Donald Carter v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: June 3, 2016
• Docket: 47A01-1602-CR-247
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), Jun 03 2016, 6:34 am this Memorandum Decision shall not be CLERK regarded as precedent or cited before any Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals court except for the purpose of establishing and Tax Court

the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Donald Carter Gregory F. Zoeller Correctional Industrial Facility Attorney General of Indiana Pendleton, Indiana Angela N. Sanchez Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Donald Carter, June 3, 2016 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 47A01-1602-CR-247 v. Appeal from the Lawrence Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable William G. Sleva, Appellee-Plaintiff Judge Trial Court Cause No. 47D02-1012-FB-1396

Crone, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 47A01-1602-CR-247 | June 3, 2016 Page 1 of 4 Case Summary [1] Donald Carter, pro se, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct

erroneous sentence. The sole restated issue presented for our review is whether

the trial court abused its discretion in denying Carter’s motion. Finding no

abuse of discretion, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History [2] On May 5, 2011, Carter pled guilty to class B felony dealing in

methamphetamine. The trial court sentenced Carter to the Department of

Correction for a term of twelve years. The court awarded him 224 credit days

for time already served. In October 2014, Carter filed a motion for jail time

credit, which was denied by the trial court. In April 2015, Carter filed a second

motion for jail time credit, which was also denied by the trial court. 1

[3] On December 21, 2015, Carter filed a motion to correct erroneous sentence.

Carter alleged that he was entitled to 381 days of credit time rather than the 224

days awarded him by the trial court. The State filed an objection to the motion

and, on January 7, 2016, the trial court denied Carter’s motion. This appeal

ensued.

1 Carter initiated an appeal of that order; however, we dismissed the appeal with prejudice.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 47A01-1602-CR-247 | June 3, 2016 Page 2 of 4 Discussion and Decision [4] Carter’s motion to correct erroneous sentence was filed pursuant to Indiana

Code Section 35-38-1-15, which provides:

If the convicted person is erroneously sentenced, the mistake does not render the sentence void. The sentence shall be corrected after written notice is given to the convicted person. The convicted person and his counsel must be present when the corrected sentence is ordered. A motion to correct sentence must be in writing and supported by a memorandum of law specifically pointing out the defect in the original sentence.

The purpose of this statute “is to provide prompt, direct access to an

uncomplicated legal process for correcting the occasional erroneous or illegal

sentence.” Robinson v. State, 805 N.E.2d 783, 785 (Ind. 2004). A motion to

correct erroneous sentence is appropriate only when the sentencing error is

“clear from the face of the judgment imposing the sentence in light of the

statutory authority. Claims that require consideration of the proceedings

before, during, or after trial may not be presented by way of a motion to correct

sentence.” Id. at 787. Sentencing claims that are not facially apparent “may be

raised on direct appeal and, where appropriate, by post-conviction

proceedings.” Id. “Use of the statutory motion to correct sentence should thus

be narrowly confined to claims apparent from the face of the sentencing

judgment, and the ‘facially erroneous’ prerequisite should … be strictly

applied….” Id.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 47A01-1602-CR-247 | June 3, 2016 Page 3 of 4 [5] We review a trial court’s decision on a motion to correct erroneous sentence

only for an abuse of discretion. Fry v. State, 939 N.E.2d 687, 689 (Ind. Ct. App.

2010). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is against

the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Id.

[6] Here, Carter has not included a copy of the trial court’s sentencing order or

judgment of conviction in the record on appeal. However, we can discern from

the chronological case summary that he was sentenced to twelve years executed

for his class B felony conviction, and was awarded 224 credit days for time

served. Carter’s sole claim is that he is actually entitled to 381 credit days for

time served and that his plea agreement provided for an erroneous calculation

of time. However, evaluation of this assertion clearly requires consideration of

information beyond the mere face of the sentencing judgment. Therefore, a

motion to correct erroneous sentence is an improper vehicle for Carter’s claim.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Carter’s motion.

[7] Affirmed.

Najam, J., and Robb, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 47A01-1602-CR-247 | June 3, 2016 Page 4 of 4