RENDERED: APRIL 3, 2026; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2023-CA-1081-MR
DONALD DONTA, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TRUSTEE FOR CONRAD DONTA APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM BOYD CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE JOHN F. VINCENT, JUDGE ACTION NO. 21-CI-00131
ROBERT DONTA, INDIVIDUALLY; ROBERT DONTA, TRUSTEE FOR CONRAD DONTA; JACK DONTA, INDIVIDUALLY; JACK DONTA, AS TRUSTEE FOR CONRAD DONTA; DORIS BRANTFERGER; DONNA VANDERHOOF, INDIVIDUALLY; DONNA VANDERHOOF, AS CONSERVATOR OR LIMITED CONSERVATOR FOR CONRAD DONTA; CONRAD DONTA; SARAH RAZOR; KENNETH DONTA; WILMA JEAN DONTA; MICHAEL DONTA; RANDY DONTA; MICHELLE DONTA; BARRY DONTA; BILLIE DONTA; JOHANNA DONTA BROWN; JENNIFER DONTA LOWE; AND COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEES OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CALDWELL, MCNEILL, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
TAYLOR, JUDGE: Donald Donta, individually and as trustee for Conrad Donta
(Donald), appeals the August 16, 2023, Order entered by the Boyd Circuit Court
dismissing an adversary challenge brought by Donald arising from a trust
administration proceeding in the Boyd District Court.1 Donald further appeals the
interlocutory Order entered by the Boyd Circuit Court on September 22, 2021, that
effectively dismissed his challenge, pending final resolution of counterclaims
asserted by appellees in this action. For the reasons stated, we affirm.
INTRODUCTION
This is an appeal of an adversary action filed in Boyd Circuit Court
challenging the ability of the Boyd District Court to allow the sale of a portion of
real property held in an inter vivos trust. Donald, a contingent beneficiary and
original trustee of a family trust, filed this adversary proceeding in 2021 pursuant
to Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 389A.010(4) in the Boyd Circuit Court to halt
the sale approved by the Boyd District Court in Case No. 97-H-00049-001.
1 Conrad Donta died intestate on March 4, 2025, during the pendency of this appeal. On March 2, 2026, Donald Donta moved to revive the appeal pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statutes 395.278, which was granted by Order entered March 16, 2026.
-2- Donald contended that he was the owner of the property as a result of having been
deeded the property as trustee under the Trust Agreement established on August
27, 1987, by his parents, William and Essie Donta, for the benefit of their son
Conrad. He also asserted that the property could not be sold as a result of an
equitable lien he claimed against the property.
The Boyd Circuit Court entered an order granting partial summary
judgment for the appellees on September 22, 2021, effectively dismissing the
complaint with prejudice. After appellees withdrew their counterclaims, the court
entered a final order on August 16, 2023, which Donald now appeals.
BACKGROUND
1. Trust for the Benefit of Conrad Donta established
William Donta and his wife, Essie, executed a Trust Agreement
(Agreement) in 1987, to create a trust for the benefit of one of their sons, Conrad
Donta. The Agreement named their son Donald as trustee for the trust. Record,
Case No. 21-CI-00131 at 119-120. The Agreement also provided that the grantors
“assigned, transferred, and conveyed” real and personal property, together with
other property that may be added, for the trustee to hold in trust. The Agreement
stated that the real estate was to be held and maintained during the life of Conrad
to provide him a home and residence. It directed the trustee to hold the remainder
of the trust property and expend such sums as necessary for the care, support and
-3- maintenance of Conrad during his lifetime. Upon Conrad’s death, the Agreement
called on the trustee to distribute any remaining principal and accumulated income
after payment of expenses and debts to five of the grantors’ children or their heirs.2
To complete the trust conveyance, Essie and William deeded three parcels of real
estate to Donald as trustee for the use and benefit of Conrad.
On October 22, 1991, William and Essie executed a second trust
instrument titled Amendment to Trust Agreement (Amended Agreement).3 This
Amended Agreement was between the grantors and Jack Donta, Donald’s brother,
who was named therein as successor trustee. The Amended Agreement stated that
the grantors intent was to replace the trustee and add other children of the grantors
as beneficiaries of the trust. Record, Case No. 21-CI-00131 at 82-83. It named
Jack Donta as successor trustee with all powers and duties set forth in the 1987
Agreement. The Amended Agreement named Robert Donta as alternate trustee,
and Arnold Donta as second alternate trustee. The Amended Agreement also
added the names of three children of the grantors as remainder beneficiaries and
2 The remainder beneficiaries were Donald Donta, Arnold Donta, Donna Vanderhoof, Kenneth Donta, and Robert Donta. 3 The Amended Agreement was recorded in the Boyd County Clerk’s office. Apparently, William Donta and Essie Donta executed another trust agreement on October 22, 1991, purportedly to revoke the original Agreement naming Donald Donta as trustee. The circuit court did not address this document and nor shall this Court, as the result for both looked to Jack Donta replacing Donald Donta as trustee.
-4- reaffirmed and ratified all other provisions of the Agreement dated August 21,
1987.4
Essie Donta died testate in October 1996, and William Donta died
testate in March 1997.
2. Limited Conservatorship for Conrad established in Case No. 97-H-
00049-001, Boyd District Court
On September 9, 1997, Kenneth Donta filed a Petition to Determine if
Disabled pursuant to KRS 387.530, and an Application for Appointment of
Guardian in Boyd District Court regarding Conrad Donta, his brother. Siblings
Doris Brantferger, Delmis Donta, Robert Donta, Jack Donta, Donna Vanderhoof,
William Donta Jr., Arnold Donta, Kenneth Donta and Donald Donta were named
as next of kin. Following a jury trial on December 16, 1997, the district court
entered a disability judgment in accordance with the jury verdict, finding that
Conrad was partially disabled in managing his financial resources as defined in
KRS Chapter 387. The court appointed Conrad’s sister, Donna Vanderhoof as a
limited conservator. The limited conservator’s powers and duties were provided in
the court’s order as follows: disposing of property, executing instruments, entering
into contractual relationships, and making major purchases with the input of
4 The three additional children named as remainder beneficiaries were Jack Donta, William Donta, Jr., and Delmis Donta.
-5- Conrad. Record, Case No. 97-H-00049-001 at 31-33. Vanderhoof performed
those duties until March 2006, when she notified the court of her inability to
continue to serve, and the alternate limited conservator for Conrad, Robert, was
substituted and assumed all duties.
In August of 2020, Robert as limited conservator for Conrad, moved
in Case No. 97-H-00049-001, for an order to allow his sister, Doris Brantferger, to
obtain a survey of a portion of the farm held in trust for Conrad so that she might
purchase it at fair market value. He also sought an order preventing Donald from
interfering with the process of the survey. Donald and his daughter, Joy Hall,
objected to the survey at a court hearing. On September 3, 2020, the court
sustained the motion for the survey to be conducted without interference from any
party. On December 15, 2020, Robert, as limited conservator, moved pursuant to
KRS 389A.010 et seq. for an order granting authority to transfer a portion of the
property held in trust. The motion explained that repairs were needed for the house
where Conrad was living. The motion proposed to sell two acres of the property to
his sister, Doris Brantferger, at fair market value determined from the appraisal.
The proceeds would go toward repairing the residence and leave approximately
twenty acres of the real estate in the trust. Donald filed a response arguing against
the sale of the property and alleging mismanagement by Jack and Donna
Vanderhoof in their fiduciary roles with Conrad.
-6- Following a hearing on January 27, 2021, the Boyd District Court
entered an order that day granting the motion for authorization to sell a portion of
the real estate held in trust for Conrad. The court authorized Jack Donta as trustee,
to execute and deliver a deed to Doris Brantferger for the sum of $22,000. Donald
filed a notice of appeal of this order in circuit court, and the Boyd Circuit Court
ordered that action consolidated with the adversary proceeding filed in Case No.
21-CI-00131, which is the action from which this appeal is taken.
3. Declaratory Judgment action in Case No. 99-CI-00485, Boyd
Circuit Court
On June 3, 1999, Donald filed a complaint in the Boyd Circuit Court
seeking declaratory relief and naming as defendants his siblings Doris Brantferger,
Delmis Donta, Robert Donta, Jack Donta, Donna Mae Vanderhoof, William Donta
Jr., Arnold Donta, Kenneth Donta, Conrad Donta, the estates of Essie Donta and
William Donta, and the Essie Donta and William Donta Trust of October 21, 1991,
by Jack Donta as trustee. Donald asked for a declaration that the trust created in
1987 was irrevocable, and for restoration to him of the trust assets. He noted that
in the 1987 Agreement for the benefit of Conrad, Donald was named trustee and
was conveyed three parcels of land. Donald asserted that the grantors did not
reserve the power to modify or revoke the trust. He alleged that Jack Donta
“through misrepresentations, undue influence and duress or other actions” induced
-7- Essie and William Donta to attempt to revoke the trust and enter into a new trust
agreement. Record, Case No. 99-CI-00485 at 5. Donald also claimed Jack Donta,
as the purported successor trustee, wrongfully took possession of the trust assets
and failed or refused to account for the assets.
Following limited discovery, on October 5, 2000, Donald moved for
partial summary judgment on the basis that the trust was not revocable as a matter
of law when the grantors did not provide for revocation in the Agreement. The
defendants responded that summary judgment was not appropriate as there were
issues of fact as to whether the grantors had intended for the Agreement to be
amended or revoked, and whether such authority was omitted from the Agreement.
They also emphasized that the purpose of the trust was never altered, and the only
changes to the initial document were to change the trustee and to add beneficiaries
who were omitted. On September 22, 2003, the court denied the motion for
summary judgment.
On November 18, 2003, the court granted Donald’s counsel’s motion
to withdraw and gave Donald twenty days to obtain new counsel. On June 15,
2004, the defendants moved for dismissal given that Donald had not hired new
counsel and had not acted to advance the case. They noted that the estates of Essie
and William Donta had been closed almost four years earlier. On June 30, 2004,
-8- the court ordered the action dismissed with prejudice and stricken from the docket.
No appeal was taken.
4. Adversary Proceeding regarding Sale of Property in Case No. 21-
CI-00131, Boyd Circuit Court
In response to the January 27, 2021, order granting the sale of a
portion of the trust property by the Boyd District Court in Case No. 97-H-00049-
001, Donald filed an adversary proceeding pursuant to KRS 389A.010(4) against
the beneficiaries of the trust (appellees herein) in the Boyd Circuit Court on
February 25, 2021. Donald alleged he acquired ownership of the real property
conveyed by deed to him as trustee in 1987, and the trial court erred in authorizing
Robert Donta, acting as limited conservator, to sell a portion of the property. He
additionally asserted the sale could not proceed because he held a lien against the
property to secure payment of expenses incurred by Donald in maintaining
Conrad’s residence for the benefit of the trust. The defendants answered that
Donald had been removed as trustee in 1991, and filed a counterclaim against him
for slander of title and breach of fiduciary duties, in using the trust real estate,
including oil and gas royalties obtained therefrom, for his own personal benefit.
The defendants, except for Kenneth Donta, filed a motion for partial
summary judgment on June 18, 2021. They claimed there was no issue of material
fact with respect to the real property in the trust because the property was deeded
-9- to the trust and not to Donald personally. Thus, Jack had authority to transfer the
property as the successor trustee. They further noted that all proper procedures
were followed for the Boyd District Court’s approval of the sale under KRS
389A.010. They also argued that Donald had not legally obtained a materialman’s
or other statutory lien on the property as a matter of law.
Donald filed a response arguing that discovery was required and
alleging res judicata as to the counterclaim, acknowledging the previous lawsuit
between the parties. The defendants, except for Kenneth Donta, replied that the
issues regarding the trustee, ownership of the Donta farm, and the failure of
Donald’s lien claim to comply with applicable law did not require discovery. They
alleged that Donald was only seeking to delay since there was no legal basis to
prevent the sale of a portion of the farm property. The defendants also raised res
judicata arguments regarding Case No. 99-CI-00485 in which Donald’s complaint
was dismissed with prejudice, and noted that the Boyd Circuit Court could take
judicial notice of its previous orders.
On September 22, 2021, the Court granted partial summary judgment.
The court considered Donald’s arguments that he was the owner of the property as
a result of the deed, but found:
It is clear to the Court from review of the deed that the deed was to the trust through its then Trustee Mr. Donald Donta. Mr. Donald Donta acquired no interest in and of the property to himself from this transfer. The Trust is
-10- and remains the owner of the property. Any claim by Donald Donta to ownership in the property individually is denied and dismissed.
Record, Case No. 21-CI-00131 at 106. Next, the court concluded that the original
trust Agreement was not irrevocable, and the grantors did not preclude or limit
amendment or modification of the Agreement. The Court found that the Amended
Agreement was valid and clearly substituted Jack for Donald as trustee.
Additionally, the court concluded that Donald was collaterally estopped from
challenging the amendment since the court dismissed his earlier challenge in 2004,
with prejudice. Finally, the court found that the lien claim asserted by Donald
against the property did not qualify as a mechanic’s, materialman’s or other
statutory lien, and the Agreement did not allow for fees to be paid to the trustee for
services rendered. The court ordered the lien filed by Donald dissolved.
The circuit court stated that since no genuine issue of material fact
remained as to the arguments Donald raised for setting aside the sale, the order of
the Boyd District Court was affirmed. The court dismissed the complaint with
prejudice. Finally, the court scheduled a hearing for the issues remaining on the
defendants’ counterclaim.
Donald filed a Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 59.05 motion
to alter, amend, or vacate the court’s order, arguing Kentucky law requires the
grantors of a trust to specifically reserve a right to amend the trust, which they
-11- failed to do. He argued that no judgment or order on the merits was entered in
Case No. 99-CI-00485, for it to have had preclusive effect as res judicata. In
addition, he argued that the court should have recognized that he had an equitable
lien, which had attached upon his advancement of monies for the improvement of
the real estate. On October 22, 2021, the court denied the motion to alter, amend
or vacate.
The defendants filed a Notice to Withdraw Counterclaim on January
27, 2023, which was sustained by the court on February 2, 2023. Defendants then
filed a Motion to Permit the Completion of the Sale on May 5, 2023, arguing that
the time to appeal had run. Donald argued that no final order had previously been
entered. Following a hearing, the court entered an Order on August 16, 2023,
stating that the case was now final and appealable, and that no further claims
remained to be addressed by the court. This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Kentucky Supreme Court has stated our standard of review for
summary judgment on appeal as follows:
Summary judgment should only be granted when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” CR 56.03. “[T]he proper function of summary judgment is to terminate litigation when, as a matter of law, it appears that it would be impossible for the respondent to produce evidence at the trial warranting a judgment in his favor.” Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv.
-12- Ctr, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991). “Because summary judgment does not require findings of fact but only an examination of the record to determine whether material issues of fact exist, we generally review the grant of summary judgment without deference to either the trial court’s assessment of the record or its legal conclusions.” Hammons v. Hammons, 327 S.W.3d 444, 448 (Ky. 2010). Our review therefore is de novo.
Ashland Hosp. Corp. v. Darwin Select Ins. Co., 664 S.W.3d 509, 515-16 (Ky.
2022). And, upon review of questions of law, our review is also de novo.
Blackstone Mining Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 351 S.W.3d 193, 198 (Ky. 2010), as
modified on denial of reh’g (Nov. 23, 2011). This Court has treated the orders on
appeal as a summary judgment, and our review proceeds accordingly.
ANALYSIS
The primary arguments Donald raises on appeal resonate from his
being named as trustee by his parents in the 1987 Agreement for the benefit of his
brother Conrad. He argues that the 1987 deed to the trust, executed simultaneously
therewith by his parents, regarding the real property at issue in this appeal,
transferred to him personally superior title to the property. And this superior title
was not affected by the Amended Agreement and his removal as trustee in 1991 or
the appointment of a limited conservator for Conrad by the district court in 1997.
However, the circuit court did not reach the merits of these issues in
the court’s disposition of Case No. 99-CI-00485 in 2004, which collaterally
-13- estopped Donald from challenging the amendment of the trust and his removal as
trustee. In the court’s September 22, 2021, order, the court held as follows:
Donald Donta filed an action in the Boyd Circuit Court, 99-CI-00485 specifically challenging the ability of the Settlors to amend the trust and change the trustee. The original Complaint in that action asked that the trust be found to be irrevocable, (and implicitly not amendable) and sought return of the assets which have been transferred away from him as trustee. The action was ultimately dismissed by the Boyd Circuit Court with prejudice on June 30, 2004. Therefore, the Plaintiff is now collaterally estopped by virtue of that action from challenging again the appropriateness of the amendment and modification made to the trust in October of 1991 within this action. . . .
Record, Case No. 21-CI-00131 at 106-07. Donald argues that the circuit court
erred in this ruling because the earlier action was not litigated on the merits to a
final judgment. We disagree.
The doctrine of res judicata precludes the litigation of repetitive
actions. Hashemian v. Louisville Reg’l Airport Auth., 493 S.W.3d 843, 845 (Ky.
App. 2016). The doctrine has two components – claim preclusion and issue
preclusion. Hashemian, 493 S.W.3d at 845; Miller v. Admin. Office of Courts, 361
S.W.3d 867, 871 (Ky. 2011).5 Resolution of this appeal centers upon the former
component – claim preclusion. Claim preclusion generally bars a party from
5 The term res judicata is sometimes referred to as claim preclusion. However, in this Opinion, we use the term res judicata as a doctrine that includes both claim preclusion and issue preclusion. Miller v. Admin. Office of Courts, 361 S.W.3d 867, 871 (Ky. 2011).
-14- relitigating a previously adjudicated cause of action. To operate as a bar to
subsequent litigation, claim preclusion requires: (1) identity of parties, (2) identity
of the causes of action, and (3) resolution of the previous cause of action on the
merits. Hashemian, 493 S.W.3d at 845. “Claim preclusion, a subpart of res
judicata, ‘bars a party from re-litigating a previously adjudicated cause of action
and entirely bars a new lawsuit on the same cause of action.’” Hashemian, 493
S.W.3d at 845 (quoting Harrod v. Irvine, 283 S.W.3d 246, 250 (Ky. App. 2009)).
As previously discussed, in 1999, Donald filed a declaratory judgment
action (Case No. 99-CI-00485) in the circuit court challenging whether the
Agreement could be amended or revoked, including his removal as the trustee for
the trust created to benefit Conrad. These are the same parties and cause of action
in this action now on appeal. The declaratory judgment action was dismissed in
2004 when Donald failed to obey a court order to obtain counsel and move the case
forward. He argues this was not a dismissal on the merits. Again, we disagree.
When the 1999 declaratory judgment action was dismissed with
prejudice for failure to move the case forward, it was dismissed as a result of a
motion by the defendants rather than court “housekeeping” under CR 77.02(2).
The defendants’ motion was pursuant to CR 41.02, although neither the motion nor
the court’s order cited the Rule. CR 41.02 states in pertinent part:
(1) For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of the court, a defendant
-15- may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him.
....
(3) Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this Rule, . . . operates as an adjudication upon the merits.
The Boyd Circuit Court did not otherwise specify, and so the dismissal of the
action on the defendants’ motion operated as an adjudication on the merits under
CR 41.02(3); see Polk v. Wimsatt, 689 S.W.2d 363, 364 (Ky. App. 1985). Donald
did not move to alter, amend or vacate the trial court’s order, nor did he appeal it.
Accordingly, Donald is estopped in this appeal from asserting any
rights or claims as trustee under the Agreement. Donald was removed as trustee by
the Amended Agreement and similarly, any rights or duties he acquired as trustee
under the 1987 deed were also extinguished. Additionally, we would note that
even if the 2004 judgment did not bar Donald’s claims as asserted in the 2021
action, the doctrine of laches would.
The doctrine of laches is generally an equitable doctrine that bars a
claim where a party engages in unreasonable delay that is prejudicial. Wiggington
v. Commonwealth, ex rel. Caldwell, 760 S.W.2d 885, 887 (Ky. App. 1988). More
specifically, our Supreme Court has recognized:
‘Laches’ in its general definition is laxness; an unreasonable delay in asserting a right. In its legal significance, it is not merely delay, but delay that results
-16- in injury or works a disadvantage to the adverse party. Thus there are two elements to be considered. As to what is unreasonable delay is a question always dependent on the facts in the particular case. Where the resulting harm or disadvantage is great, a relative brief period of delay may constitute a defense while a similar period under other circumstances may not. What is the equity of the case is the controlling question. Courts of chancery will not become active except on the call of conscience, good faith, and reasonable diligence. The doctrine of laches is, in part, based on the injustice that might or will result from the enforcement of a neglected right.
Plaza Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Wellington Corp., 920 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Ky. 1996)
(quoting Denison v. McCann, 197 S.W.2d 248, 249 (Ky. 1946)).
In this case, Donald waited over seventeen years from the dismissal of
his 1999 action in 2004 to reassert his alleged claims as trustee under the 1987
Agreement. During that time period, Jack served as trustee under the Amended
Agreement and Robert had performed his duties as limited conservator for Conrad.
Both served the needs of Conrad in accordance with the court orders and the
wishes of Conrad’s parents. The purpose of the trust was to serve Conrad’s needs,
not to benefit Donald. And Donald failed to demonstrate how this delay benefited
Conrad. Such a lengthy delay in exercising alleged rights under a trust instrument
cannot be condoned by the courts nor will we do so in this case.
Our ruling on the trust issues disposes of all of Donald’s arguments on
appeal except his equitable lien claim. This argument looks to the denial of his
-17- equitable lien claim against the subject real property held in trust for Conrad. In
his complaint Donald asserted that he:
[P]ersonally expended his personal funds for the upkeep and support of the subject real estate . . . which expense Donald Donta was not obligated to spend, but expended for the benefit and happiness of Conrad Donta, and all for which Donald Donta claims an interest in the subject property, pursuant to applicable law[.] . . .
Record, Case No. 21-CI-00131 at 19. Before filing this action, Donald recorded
his lien claim for $250,000 in the Boyd County Clerk’s office in June of 2020 for
labor, services and materials rendered for the period of August of 1987 through
May of 2020. Record at 90. Donald had not previously sought to enforce a lien
claim against the property until the filing of his adversary complaint in February of
2021, which was the premise for appellees’ counterclaim below.
Equitable liens in Kentucky have been recognized to be created in two
different instances, as follows:
Such a lien arises either from a written contract which shows an intention to charge some particular property with a debt or obligation, or is implied and declared by a court of equity out of general considerations of right and justice as applied to the relations of the parties and the circumstances of their dealings. . . .
Gabbard v. Watkins, 133 S.W.2d 54, 57 (Ky. 1939) (citation omitted); see also
New Tech Mining, Inc. v. THC Kentucky Coal Venture I, LLC, 492 S.W.3d 895,
901 (Ky. App. 2016). Neither situation applies here. There was no written
-18- contract with the trust or its beneficiaries and Donald has failed to establish any
special circumstances that would justify him being reimbursed for expenses he
voluntarily paid, especially after being removed as trustee in 1991. And, as the
circuit court correctly pointed out, he seeks payment of monies from the trust or
against trust property that he had not previously obtained approval for from the
court. This Court is not aware of any statutory basis which would support a claim
against the real property in the trust based on the facts of this case. Accordingly,
the circuit court did not err in denying the claim and dissolving Donald’s lien filed
in the Boyd County Clerk’s office.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the orders of the Boyd Circuit
Court granting summary judgment to appellees and dismissing the complaint
below.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS: BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Robert W. Miller Robert T. Renfroe Grayson, Kentucky R. Stephen McGinnis Greenup, Kentucky
-19-