Donald Davis v. American Casualty Company of Reading PA

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-26-00005-CV

DONALD DAVIS, APPELLANT

V.

AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF READING PA, APPELLEE

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1 Potter County, Texas

Trial Court No. 113038-1-CV, Honorable Walton Weaver, Presiding

August 26, 2026

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before PARKER, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

Donald Davis, appellant, proceeding pro se, appeals an order from the trial court granting the plea to the jurisdiction filed by American Casualty Company of Reading, PA, appellee (“ACC”). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

This case arises from a compensable work-related injury Davis sustained in 2003.

Davis filed for and received workers’ compensation benefits from ACC. Around 2008,

Davis disputed the amount of his temporary income benefits, asserting that ACC had underpaid him. He initiated administrative proceedings to resolve the issue at the Texas Department of Insurance, Division of Workers’ Compensation. The Division issued a decision in which it determined Davis’ benefit rate for the contested period of April 14, 2003, through October 3, 2004. Davis then sought judicial review in district court. ACC filed a plea to the jurisdiction, which the trial court denied. When ACC appealed that order to this Court, we determined that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the suit. See Davis v. Am. Cas. Co., 408 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2012, pet. denied). The Texas Supreme Court denied Davis’ petition for review and mandate issued on November 2, 2012. Davis’ remedy of appeal was then exhausted and the judgment was final. See TEX. R. APP. P. 51.1(b) (“When the trial court clerk receives the mandate, the appellate court’s judgment must be enforced.”).

In 2025, Davis initiated a new proceeding with the Division, again seeking a decision as to the appropriate temporary income benefit rate for the period of April 20, 2003, through September 28, 2004. On April 17, 2025, the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) held a hearing on that issue and the related issue of whether the Division had jurisdiction to determine the rate. The ALJ concluded that the Division did not have jurisdiction. After the ALJ’s decision became final, Davis filed this lawsuit for judicial review on July 25, 2025. In October of 2025, Davis filed a motion for summary judgment. On October 27, 2025, the trial court signed a notice of hearing setting Davis’ motion for hearing by submission on November 25, 2025. ACC filed a response to Davis’ motion, in which it also asserted a plea to the jurisdiction contending that Davis’ claims were moot, on November 17.

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The trial court considered the pleadings by submission on November 25. On December 2, 2025, it denied Davis’ motion for summary judgment and granted ACC’s plea to the jurisdiction. Davis filed a motion for new trial, which was overruled by operation of law. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

In his sole issue on appeal, Davis asserts that the trial court violated his due process rights when it heard and granted ACC’s plea to the jurisdiction without providing him an opportunity to respond. 1

A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea that challenges the existence of subject matter jurisdiction, i.e., the court’s power to adjudicate a case. Suarez v. City of Texas City, 465 S.W.3d 623, 632 (Tex. 2015). Whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold matter that a court may address on its own motion and at any time. See Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993); see also City of Houston v. Harris, 192 S.W.3d 167, 175–76 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (recognizing there is no notice of hearing requirement for plea to jurisdiction). The trial court was authorized to grant the plea and dismiss the case without Davis’ participation. See Kimmell v. Cooper, No. 03-01-00333-CV, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 1381, at *5–6 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 22, 2002, no pet.) (concluding trial court’s dismissal for want of jurisdiction without notice to defendant was permissible); see also Vernco Constr., Inc. v. Nelson, 460 S.W.3d 145, 149 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam) (court can

1 Davis is currently confined at the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and requested to participate in all hearings by telephone or videoconference.

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rule on jurisdictional plea by submission or after evidentiary hearing). A response from Davis would not have altered the question before the court, which was whether Davis had alleged facts and causes of action that conferred jurisdiction on the court. See Martinez v. State, No. 13-10-00076-CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 1809, at *6–7 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Mar. 10, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding service of jurisdictional plea and hearing notice is unnecessary when trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction at issue).

Thus, the relevant inquiry for this Court is whether the trial court had jurisdiction over Davis’ claims against ACC and, accordingly, whether the plea to the jurisdiction was properly granted. Because the issue of mootness implicates subject matter jurisdiction, it may be raised in a plea to the jurisdiction. See, e.g., Buzbee v. Clear Channel Outdoor, LLC, 616 S.W.3d 14, 22 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.). A case becomes moot if a live controversy ceases to exist, if the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome, or if the trial court’s actions cannot affect the parties’ rights. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Jones, 1 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Tex. 1999).

As the plaintiff, Davis had the burden to establish the trial court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter of his case. See Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tex. 2012). In his original petition, Davis acknowledged that the Division determined it did not have jurisdiction because a final decision had been made on Davis’ claim. Davis attached the Division’s decision, which recited that Davis “previously litigated his temporary income benefit rate from April 14, 2003, through October 3, 2004, through dispute resolution with the Division. [Davis] appealed his dispute to the District Court in Potter County, Texas.” We take judicial notice that on January 27, 2012, this Court issued an opinion in the appeal from Davis’ case in district court, in which we ordered dismissal

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of the case for lack of jurisdiction. 2 See Davis, 408 S.W.3d at 7. We further take judicial notice that mandate issued on November 2, 2012.

It is apparent from the pleadings that Davis previously litigated his temporary income benefit rate. The issue presented in Davis’ current case, i.e., the appropriate temporary income benefit rate from April 20, 2003, through September 28, 2004, is the same as that presented in the prior proceeding. See id. Upon the issuance of this Court’s mandate, the prior judgment was made final for all purposes, and there is no longer a live controversy between the parties.

In the absence of a live controversy, the case is moot. Jones, 1 S.W.3d at 86. We conclude that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case and properly granted ACC’s plea to the jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s order granting ACC’s plea to the jurisdiction and dismissing the case.

Judy C. Parker

Chief Justice

2 ACC provided numerous exhibits in support of its plea to the jurisdiction, but the exhibits are not authenticated.