reasonable because it failed to construe the evidence as Maier wished—in a light most favorable to him. See Maier, 2014 WL 1810151 at *9. Given this standard, we believe that the court’s opinion provided a reasonable application of this case’s facts. III. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, we believe the Wisconsin Court of Appeals did not unreasonably reject Maier’s numerous claims. Maier failed to demonstrate that his conviction under the stalking statute was contrary to, or involved an unreason- able application of, clearly established Federal law. Nor has he demonstrated that the decision was based on an unreason- able determination of the facts in light of the evidence pre- sented at trial. AFFIRMED.