Supreme Court of Florida _______________
No. SC19-1851 _______________
DONALD H. DAVIDSON JR., Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.
July 8, 2021
PER CURIAM.
Donald H. Davidson Jr. appeals his judgment of conviction of
first-degree murder and sentence of death. We have jurisdiction.
See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons explained below,
we affirm in all respects.
BACKGROUND
In September 2014, Davidson was conditionally released from
prison, meaning that he was still subject to the Department of
Corrections’ (DOC) supervision even though he no longer resided in prison. As a condition of his supervised release, Davidson was
required to wear a GPS monitor on his ankle.
On the morning of December 1, 2014, Davidson left his job
early, complaining to his employer that he felt ill. Davidson called
James Earls, his stepbrother, asking to be picked up from a
restaurant near Davidson’s work. As requested, Earls picked
Davidson up and dropped him off at the home of Roseann Welsh
and Michael Scott, longtime friends of Davidson. Welsh was home,
but Scott and their two children—R.S. and M.S.—were not.
Welsh invited Davidson into the home. After being in the
home for some time, Davidson requested to be shown a video game
in Welsh’s bedroom, and Welsh agreed. While in the bedroom,
Davidson put Welsh in a chokehold, forced her face-first into the
bed, pulled her dress over her head, and began trying to rape her.
While Davidson was attempting to rape Welsh, 10-year-old
M.S. arrived home from school. Hearing the arrival of the school
bus, Welsh broke away from Davidson and ran into the adjoining
bathroom, but Davidson followed her there. In the bathroom, he
located a shoe and removed the lace from it. He then used that lace
to strangle Welsh in the shower until she lost consciousness. He
-2- “lean[ed]” her down to the floor. Realizing that she was still
breathing, Davidson stabbed her in the throat three times with a
buck knife.
After killing Welsh, Davidson emerged from the bedroom,
encountering M.S. in the kitchen. He grabbed her by the neck,
threw her against the couch, and started to sexually assault her.
Davidson told her to remove her clothing and suck his penis. She
complied.
While the assault was ongoing, M.S.’s thirteen-year-old
brother, R.S., returned home from school. Davidson turned his
focus to R.S., whom he met at the front door. He told R.S. that his
sister and mother were not at home. Though somewhat skeptical of
Davidson’s statement, R.S. left the home in search of his sister and
mother.
After R.S. left, Davidson removed his GPS ankle monitor,
forced M.S. into the family’s minivan, and drove away. As he was
driving, Davidson threw out his cell phone through an open window
and directed M.S. to duck down when they passed by other
vehicles. While in the minivan, Davidson again sexually assaulted
M.S. by fondling her vagina, placing his penis in her mouth, and
-3- placing his penis in or around her anus and vagina. Eventually, he
returned to a location near M.S.’s home, allowed her to exit the
minivan, and then began driving to Georgia.
Meanwhile, after failing to locate his sister and mother, R.S.
returned home. While looking through the home, R.S. found his
deceased mother in her bedroom. He then called 911 and reported
that his mother was dead, stating: “[S]he’s bleeding in her mouth
and eyes.”
Police responded to the home and began an investigation,
which included searching the home for physical evidence, speaking
with Scott, and interviewing R.S. Based in part on the information
learned from Scott and R.S., police issued a BOLO 1 for the stolen
minivan.
Moments later, while still at the scene, police officers observed
M.S. approaching the home. Officers took her to a police station
where Detective Ryan Ellis interviewed her. Among other things,
M.S. told him that she heard her mother yell something about
calling 911 as she was arriving home from school. According to
1. BOLO stands for “Be on the Lookout.”
-4- M.S., Davidson physically and sexually assaulted her in her home,
kidnapped her, stole the minivan, and sexually assaulted her again
in the stolen minivan.
After her interview with Detective Ellis, M.S. was interviewed
and examined by a child protective investigator (CPI). M.S. again
recounted the details of Davidson’s sexual assaults against her.
Additionally, M.S. stated that her buttocks and neck were hurting
from the assaults.
In the early morning hours of December 2, police officers
located and stopped the stolen minivan. Inside the vehicle, police
officers found and apprehended Davidson. After Davidson was
taken to a police station interview room, Detective Wes Smith
advised him of his Miranda 2 rights, which he acknowledged and
waived. Then Detectives Smith and Dwayne Singletary interviewed
Davidson.
During the interview, Davidson confessed to committing
several crimes. He acknowledged attempting to rape Welsh,
murdering Welsh by strangling and stabbing her, sexually
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
-5- assaulting M.S. both in her home and in the minivan, and
kidnapping her. He also told the detectives that he ingested cocaine
a short time before arriving at Welsh’s home.
Ultimately, the State charged Davidson with nine crimes,
including first-degree premeditated murder, kidnapping, and
multiple counts of sexual battery upon a child twelve years of age or
younger. Based on the charge of first-degree murder, the State filed
a notice of intent to seek the death penalty.
Davidson filed numerous motions, including one that
challenged the constitutionality of the prior-violent-felony
aggravator. 3 He argued that this aggravator was overbroad and
vague—both facially and as applied—rendering the entire death-
penalty statute constitutionally infirm. Following a hearing, the
trial court rejected Davidson’s argument.
At a subsequent hearing, Davidson expressed his intent to
plead guilty to first-degree murder (and the other charged crimes)
and waive a penalty-phase jury. After a lengthy colloquy with
Davidson and the presentation of a detailed factual basis by the
3. See § 921.141(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (2019).
-6- prosecutor, the court accepted the guilty plea—finding it to be
“knowingly, freely, voluntarily, and intelligently given.”
At the ensuing penalty-phase hearing, the State introduced
numerous exhibits, including: (1) the judgment and sentence for
Davidson’s aggravated-battery conviction for assaulting a pregnant
female in 2010, (2) Davidson’s police interview, (3) M.S.’s interview
with Detective Ellis, (4) R.S.’s 911 call, (5) a stipulation that
Davidson was declared a sexual predator in 2005, and (6) a
stipulation that Davidson was on conditional release at the time of
the murder.
In addition, the State called eight witnesses. One such
witness was Dr. Valerie Rao, the medical examiner who performed
the autopsy of Welsh. According to Dr. Rao, Welsh died from
asphyxiation—due to strangulation—and the stab wounds to her
neck. Detectives Ellis and Smith also testified, discussing their
involvement in the investigation and relaying facts gleaned from the
interviews.
The victim of Davidson’s 2010 aggravated battery provided
details about Davidson’s attack against her. According to the
victim, Davidson entered her home under false pretenses, grabbed
-7- her neck, lifted her off the floor, and squeezed her neck so tightly
that she blacked out. After she lost consciousness, Davidson began
removing her clothing. She regained consciousness and ran from
Davidson. Though he pursued her, she was able to escape.
After the State rested, the defense presented mitigating
evidence. This evidence included the testimony of three experts: Dr.
Erin Bigler, Dr. Robert Ouaou, and Dr. Steven Gold.
Dr. Bigler is a clinical neuropsychologist and cognitive
neuroscientist, who reviewed scans of Davidson’s brain. She made
two significant findings. One, the “overall white matter volume in
Mr. Davidson’s brain was on the low end of average . . . [which] can
have implications for how the brain is functioning.” Two, a PET
scan showed metabolic differences in the cerebellum and
orbitofrontal portions of Davidson’s brain. Dr. Bigler declined to
comment on the significance of this latter finding.
Dr. Ouaou, a neuropsychologist, reviewed numerous records
and administered neuropsychological tests on Davidson. Based on
the records, test results, and Dr. Bigler’s report, Dr. Ouaou
concluded that, at the time of the murder, Davidson was under the
influence of a mental or emotional disturbance and that his ability
-8- to conform to the law’s requirements was substantially impaired
due to brain damage and cocaine use.
Dr. Gold, a psychologist, discussed Davidson’s adverse
childhood experiences (ACEs). He explained that Davidson’s
background included the following ACEs: “childhood physical
abuse, childhood physical neglect, childhood emotional neglect,
childhood sexual abuse, parents separated or divorced, mother
treated violently, . . . a household member going to prison, . . .
childhood verbal abuse[,] [and a chaotic] household.” He opined
that the ACEs on their own or in combination with trauma “over-
activate [the] part of the brain responsible for emotionality and
impulsivity [and cause] . . . the part of the brain that cur[bs]
emotional expression [and] impulses . . . [to be] underdeveloped and
underactive.” Those changes cannot be altered, Dr. Gold explained,
absent significant intervention which was not present in Davidson’s
background. Ultimately, however, Dr. Gold refrained from offering
an opinion as to Davidson’s mental or emotional state at the time of
the crimes or his ability to comply with the law.
Ten lay witnesses also testified in support of the defense case.
In broad terms, their testimony established that Davidson’s
-9- upbringing was chaotic and difficult. Davidson’s father abandoned
the family while Davidson was young, leaving the mother (who was
poor) to raise Davidson and Earls without him. Davidson lived in a
dirty home, sometimes lacking electricity and running water. He
frequently went hungry and routinely slept on the floor or couch.
Additionally, Davidson lived “from time to time” in the same
household as two uncles who had been prosecuted for sexual
offenses. In addition, Davidson was sexually abused as a child by
an older cousin and later by Earls. Aside from the sexual abuse,
some of Davidson’s relatives physically or emotionally abused him,
at least to some extent. For example, Davidson’s great-
grandmother occasionally slapped him on the face, hard enough to
leave red marks; two of his cousins and one uncle sometimes beat
him up; Earls picked on him; and one of his aunts would
occasionally “whip” him. As for academics, Davidson did poorly in
school, never obtaining a high school diploma. In addition,
Davidson suffers from several health issues, experienced
hallucinations as an adult, and has been diagnosed with ADHD.
Following the penalty-phase hearing, the parties submitted
sentencing memoranda. In arguing for the death penalty, the State
- 10 - relied on five aggravating circumstances, including that Davidson
had committed prior violent felonies. For his part, Davidson asked
the court to find two statutory mitigating circumstances—he was
under the influence of an extreme emotional disturbance at the
time of the murder and his ability to conform to the requirements of
the law was substantially impaired. As for nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances, Davidson contended that he established more than
seventy such circumstances.
At the Spencer 4 hearing, the defense introduced several
exhibits, 5 presented additional argument, and read into the record
the proposed mitigators. Additionally, the defense read a written
statement prepared by Davidson. In that statement, Davidson
expressed remorse and regret for what he did to Welsh, Scott, M.S.,
and R.S.
Thereafter, the court held a sentencing hearing where it
pronounced a sentence of death for the first-degree murder of
4. Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).
5. These exhibits included Davidson’s medical and educational records, brain scans, disability records, Dr. Ouaou and Dr. Bigler’s demonstrative slides, and childhood photographs of Davidson.
- 11 - Welsh. In the sentencing order, the trial court found five
aggravating factors to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, with
the noted weight: Davidson committed the murder while under a
sentence of imprisonment for a felony (great weight); Davidson
committed prior violent felonies consisting of the 2010 aggravated
battery, as well as the sexual batteries on and kidnapping of M.S.
(great weight); Davidson murdered Welsh after attempting to
commit a sexual battery upon her (great weight); the murder was
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (great weight); and Davidson
committed the murder after having been designated a sexual
predator (moderate weight).
As for mitigating circumstances, the trial court rejected the
substantial-impairment mitigator, relying on Davidson’s “own
admissions” and his post-murder efforts to conceal his wrongdoing.
In so concluding, the court discounted Dr. Ouaou’s contrary
opinion. Nevertheless, as to the other proposed statutory mitigator,
the court found that Davidson committed the murder while under
the influence of an extreme emotional disturbance. But the court
assigned only some weight, stressing that the disturbance “was
exacerbated by his voluntary ingestion of cocaine.”
- 12 - In addition, the court addressed all proposed nonstatutory
mitigating circumstances, grouping them into several categories:
childhood upbringing; childhood abuse; educational background;
mental health, drug use, and behavioral issues; remorse; and
miscellaneous. Under the headings childhood upbringing and
childhood abuse, the court found fifteen mitigating circumstances
to which it assigned various weight. These circumstances included
the following: Davidson’s father abandoned him at a young age
(little weight); Davidson was raised by a single mother, and she was
very poor (little weight); Davidson lived with two uncles, both of
whom were prosecuted for sexual offenses (little weight); Davidson
and Earls thought that incestuous relations were normal when they
were young (some weight); and Davidson lived with numerous
violent relatives who abused him and one another (some weight).
The court also recognized as mitigating Davidson’s poor scholastic
performance and mental-health issues, assigning weight ranging
from slight to some.
Ultimately, the court concluded that the aggravating
circumstances heavily outweighed the mitigating circumstances,
- 13 - thereby warranting imposition of the death penalty. Davidson now
appeals.
ANALYSIS
Davidson raises three issues for our review. First, Davidson
asserts that the trial court committed fundamental error by not
finding beyond a reasonable doubt that sufficient aggravating
circumstances existed and that those aggravating circumstances
outweighed the mitigating circumstances. Next, he contends that
the trial court erred in rejecting the substantial-impairment
mitigator and abused its discretion in assigning too little weight to
certain nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. Finally, Davidson
argues that the prior-violent-felony aggravator is unconstitutional. 6
Though not raised by Davidson, we must also determine whether
6. The State raises the issue of the comparative proportionality of Davidson’s death sentence. However, after the briefing in this case, we decided Lawrence v. State, 308 So. 3d 544 (Fla. 2020). In Lawrence, we held that the conformity clause in article I, section 17 of the Florida Constitution prohibits us from undertaking comparative proportionality review. Id. at 550-52. Thus, in accordance with Lawrence, we do not review the comparative proportionality of Davidson’s death sentence.
- 14 - Davidson’s guilty plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
entered. 7
Sufficiency of Findings
For his first argument, Davidson assails as fundamental error
the trial court’s failure to find beyond a reasonable doubt that
sufficient aggravating circumstances existed and that those
circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances. We
disagree. 8
Davidson’s argument rests upon the faulty premise that the
sufficiency and weighing determinations of section 921.141 are
subject to the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. Our recent
case law is inconsistent with that premise. For example, in Rogers
v. State, 285 So. 3d 872, 885 (Fla. 2019), we rejected the argument
“that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that it must
determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether the aggravating
factors were sufficient to justify the death penalty and whether
7. See Altersberger v. State, 103 So. 3d 122, 128 (Fla. 2012).
8. This issue involves a pure legal matter and is thus subject to de novo review. See Anderson v. State, 291 So. 3d 531, 533 (Fla. 2020) (citing Khianthalat v. State, 974 So. 2d 359, 360 (Fla. 2008)).
- 15 - those factors outweighed the mitigating circumstances.” (Emphasis
added.) We explained that “these determinations are not subject to
the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof.” Id. at 886.
Since Rogers, we have consistently held the reasonable-doubt
standard inapplicable to either the sufficiency or weighing
determination. See, e.g., Craft v. State, 312 So. 3d 45, 57 (Fla.
2020); Santiago-Gonzalez v. State, 301 So. 3d 157, 177 (Fla. 2020);
Bright v. State, 299 So. 3d 985, 998 (Fla. 2020); Doty v. State, 313
So. 3d 573, 577 (Fla. 2020); Lawrence, 308 So. 3d at 552 n.8.
Davidson has not presented a compelling argument to recede from
our precedent.
Mitigation
Davidson presents two challenges to the trial court’s handling
of mitigating evidence: one directed at the rejection of the
substantial-impairment mitigator and the other assailing the weight
assignment for certain nonstatutory mitigators. We find no merit in
either challenge.
In his first challenge, Davidson argues that the trial court’s
rejection of the substantial-impairment mitigator lacks evidentiary
support. However, we have upheld rejection of the substantial-
- 16 - impairment mitigator where a defendant “took logical steps to
conceal his actions from others.” Snelgrove v. State, 107 So. 3d
242, 260 (Fla. 2012) (quoting Zommer v. State, 31 So. 3d 733, 750
(Fla. 2010)). This is so because “[logical] steps constitute
‘purposeful actions . . . indicative of someone who knew those acts
were wrong and who could conform his conduct to the law if he so
desired.’ ” Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Hoskins v.
State, 965 So. 2d 1, 18 (Fla. 2007)).
Here, Davidson took several logical steps to conceal his
murder of Welsh and flee from her home. For example, Davidson
lied to R.S. to keep him from entering the home; Davidson cut off
his GPS tracking device; Davidson stole the family’s minivan to
facilitate his escape; and, while in the minivan, Davidson discarded
his cell phone to avoid being tracked and directed M.S. to duck
down so that others could not see her. This conduct constitutes
competent, substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s
rejection of the substantial-impairment mitigator—notwithstanding
the testimony of Davidson’s experts. Cf. Bright, 299 So. 3d at 1006-
07 (upholding the rejection of the substantial-impairment mitigator
based on the defendant’s purposeful actions, which consisted of
- 17 - fleeing from the scene of the murder and hiding the murder
weapon); Ault v. State, 53 So. 3d 175, 187 (Fla. 2010) (upholding
the trial court’s rejection of the same mitigator based on the
defendant’s purposeful post-murder conduct); see also Colley v.
State, 310 So. 3d 2, 16 (Fla. 2020) (“Even expert evidence can be
rejected if that evidence cannot be reconciled with other evidence in
the case.” (citing Bright, 299 So. 3d at 1006-07)).9
Davidson also argues that rejection of this statutory mitigator
is inconsistent with the trial court’s acceptance of seven
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances concerning his mental
health. This argument also lacks merit. Of note, Davidson fails to
explain how acceptance of those mitigating circumstances
inevitably leads to the conclusion that he was substantially
impaired at the time of the murder. As noted by the State, the trial
court could properly determine that Davidson suffered from mental-
9. We also note that the trial court made a finding that “Dr. Ouaou never questioned the defendant about the crimes in this case, his feelings about the crimes in this case, or what he was feeling leading up to the crimes in this case.” This finding further undermines Davidson’s argument that the trial court improperly rejected the mitigator.
- 18 - health issues to some extent, but nonetheless had the ability to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
Finally, Davidson’s reliance on Coday v. State, 946 So. 2d 988
(Fla. 2006), is misplaced. In Coday, we found an abuse of
discretion in the trial court’s rejection of the substantial-
impairment mitigator. Id. at 1004-05. We noted that six experts
testified in support of the mitigator, and the State called no experts
to rebut that testimony. Id. at 1003-05. Of importance, we
stressed, “The evidence offered by the State to counter this
mitigation evidence can be squared with the expert testimonies.” Id.
at 1005 (emphasis added). Here, in contrast with Coday, the State
provided evidence that supported rejection of the mitigator, i.e.,
Davidson’s purposeful conduct to conceal his crimes and flee from
Welsh’s home.
Davidson’s second challenge concerns the assignment of little
weight to certain nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. According
to Davidson, it was arbitrary and unreasonable for the court to
assign little weight to his father’s abandonment and abusive
childhood experiences. Davidson’s argument lacks merit.
- 19 - Here, the trial court found that Davidson’s father had indeed
abandoned him at a young age, that Davidson (at times) lived with
two uncles who were sex offenders—assigning little weight to each
circumstance. Davidson did not present evidence establishing a
close nexus between this mitigating evidence and his murdering
Welsh. See Bright, 299 So. 3d at 1008 (finding no abuse of
discretion in the trial court’s assignment of no weight to the
defendant’s difficult childhood; stressing that no evidence
connected the abuse and neglect with the murders). The mitigating
value of the above evidence was less than compelling in other
respects. As for living with two sex-offender uncles, there was no
evidence that either of them abused Davidson; and the evidence
does not disclose the length of time that they actually lived in the
same household as Davidson. And, although Davidson’s father
abandoned him at an early age, Davidson had a good and loving
relationship with his mother. Thus, in light of the evidence
presented in this case, Davidson has not demonstrated an abuse of
discretion. See Craft, 312 So. 3d at 53-54.
Davidson points to our decisions in Morton v. State, 789 So. 2d
324 (Fla. 2001), and Douglas v. State, 878 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2004),
- 20 - but they in no way undermine our analysis. In each case, we found
no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s assigning little weight to
the defendant’s childhood abuse or parental abandonment. See
Morton, 789 So. 2d at 332 (child abuse); Douglas, 878 So. 2d at
1260 (parental abandonment). Of significance, neither case states
or suggests that long-term abuse or permanent parental
abandonment warrant a specific weight; nor does either case limit
the discretion of the trial court in assigning weight to such
evidence. Indeed, both decisions stress that the weight given to
such circumstances is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial
court. Morton, 789 So. 2d at 332 (“The weight given to this
mitigating circumstance is also within the trial court’s discretion.”
(citing Shellito v. State, 701 So. 2d 837, 844 (Fla. 1997))); Douglas,
878 So. 2d at 1260 (“[T]he weight given to this mitigating
circumstance is within the trial court’s discretion.”). Thus, Morton
and Douglas do not help Davidson. 10
10. To the extent Davidson also relies on the evidence of his abusive childhood, such reliance is misplaced. As the State properly notes, the trial court gave more than “little weight” to his childhood abuse.
- 21 - Davidson also attacks the assignment of little weight to
portions of his mental-health mitigation. He contends that it was
unreasonable for the court to assign little weight to such
circumstances based on the fact that it assigned the same weight to
his good behavior in court. We reject this argument as inconsistent
with our reasoning in Craft, 312 So. 3d at 53-54. Specifically, Craft
argued, “[T]he weight assigned to the childhood-trauma mitigator
was arbitrary and unreasonable because the trial court also
assigned the same weight to the mitigating circumstance that Craft
exhibited good behavior during trial.” Id. In rejecting that
argument, we observed that the trial court “independently
considered and weighed both mitigating circumstances,” the “trial
court’s findings with respect to both circumstances [we]re
supported by competent, substantial evidence,” and “the trial court
did not simply arbitrarily assign all mitigation the same weight.” Id.
at 54.
Here, as reflected in the sentencing order, the trial court gave
individualized consideration to each proposed mitigating
circumstance and assigned various weight—ranging from none to
some—to the mitigating circumstances found to be established.
- 22 - And Davidson does not claim that the underlying factual findings
are not supported by competent, substantial evidence. Thus, Craft
supports affirmance.
In sum, Davidson has not demonstrated error or an abuse of
discretion in the trial court’s handling of mitigating circumstances.
Constitutionality of Prior-Violent-Felony Aggravator
As his final argument, Davidson challenges the
constitutionality of the prior-violent-felony aggravator. See §
921.141(6)(b), Fla. Stat. Specifically, Davidson argues that the
prior-violent-felony aggravator is overbroad and impermissibly
vague, thereby constituting cruel and unusual punishment under
the state and federal constitutions. Our cases have consistently
rejected overbreadth and vagueness challenges to this aggravator.
See, e.g., Bush v. State, 295 So. 3d 179, 214 (Fla. 2020); Gonzalez v.
State, 136 So. 3d 1125, 1169 (Fla. 2014); Lowe v. State, 2 So. 3d
21, 44 (Fla. 2008); Hudson v. State, 708 So. 2d 256, 261 & n.4 (Fla.
1998)). And we see no reason to depart from that case law now.
Voluntariness of Guilty Plea
In death-penalty cases, “[t]his Court has a mandatory
obligation to independently review the sufficiency of the evidence
- 23 - underlying [a first-degree murder] conviction, and the ‘customary
review’ evaluates whether the conviction is supported by competent,
substantial evidence.” Santiago-Gonzalez, 301 So. 3d at 180
(quoting Ocha v. State, 826 So. 2d 956, 965 (Fla. 2002)). “However,
where a defendant pleads guilty and waives a jury trial, the relevant
inquiry is not whether there was competent, substantial evidence,
but whether the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
entered the guilty plea.” Id. (citing Tanzi v. State, 964 So. 2d 106,
121 (Fla. 2007)). “Proper review requires this Court to scrutinize
the plea to ensure that the defendant was made aware of the
consequences of his plea, was apprised of the constitutional rights
he was waiving, and ple[aded] guilty voluntarily.” Covington v.
State, 228 So. 3d 49, 67 (Fla. 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting
Ocha, 826 So. 2d at 965).
Here, as argued by the State, the trial court conducted an
extensive inquiry into Davidson’s knowledge and understanding of
the charges against him, his rights, and the consequences of
pleading guilty. Specifically, the trial court apprised Davidson that
a guilty plea would mean no guilt-phase trial and the forfeiture of
trial-related rights such as requiring the State to prove his guilt
- 24 - beyond a reasonable doubt, the right to have a jury decide his guilt,
the right to be represented by a lawyer at the trial, the right to call
and confront witnesses, and the right to remain silent. The court
also apprised Davidson that there were only two sentencing options
for the first-degree-murder conviction: life in prison or death. And,
after being so advised, Davidson told the trial court that he was
making the decision to plead guilty “based on [his] own free[] and
voluntary will.”11 Finally, the evidence of guilt was overwhelming as
detailed in the factual basis given by the prosecutor.
Thus, we conclude that Davidson’s guilty plea was voluntarily
and knowingly given. See Craft, 312 So. 3d at 58; Santiago-
Gonzalez, 301 So. 3d at 180.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons given above, we affirm Davidson’s first-degree-
murder conviction and his sentence of death.
It is so ordered.
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LAWSON, MUÑIZ, COURIEL, and GROSSHANS, JJ., concur. LABARGA, J., concurs in result with an opinion.
11. Davidson also signed a written plea form acknowledging the forfeiture of certain trial-related rights and attesting to the voluntary nature of the plea.
- 25 - NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
LABARGA, J., concurring in result.
For the reasons expressed in my dissenting opinion in
Lawrence v. State, 308 So. 3d 544 (Fla. 2020) (receding from
proportionality review requirement in death penalty direct appeal
cases), I can only concur in the result.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Clay County, Don H. Lester, Judge – 102014CF001904000AMX
Jessica Yeary, Public Defender, and Barbara J. Busharis, Assistant Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellant
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and William David Chappell, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellee
- 26 -