Donald Davidson v. State of Arkansas
This text of Donald Davidson v. State of Arkansas (Donald Davidson v. State of Arkansas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 295 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION II No. CR-25-391
Opinion Delivered May 13, 2026
DONALD DAVIDSON APPEAL FROM THE HOT SPRING APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 30CR-23-175] V. HONORABLE STEPHEN L. SHIRRON, JUDGE STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE AFFIRMED; REMANDED FOR CORRECTION OF SENTENCING ORDER
BART F. VIRDEN, Judge
A Hot Spring County jury convicted appellant Donald Davidson of one count of
second-degree sexual assault and three counts of rape. He was sentenced as a habitual
offender to an aggregate term of eighty-five years’ imprisonment. On appeal, he challenges
the sufficiency of the evidence as to each of the rape convictions. 1 We affirm but remand for
correction of the sentencing order to reflect Davidson’s habitual-offender status.
I. Background
1 Davidson does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for second-degree sexual assault. Only a brief recitation of the testimony from Davidson’s trial is necessary because his
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is not preserved. In June 2023, MV1 was arrested
following a physical and verbal altercation with Davidson. While in custody, MV1 disclosed
to law enforcement that Davidson had sexually abused him as a child. Lieutenant Glen Pye
with the Hot Spring County Sheriff’s Department testified that his investigation into MV1’s
allegations revealed other possible victims.
On October 11, 2023, the State charged Davidson with committing rape2 and sexual
assault as to MV1 between 1990 and 2001 when he was under the age of fourteen; rape and
sexual assault as to MV2 between 1989 and 2001 when she was under the age of fourteen;
and rape as to MV3 between 2008 and 2011 when she was under the age of fourteen.
The testimony at trial revealed that MV1 and MV2, now adults, are the much younger
siblings of Davidson’s wife, Kathy. Lillian Kennerly, Kathy, MV1, and MV2’s mother, lived
next door to Davidson and permitted Davidson and Kathy to babysit MV1 and MV2 when
they were very young. Even after MV1 and MV2 told Kennerly that Davidson was abusing
them, Kennerly continued to allow Davidson to have access to MV1 and MV2 because she
said that she did not want to “break up” her family.
2 A person commits rape if he or she engages in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual activity with another person who is less than fourteen years of age. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14- 103(a)(3)(A) (1987 & Repl. 2006). “Deviate sexual activity” means any act of sexual gratification involving the penetration, however slight, of the anus or mouth of a person by the penis of another person; or the penetration, however slight, of the labia majora or anus of a person by any body member or foreign instrument manipulated by another person. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-101(1)(A) (1987 & Repl. 2006).
2 MV1 and MV2 testified that Davidson, their brother-in-law, would take each of them
on drives and allowed them to sit on his lap and steer the vehicle while he fondled their
genitalia. They also testified that Davidson played hide-and-seek with both of them and that,
when he would find one of them, he would perform oral sex on that child. MV1 further
testified that, as a teenager, Davidson performed oral sex on him and, on one occasion,
sedated him and digitally penetrated his anus. MV3, Davidson’s niece—now an adult—
testified that she was childhood friends with Davidson’s daughter, Ariel, and often spent the
night with her. MV3 said that Ariel preferred to sleep in the bed with Davidson and Kathy,
so MV3 slept there as well. MV3 testified that on one occasion, she awoke in the middle of
the night to find Davidson wetting his fingers and then touching her vagina.
The State also presented testimony from three witnesses, who were adults at the time
of trial, that Davidson touched them inappropriately when they were prepubescent children
and that the abuse often occurred during drives or while Davidson was playing with them.
The State then rested. Defense counsel moved for dismissal and directed verdict, which were
denied, except with respect to one count of second-degree sexual assault as to MV2.
Davidson called Ariel and Kathy to testify on his behalf. They disputed much of what
the State’s witnesses had said. Defense counsel then renewed his motions for dismissal and
directed verdict, and they were again denied. The jury returned a guilty verdict, and Davidson
was sentenced to imprisonment: twenty-five years for the rape of MV1; ten years for the
second-degree sexual assault of MV1; twenty-five years for the rape of MV2; and twenty-five
3 years for the rape of MV3. Davidson brings this appeal, challenging only the rape
convictions.
II. Discussion
On appeal, Davidson argues that MV1, MV2, and MV3 were not credible witnesses;
however, Davidson did not raise this argument in his directed-verdict motions below. A
motion for directed verdict is treated as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.
Herrington v. State, 2025 Ark. App. 316, 717 S.W.3d 536. A directed-verdict motion shall
state the specific grounds therefor. Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1(a). The failure of a defendant to
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence at the times and in the manner required will
constitute a waiver of any question pertaining to the sufficiency of the evidence to support
the verdict or judgment. Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1(c). Moreover, a party cannot enlarge or change
the grounds for an objection or motion on appeal but is bound by the scope and nature of
the arguments made at trial. Weir v. State, 2023 Ark. App. 368, 675 S.W.3d 430.
In his directed-verdict motions at trial with respect to MV1 and MV3, defense counsel
said that neither victim had been penetrated “in any way, shape, or form.” As for MV2,
defense counsel moved to dismiss the rape charge on ex post facto grounds. Davidson has
clearly changed the grounds for his sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge and now points to
the credibility of the victims; however, arguments not raised at trial will not be addressed for
the first time on appeal. See King v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 309.
Even if we were to consider Davidson’s argument that MV1, MV2, and MV3 were
not credible witnesses, Davidson would not prevail. We will affirm a conviction if there is
4 substantial evidence to support it. Herrington, supra. When reviewing a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State,
considering only the evidence that supports the guilty verdict. Id. Witness credibility is an
issue for the fact-finder. Roberts v. State, 2024 Ark. App. 143, 686 S.W.3d 69.
Davidson asserts that MV1 and MV3 were not credible because of inconsistencies in
their testimony. According to Davidson, MV1’s testimony was contradicted by MV2 in that
MV1 suggested that he and MV2 were together when they were abused, but MV2 clearly
testified that MV1 was not present when she was touched inappropriately. As for MV3,
Davidson argues that her testimony cannot be believed because she continued to come to
his home and stay the night in his bed after he allegedly raped her. Also, he asserts that
MV3’s testimony is contradicted by the testimony of Kathy and Ariel.
MV1, MV2, and MV3 testified in great detail to deviate sexual activity perpetrated on
them by Davidson. It is well established that the uncorroborated testimony of the victim
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