In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-25-00298-CV ___________________________
DONALD BRITTON, Appellant
V.
RIAD ALMASRI, KHALID A. AZZOUZ, FORT WORTH DENTAL INSTITUTE, PLLC, AND FAST NEW SMILES OF FORT WORTH, LLC, Appellees
On Appeal from the 348th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 348-344232-23
Before Kerr, Womack, and Walker, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Walker MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. INTRODUCTION
Appellant Donald Britton, acting pro se, filed a health care liability suit against
Appellees Riad Almasri, Khalid A. Azzouz, Fort Worth Dental Institute PLLC, and
Fast New Smiles of Fort Worth LLC, alleging that he had sustained injuries from their
dental malpractice. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.001(13).
Almasri and Azzouz moved to dismiss Britton’s claims against them, asserting
that he had failed to comply with Chapter 74 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code. See id. § 74.351 (requiring claimant to serve an expert report on all parties (or
their attorneys) not later than the 120th day after the original answer is filed). The
trial court granted their motion and dismissed Britton’s claims against them.
Britton moved for a jury trial on his claims against Fort Worth Dental Institute
and Fast New Smiles of Fort Worth (the entities). However, the trial court discovered
that Britton had not requested citation for his claims against them and twice ordered
him to request citation, warning that his failure to effectuate service would result in
the dismissal of his remaining claims for want of prosecution. Britton moved to
recuse the trial court judge, alleging that she had “engaged in harassment, intimidation
and threats” by ordering him to request citation. Despite the trial court’s orders and
warnings, Britton did not request citation, and the trial court dismissed his claims
against the entities. Britton filed this appeal.
2 In twelve issues—which we have consolidated into three groups—he
complains of the trial court’s (1) dismissal of his claims against Almasri and Azzouz,
(2) dismissal of his claims against the entities, and (3) alleged mistreatment of him.
Because Britton failed to serve an expert report on Almasri and Azzouz and failed to
request citation for his claims against the entities, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by dismissing his claims. Because his accusation of mistreatment by the
trial court is inadequately briefed—to a degree that cannot be interpreted away by a
liberal construction—nothing is presented for our review. We will affirm.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On August 4, 2023, Britton filed his “Petition for Damages” against Almasri,
Azzouz, and the entities for their allegedly defective dental work.1 Twelve exhibits
were attached to his petition, including his dental records—Exhibit L—from another
dental office. Britton requested citation for his claims against Almasri and Azzouz,
but he did not request citation for his claims against the entities.
On October 6, 2023, Almasri and Azzouz timely filed their answers and
complained of Britton’s lack of compliance with Chapter 74 of the Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code—requiring Britton to provide them with written notice
at least sixty days before he filed the suit and to include an authorization form for the
1 Britton’s petition alleged “breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, financial exploitation of Elderly (Texas Penal Code 32.53 (a)(2)[(,] malpractice, violation of dentist ethic and code of conduct, theft, deceptive practices, extortion and punitive damages.”
3 release of his protected health information. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.
§ 74.051. Because Britton did not provide advanced notice and did not include an
authorization form, Almasri and Azzouz moved to abate the case. On January 5,
2024, following a hearing,2 the trial court granted their motion and abated the case for
sixty days to allow Britton to comply with Chapter 74.
On March 25, 2024, Almasri and Azzouz moved, pursuant to Section 74.351 of
the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, to dismiss Britton’s claims against them.
See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351. Section 74.351 required Britton to
serve—within 120 days—on Almasri and Azzouz an expert report describing (1) the
applicable standard of care, (2) how their actions failed to meet that standard, and
(3) the causal relationship between that failure and the damages claimed. See id
§ 74.351(a), (r)(6). Britton did not respond to Almasri and Azzouz’s motion to
dismiss, but instead, he moved for summary judgment on his claims against them.
On May 2, 2024, the trial court heard Almasri and Azzouz’s motion to dismiss
and Britton’s motion for summary judgment. With respect to the motion to dismiss,
Britton argued that Exhibit L was an expert report and “was submitted along with the
petition itself.” Almasri and Azzouz countered that Britton had actually submitted
2 At the abatement hearing, Britton attempted to urge a motion for summary judgment. However, the trial court explained that his motion was not before the trial court and that opposing counsel had not received notice of the motion. In our review of the clerk’s record, Britton had not filed a motion for summary judgment prior to the abatement hearing.
4 “medical records with no opinion, no C.V.” and that Exhibit L was not an expert
report. The trial court agreed with Almasri and Azzouz and found that Exhibit L
“look[ed] like medical records” and was “not the required Chapter 74 expert report.”
Following its finding that Britton had not served an expert report on Almasri and
Azzouz, the trial court signed an order dismissing Britton’s claims against them.3
After the trial court dismissed his claims against Almasri and Azzouz, Britton
moved for a trial by jury on his claims against the entities.4 However, Britton had not
requested citation for his claims against them and neither defendant had answered or
appeared at any hearings.
On April 4, 2025, the trial court signed an order regarding proof of service. In
its order, the trial court noted that Britton had not requested and paid for citations to
be issued against the entities, and thus, they had not been properly served. The trial
court ordered Britton to file proof that he had properly served the entities no later
than April 30, 2025, and warned him that if he failed to do so, his claims against them
may be dismissed for want of prosecution.
3 Almasri and Azzouz’s motion to dismiss had requested attorney’s fees, but at the hearing, they elected to waive the request for attorney’s fees. 4 While Britton’s claims against the entities were still pending, he attempted to appeal the trial court’s order dismissing his claims against Almasri and Azzouz, but we dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Britton v. Azzouz, No. 02-24-00206- CV, 2024 WL 3365246, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 11, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.).
5 On April 24, 2025, Britton filed a document titled “Proof of Service.”5 Britton
asserted that he had served the entities three times by sending his petition via certified
mail to their registered agent (Almasri) and attorney (Hazim Mandavia). Britton also
attached various exhibits, including certified mail receipts, emails from the Texas
Secretary of State, and dental records. He did not request citation.
On May 12, 2025, the trial court signed an order noticing dismissal for want of
prosecution. In that order, the trial court addressed Britton’s “Proof of Service.” The
relevant portion of the order reads:
None of these documents, however, establishes that [Britton] has properly served Defendants Fort Worth Dental Institute, PLLC, and Fast New Smiles of Fort Worth. In fact, it does not appear that [Britton] has requested and paid for the Clerk to issue citations to these Defendants in the 21 months this case has been pending. The fact that one of the individual Defendants may be the registered agent for one of the business entities does not relieve [Britton] of his service obligations. The Court further notes that Hazim Mandavia has not filed an appearance on behalf of Fort Worth Dental Institute, PLLC, or Fast New Smiles of Fort Worth in this case. The Court, accordingly, will allow [Britton] one last opportunity to obtain citations from the Clerk and properly serve Fort Worth Dental Institute, PLLC, and Fast New Smiles of Fort Worth with all required documents.
The trial court’s order warned that unless Britton requested citation for his
claims against the entities and provided proof no later than June 13, 2025, his claims
5 On April 14, 2025, Britton filed a motion to recuse the trial court judge. He argued that the trial court judge was prejudiced, biased, and engaged in unethical, illegal, and improper conduct. Those accusations arose from the trial court’s order directing him to request citation.
6 against them would be dismissed for want of prosecution. Despite the trial court’s
orders and warnings, Britton did not request citation.
On June 17, 2025, the trial court signed a final order dismissing Britton’s claims
against the entities. Britton appealed.
III. DISCUSSION
Britton’s brief enumerates twelve issues, but in substance, many of them are
merely restatements or arguments related to his other issues. For ease of discussion,
we have reordered and consolidated Britton’s issues into three groups: (1) dismissal
of his claims against Almasri and Azzouz, (2) dismissal of his claims against the
entities, and (3) accusations of mistreatment by the trial court.6
As a preliminary matter, we note that Britton’s brief is wholly noncompliant
with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1 (setting out
requisites of appellant’s brief). It is devoid of any references to the clerk’s record or
reporter’s record and lacks citations to any legal authority. We could thus decide this
appeal based on the inadequacy of Britton’s briefing, but we instead decide to reach
the merits of his first two issues because we are able to discern what he intended to
6 We first address Britton’s second issue, then his first issue, and finally we address his third through twelfth issues together. See Hockins v. U.S. Certified Contractors, Inc., No. 02-17-00180-CV, 2018 WL 2248487, at *2 n.2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 17, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (addressing appellate issues out of order for ease of discussion); Aero DFW, LP v. Swanson, No. 02-06-00179-CV, 2007 WL 704911, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 8, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) (addressing appellate issues together for ease of discussion).
7 present for our review. The same cannot be said for his third through twelfth issues,
as they are an amalgamation of allegations of mistreatment by the trial court and
unaccompanied by references to the record. These deficiencies prevent us from
discerning the complaints Britton intended to raise for our review or the relief
sought—much less the legal and factual support for his arguments. Consequently, the
severity of his inadequate briefing presents nothing for our review in his third through
twelfth issues.
A. CLAIMS AGAINST ALMASRI AND AZZOUZ
In his second issue, Britton complains that the trial court erred by dismissing
his claims against Almasri and Azzouz because he complied with Chapter 74 of the
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code by serving them “with a doctor’s report as
required.” We disagree.
1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
Chapter 74 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, also known as the
Texas Medical Liability Act, requires health care liability claimants to serve an expert
report upon each defendant not later than 120 days after that defendant’s answer is
filed. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351(a). “Each defendant physician or
health care provider whose conduct is implicated in a report must file and serve any
objection to the sufficiency of the report not later than the later of the 21st day after
the date the report is served or the 21st day after the date the defendant’s answer is
filed.” Id.
8 The Texas Supreme Court has explained that the purpose of the expert report
requirement is to weed out frivolous malpractice claims in the early stages of litigation,
not to dispose of potentially meritorious claims. Am. Transitional Care Ctrs. of Tex. v.
Palacios, 46 S.W.3d 873, 877 (Tex. 2001); see also Loaisiga v. Cerda, 379 S.W.3d 248, 258
(Tex. 2012) (“[Expert report] requirements are meant to identify frivolous claims and
reduce the expense and time to dispose of any that are filed.”). In accordance with
that purpose, the Act provides a mechanism for dismissal of the claimant’s suit in the
event of an untimely or deficient report. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.
§ 74.351(a), (b).
An expert report is sufficient under the Act if it “provides a fair summary of
the expert’s opinions . . . regarding applicable standards of care, the manner in which
the care rendered . . . failed to meet the standards, and the causal relationship between
the failure and the injury.” Id. § 74.351(r)(6). The trial court need only find that the
report constitutes a “good faith effort” to comply with the statutory requirements. Id.
§ 74.351(l); see also Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 878. The Texas Supreme Court has held that
an expert report demonstrates a “good faith effort” when it “(1) inform[s] the
defendant of the specific conduct called into question and (2) provid[es] a basis for
the trial court to conclude the claims have merit.” Baty v. Futrell, 543 S.W.3d 689,
693–94 (Tex. 2018). A report “need not marshal all the claimant’s proof,” but “a
report that merely states the expert’s conclusions about the standard of care, breach,
and causation” is insufficient. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 878–79.
9 We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss based on
the adequacy of an expert report for an abuse of discretion, and in analyzing a report’s
sufficiency under this standard, we consider only the information contained within the
four corners of the report. Id. at 877–78. A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts
without reference to any guiding rules or principles—that is, if its act is arbitrary or
unreasonable. Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. 2007). An appellate court
cannot conclude that a trial court abused its discretion merely because the appellate
court would have ruled differently in the same circumstances. E.I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 558 (Tex. 1995).
2. Britton’s Failure to Serve an Expert Report
Britton contends that he complied with Chapter 74 of the Texas Civil Practice
and Remedies Code by attaching Exhibit L—allegedly his expert report—to his
petition.7 At the hearing on Almasri and Azzouz’s motion to dismiss, Britton made
two arguments in support of this position.
First, he maintained that Exhibit L was an expert report because it “shows the
chief complaint, what [the dentist’s] findings were, his prognosis, [and] his diagnosis.”
Second, he argued that Almasri and Azzouz waived any complaint to his expert report
Britton does not challenge the trial court’s finding that his claims against 7
Almasri and Azzouz are governed by Chapter 74 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.
10 because they did not object to it within twenty-one days. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code Ann. § 74.351(a).
At the hearing, the trial court found that Exhibit L “isn’t a medical expert
report. These are medical records.” We agree with the trial court. Britton’s “expert
report” is no expert report at all; rather, it is merely eight pages of dental records from
a different dentist’s office. Exhibit L does not provide an expert opinion—it is simply
another dentist’s notations, generalized statements, and recitation of facts regarding
that dentist’s subsequent treatment of Britton.
As we discussed above, the report need not marshal all Britton’s proof, but it
must include the expert’s opinion on each of the three elements that the Act
identifies: standard of care, breach, and causal relationship. See Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at
878. “A report cannot merely state the expert’s conclusions about these elements.”
Id. at 879. “[R]ather, the expert must explain the basis of his statements to link his
conclusions to the facts.” Earle v. Ratliff, 998 S.W.2d 882, 890 (Tex. 1999). Here, not
only is there no discussion of the dentist’s opinion on standard of care, breach, and
causal relationship—there is no opinion at all. The dentist proffers no opinion or
conclusion of Almasri’s and Azzouz’s treatment of Britton. Consequently, Britton’s
argument is untenable—how can Exhibit L be an expert report if it does not contain
an opinion or a conclusion?
We thus conclude that Britton’s Exhibit L does not constitute a “good faith
effort” to comply with the statutory requirements in Section 74.351 and that Almasri
11 and Azzouz were not served with an expert report. See Baty, 543 S.W.3d at 693–94.
Having concluded that Almasri and Azzouz were not served with an expert report, we
are unpersuaded by Britton’s second argument of waiver.
Because Britton failed to serve an expert report on Almasri and Azzouz, we
conclude that the trial court’s order dismissing his claims against them was not
arbitrary or unreasonable. See Low, 221 S.W.3d at 614. Accordingly, we hold that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Britton’s claims against Almasri
and Azzouz.
We overrule Britton’s second issue.
B. CLAIMS AGAINST THE ENTITIES
In his first issue, Britton complains that the trial court erred by dismissing his
claims against the entities because he had allegedly served them on multiple occasions.
We disagree.
We review a trial court’s dismissal for want of prosecution for an abuse of
discretion. Ex parte J.C., No. 02-20-00303-CV, 2021 WL 3679238, at *2 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth Aug. 19, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.); Sellers v. Foster, 199 S.W.3d 385, 390
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, no pet.).
“Unless the citation or court order otherwise directs, the citation must be
served by: (1) delivering to the defendant, in person, a copy of the citation, showing
the delivery date, and of the petition; or (2) mailing to the defendant by registered or
12 certified mail, return receipt requested, a copy of the citation and of the petition.”
Tex. R. Civ. P. 106(a).
A trial court derives its authority to dismiss a suit for want of prosecution from
two independent sources: (1) Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 165a and (2) a trial
court’s inherent power to maintain and control its own docket. See Tex. R. Civ. P.
165a; Villarreal v. San Antonio Truck & Equip., 994 S.W.2d 628, 630 (Tex. 1999).
Under Rule 165a, a trial court may dismiss a case based on either the “failure of any
party seeking affirmative relief to appear for any hearing or trial of which the party
had notice” or the case’s failure to be “disposed of within time standards promulgated
by the Supreme Court.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 165a(1), (2). Rule 6 of the Rules of Judicial
Administration provides that civil jury cases must be disposed of within eighteen
months from the appearance date. Tex. R. Jud. Admin. 6.
2. Britton’s Failure to Request Citation
Britton argues that dismissal of his claims against the entities was an abuse of
the trial court’s discretion because he satisfied service of process. We disagree. He
conflates obtaining citation and effectuating service of process.
Britton filed his suit on August 4, 2023, and he was required to request citation
from the clerk and serve a copy of the citation and the petition on the entities. See
Tex. R. Civ. P. 106(a). He failed to do so.
On April 7, 2025, and May 9, 2025, the trial court signed orders directing him
to obtain citation from the clerk for those claims. In spite of the trial court’s orders
13 and warnings, he failed to request citation. Britton was evidently aware of how to
obtain citation—demonstrated by his request for citation on August 4, 2023, for his
claims against Almasri and Azzouz—and the trial court warned him of the
consequence for failing to request citation: dismissal of his claims against the entities.
On June 17, 2025, the trial court signed an order dismissing his claims against
the entities. Twenty-two months had elapsed between Britton’s filing his petition and
the trial court’s signing the dismissal—during which time he chose not to request
citation.8 In light of Rule 165a, the trial court’s repeated orders and warnings, and
Britton’s failure to comply, we conclude that the trial court’s dismissal order was not
arbitrary or unreasonable. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 165a; Low, 221 S.W.3d at 614.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing
Britton’s claims against the entities.
We overrule Britton’s first issue.
C. ACCUSATIONS OF MISTREATMENT BY THE TRIAL COURT
In his third through twelfth issues, Britton levies several far reaching and grave
accusations against the trial court, including “obstruction of justice, coercion,
harassment, racism, and intimidation.” Beyond lodging these accusations, he offers
no citation to the record to support his claims that the trial court engaged in such
Rather than request issuance of citation for his claims against the entities, 8
Britton filed a motion to recuse the trial court judge and a motion alleging “obstruction of justice, coercion, harassment, racism, and intimidation.”
14 mistreatment. Because his brief lacks record references, case law citations, and
substantive legal analysis, Britton presents nothing for our review.
An appellant bears the burden of identifying and explaining how the trial court
erred. Gunderson v. Nat’l Indoor RV, LLC, No. 02-24-00025-CV, 2024 WL 3365233, at
*2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 11, 2024, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). A crucial part of
that burden is the appellant’s responsibility to “present argument that will enable the
[appellate] court to decide the case” by filing a brief that “state[s] . . . the facts . . .
supported by record references” and “contain[s] a clear and concise argument for the
contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.” Tex.
R. App. P. 38.1(g), (i), 38.9; see also Gunderson, 2024 WL 3365233, at *2.
While we construe appellate briefs liberally and attempt to reach the merits of
the dispute whenever reasonably possible, see Tex. R. App. P. 38.9; Horton v. Stovall,
591 S.W.3d 567, 569 (Tex. 2019), absent “appropriate ‘citation[s] to the record[,] . . .
citations for legal references,’ and ‘substantive [legal] analysis,’ a brief is inadequate to
present an issue for our review, and the issue is waived.” Gunderson, 2024 WL
3365233, at *2 (quoting NexPoint Advisors, L.P. v. United Dev. Funding IV, 674 S.W.3d
437, 446 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2023, pets. denied)); see In re Guardianship of
Onyebuchi, No. 02-13-00401-CV, 2014 WL 4463114, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
Sept. 11, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (recognizing that “arguments raised on appeal
15 that are unsupported by analysis or appropriate citation to legal authority and to the
record present nothing for us to review”).
2. Britton’s Inadequate Briefing
Britton fails to support his third issue with any record references. The clerk’s
record and reporter’s record are unreferenced. See Shetty v. Arconic Inc., No. 01-19-
00158-CV, 2020 WL 2026371, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 28, 2020,
no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding issues inadequately briefed when appellant’s “brief
include[d] a recitation of the facts . . . [but] no record references”); Bolling, 315 S.W.3d
at 896 (recognizing that “[i]f record references are not made . . ., the brief fails”).
And the portion dedicated to Britton’s legal argument is likewise problematic
because it does not provide a cogent argument that we can review—it contains no
substantive legal analysis or explanation of why Britton believes that he is entitled to
relief. See Gunderson, 2024 WL 3365233, at *4 (holding issues inadequately briefed
when appellant broadly referenced “textbook law” without citation to legal authority
or substantive legal analysis”).
In fact, there are no case-law citations—zero—anywhere in Britton’s brief. See
id. at *3 (holding issues inadequately briefed when “[t]he four sections of [the
appellant’s] brief . . . dedicate[d] to his four appellate issues lack[ed] any case law
whatsoever”). Instead, Britton appears to assume that this court will fill in the gaps by
sifting through the record, researching the relevant case law, and applying the specific
16 provisions and precedent applicable to his case—presumably with the hope that we
will select the statutes and precedent that benefit him the most.
It is Britton’s burden to discuss his assertions of error, and “we do not and
cannot assume the responsibility of doing [Britton’s] briefing for [him].”9 Id. at *2
(quoting De Los Reyes v. Maris, No. 02-21-00022-CV, 2021 WL 5227179, at *9 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Nov. 10, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.)). We would be “abandon[ing]
our role as a neutral adjudicator” were we to “search[ ] the record for facts . . .
favorable to [a party’s] position,” “do[ ] the legal research that might support [his]
contentions,” and then “resolv[e] the appeal based on the legal arguments we crafted
on [the party’s] behalf.” Id. at *2–4 (internal quotations omitted); Shetty, 2020 WL
2026371, at *2; Bolling, 315 S.W.3d at 895.
Even construing Britton’s brief liberally, we are unable to determine the scope
of alleged mistreatment that he intended to present for our review. See Tex. R. App.
P. 38.1(f); 38.9. We are likewise unable to evaluate his argument because he made no
citations to the record. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). Finally, without citations to legal
authority, Britton also fails to illuminate why he should be entitled to relief. See id.
A pro se litigant is held to the same standards as a licensed attorney and must 9
comply with applicable laws and procedural rules. In re T.H., No. 02-19-00300-CV, 2020 WL 5833624, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 1, 2020, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.); Flores v. Off. Depot, Inc., No. 02-10-00311-CV, 2011 WL 2611140, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 30, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.).
17 Therefore, given the complete absence of substantive legal analysis and record
citations, we conclude that Britton has inadequately briefed issues three through
twelve. Accordingly, such inadequate briefing prevents this court from addressing the
merits of these issues, and we hold that any complaints that Britton intended to raise
in these ten issues are waived. See Gunderson, 2024 WL 3365233, at *4 (holding that
appellant waived all issues due to his “sparse record references, lack of legal citations,
and failure to provide any meaningful analysis of his appellate issues”); Shetty,
2020 WL 2026371, at *2 (holding that appellant “waived any error on appeal” when
brief “include[d] no record references or citation to any legal authority whatsoever”).
We overrule Britton’s third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, nineth, tenth,
eleventh, and twelfth issues.
IV. CONCLUSION
Having overruled Britton’s twelve issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(a).
/s/ Brian Walker
Brian Walker Justice
Delivered: November 6, 2025