Donahue v. Potter

CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedMay 20, 2026
DocketCivil Action No. 2026-1353
StatusPublished

This text of Donahue v. Potter (Donahue v. Potter) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Donahue v. Potter, (D.D.C. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

BLEU BLAZE DONAHUE, ) ) Plaintiff, ) v. ) Civil Action No. 26-1353 (UNA) ) AMY E. POTTER, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on consideration of plaintiff’s application for leave to

proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) and his pro se complaint (ECF No. 1). The Court

GRANTS the application and, for the reasons discussed below, DISMISSES the complaint.

Defendant Potter is a United States Magistrate Judge for the District of Oregon, see

Compl., Attach. (ECF No. 1-1) at 5 (page numbers designated by CM/ECF), and defendant

Aiken is a United States District Judge for the District of Oregon, see id. at 6. It appears that a

civil case assigned to Judge Aiken was referred to Magistrate Judge Potter, see id., who, on

February 24, 2026, “issued a Findings & Recommendation (F&R) . . . recommending that

[p]laintiff’s motion to amend be denied and that the entire case be dismissed with prejudice,” id.

at 7.

“On April 9, 2026, two days after [p]laintiff filed his recusal request, [Judge] Aiken

issued an Order . . . adopting [the] F&R in full and dismissing the case with prejudice.” Id. at 8.

According to plaintiff, Judge Aiken did not rule on the recusal request and declared plaintiff’s

then-pending motions moot. See id. Plaintiff claimed to have suffered violations of rights

protected under the First, Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution, see id.,

loss of liberty, see id. at 9, and psychological, reputational and financial harm, see id. at 9-10. Among other relief, plaintiff has demanded $10 billion from each defendant for compensatory

and punitive damages. See id. at 10.

Plaintiff’s own factual allegations require this Court to dismiss the complaint for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction. “Few doctrines were more solidly established at common law than

the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial

jurisdiction[.]” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553–54 (1967); see Sindram v. Suda, 986 F.2d

1459, 1460 (D. C. Cir.1993). “In determining whether a judge was acting in his judicial capacity,

courts should look to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed

by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his

judicial capacity.” Thomas v. Wilkins, 61 F. Supp. 3d 13, 19 (D.D.C. 2014) (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted), aff’d, No. 14-5197, 2015 WL 1606933 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 23, 2015). The

acts about which plaintiff complains – dismissing a complaint, resolving pending motions,

issuing and adopting an F&R – are acts a judge or magistrate judge normally performs. See

Cannady v. Kyndryl Holdings, Inc., No. 24-cv-3638 (AHA), 2025 WL 2977582, at *3 (D.D.C.

Oct. 22, 2025) (“Issuing bond orders and denying motions are actions routinely performed by

judges.”); Thomas, 61 F. Supp. 3d at 19 (finding that federal district judge “was clearly acting in

his judicial capacity when he refused to file various court documents submitted by Plaintiff,” as

“judge’s decision to file or deny a party’s motions or requests is an action routinely performed by

a judge in the course of litigation, and thus would constitute a judicial act immune from suit”).

Plaintiff acknowledges that the actions described in his complaint “were taken in

[defendants’] official capacities as federal judicial officers,” Compl., Attach. at 6, such that Judge

Aiken and Magistrate Judge Potter both are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from suit. See

Mirales v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (holding that “judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages”); Bailey v. Kay, 296 F. App’x 96, 97 (D.C.

Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of claim for damages against a federal magistrate

judge is barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity).

A separate Order will issue.

DATE: May 18, 2026 /s/ CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER United States District Judge

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Pierson v. Ray
386 U.S. 547 (Supreme Court, 1967)
Mireles v. Waco
502 U.S. 9 (Supreme Court, 1991)
Thomas v. Wilkins
61 F. Supp. 3d 13 (District of Columbia, 2014)
Bailey v. Kay
296 F. App'x 96 (D.C. Circuit, 2008)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Donahue v. Potter, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/donahue-v-potter-dcd-2026.